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ABSTRACT  
The Politics of Crisis Management in Post-1997 Hong Kong: 
A State-society Interactive Framework 
by 
CHAN Hin Yeung 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Most studies and research on crisis management and government crises put their 
focus on advanced, democratic nations, where governments have to bear the 
responsibility of handling of a crisis through elections.  However, relatively little 
attention has been given on the consequences of crises, particularly governance 
crises, in regimes without full democracy.  By using post-1997 Hong Kong, a 
liberal society with limited democracy, as an example, this thesis aims to examine the 
applicability of crisis management theories and models currently available, and to 
introduce an entirely new State-society Interactive Framework
1
 to tackle their 
limitations. 
 
The Five Tasks Leadership Approach suggested by Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 
(2005) and the Pattern of Politicization Approach of Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003), 
which respectively represents the top-down and bottom-up crisis management 
approaches, are selected as the analytical framework.  This thesis begins with an 
application of these two approaches on an analysis of two noticeable crisis cases in 
post-1997 Hong Kong – the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed 
Railway incident.  Based on the results, this research found that the applicability of 
current theories and models derived from previous studies is restrictive in two 
aspects - First, the level of severity of the crises affects the validity of those studies.  
Hence, for the purpose of effective interpretation, only mega-crises are chosen for 
this thesis.  Second, instead of explaining the incident, most of the current theories 
view crises as a clue for fault-finding in the aftermath, with little attention devoted to 
the development process.    
 
Drawing upon different approaches in the field, this thesis has developed a heuristic 
                                                 
1
 A condensed version of this thesis - an article entitled “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: 
How Crises Catalyse Changes under the State-society Interactive Framework” - was published in the 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2013, pp. 200-210. 
Crisis Development Ladder and the State-society Interactive Framework more 
relevant for limited democracies, such as Hong Kong and Mainland China.  The 
Crisis Development Ladder refers to the flow from crisis to governance crisis and 
from governance crisis to change.  At each stage of this process, there are 
interactions between the Crisis Strengthening Forces and Weakening Forces.  By 
focusing on the Catalytic Effect of Crisis that accelerates reforms and changes, this 
research argues that critical crisis is politically influential and decisive in 
authoritarian system with an increasingly proactive civil society.  This research has 
illustrated the deliberation of developing a crisis-driven society as an alternative to 
influence decision-making under non-democratic rule with valid examples.  The 
current result suggests that crises are far beyond unfavourable situations that 
challenge the legitimacy of the government.  More importantly, in the context of 
Hong Kong as well as other non-democratic systems, crises provide opportunities to 
initiate political changes.  The current political institution in Hong Kong makes it 
possible for the government to pay no heed to the wants of the general public.  Thus, 
the cases explored in this thesis show how activists and those who are not involved in 
the decision-making process use crises as a catalyser to impose sufficient political 
influence to the government so as to force a real change under a closed political 
system. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background 
For a long period of time since the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administration Region (HKSAR) in 1997, the general public does not seem to be 
satisfied with the performance of the government, especially on its crisis 
management technique.  This is especially the case in recent years, as a popular 
discourse exists suggesting that there are many crises in Hong Kong.  As scholars, 
politicians, and also members of society, it is of interest to investigate why some 
events would eventually become crises while others would not.  The underlying 
questions would be: Who is responsible for “creating” or generating crises, and why 
different crises may have different outcomes.   
 
The civil society of Hong Kong is rapidly developing.  This is to some extent 
related to (or attributed to) the arising of different crises, among which the “1 July 
2003 Demonstration” would serve as a good example.  The aim of the current 
research is to study how the expanding civil society can influence a crisis and the 
crisis management of the government, with a focus on different stages of a crisis in 
which the public react to government decision/action.  Specifically, an in-depth 
investigation on the extent to which those public reactions influence the next 
decision/action of the government is carried out.  Moreover, since a crisis involves 
different stakeholders, including politicians, media, and pressure groups, the 
stakeholders’ own agenda could affect the whole crisis management process and 
even the outcomes of a crisis.  The effects of these various forces on the 
decision-making process of the government are also thoroughly examined.  
2 
 
1.1.1  Crisis and Crisis Management: An Overview 
Various scholars have attempted to provide a definition for crisis. For example, 
Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007, 11) addressed crisis as “an unfavourable state of 
instability or disequilibrium” and “something demanding for an immediate 
response…… [while] the appropriate response is usually unknown”, whereas 
Robinson (1972) emphasized crisis as an occasion for decision, and Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin (1997, 279) considered it “the necessity to make critical choices”.  
Kouzmin (2008, 159) further provided three prerequisites for a crisis: A triggering 
event that critically destabilizes existing mechanisms of functionality to the point of 
seizure, affects constituency, and requires major redistribution of resources and 
recognition by the authority.  Any happening that merely fulfills one of those three 
requirements should only be identified as an accident, a tragedy, or a disaster instead 
of a crisis.  
 
Crisis management is a new and diversified field with different schools of 
perspectives.  Despite the varying points of view, previous studies mostly agree that 
governments are the ones to take the lead in the crisis management process.  While 
there is no clear definition for the term “crisis management”, government is expected 
to be responsible for managing crisis as crisis is “a situation that threatens 
high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available 
for response before the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the 
decision-making unit by its occurrence” (Hermann 1972, 13).  
 
From a public administration perspective, there are three features of crisis that may 
threaten the normal operation of the bureaucracy: Severe threat, time pressure, and 
high uncertainty ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).  The shock stemming from 
3 
 
crises has the ability to paralyze the daily routine of bureaucrats, and therefore, 
leadership and centralization of decision-making are important.  As such, when 
investigating crisis management, the majority of literature in the field has adopted a 
top-down approach, which emphasizes on the leadership of governments in crises 
(Table 2.1).  In general, the top-down approach focuses on the question of what 
should be done by the government during a crisis. 
 
In contrast, the bottom-up approach focuses on how different non-state actors would 
react, and the effects of their reactions, during a crisis.  This is especially the case 
during election periods, as McConnell and Stark (2002) explained in their study on 
the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease crisis in Britain, which suggested that crises could 
be highly sensitive issues during elections due to the super-sensitivity of the 
government, especially the ruling party, on public opinion.  The bottom-up 
approach also associates crisis with political communication, and in this regard, 
decision-makers could not neglect real politics and should have the deliberate 
intention to explain the situation (Olson 2000).  In the aftermath of crises, 
government officials are often faced with three political questions: 1) What happened? 
2) Why were the responses inadequate? 3) What is going to happen?  These 
questions reflect the significance of crisis communication as a topic for investigation.   
 
Although the field is interdisciplinary in nature, the current research in crisis 
management is restricted by a relatively solid geographical boundary.  A study on 
articles published by the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management (JCCM), 
the only crisis management journal on the list of Social Sciences Citation Index 
4 
 
(SSCI)
2
, found that there is an imbalance in the number of research articles from 
different parts of the world.  As seen from Table 1.1, which shows the number of 
articles that were in print with JCCM from 2008-2012 categorized by case studies 
and authors from different regions, the western world (i.e. America and Europe) has 
dominated both in the number of case studies and authors’ affiliations.  However, it 
is worth noting that even though research on Asia or by scholars affiliated with Asian 
academia are relatively thin, it is not a proof that there is no or very little crisis 
studies in Asia.  Rather, this is to point out that current crisis management theories 
and models are mainly driven by western scholars.  In particular, a liberal 
democracy is often taken for granted when the study of politics of crises is concerned, 
leading to a research gap for such topic in Asia, where full democracy is yet to be 
established in many countries.    
Region Articles: 
Case study 
(N=85) 
Articles: 
Case study 
(percent) 
Authors’ 
affiliation 
(N=85) 
Authors’ affiliation 
(percent) 
America 22.5 26.5 % 25.9 30.5 % 
Europe 44.5 52.35 % 55.1 64.8 % 
Asia 3 3.5 % 1.5 1.8 % 
Oceania 2 2.35 % 2.5 2.9 % 
Others / Not 
Specified 
13 15.3 % 0 0 
Note: The number would be less than one if authors or case studies came from different regions 
Source: Data compiled by the author from the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2008 
– 2012 (Special issues were excluded) 
Table 1.1 Articles published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management (JCCM), 2008-2012 
 
                                                 
2
 Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), is a data base produced by Thomson Reuters accesses to the 
bibliographic and citation information from 3,000 of the world's leading social sciences journals 
across 50 disciplines. For details, please see: 
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/social_sciences_citation_in
dex/ 
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1.1.2  Conceptualization: The Civil Society, State, and Government 
The current thesis involves the development of a “State-society Interactive 
Framework”. As such, this section aims to provide background information, and 
probably a workable “definition”, for both “state” and “civil society”.  In 
contemporary discussion, there is no agreement on the definition of civil society, 
which stems from various origins and varies among different schools of thoughts in 
disciplines as diverse as sociology, political science, and philosophy.  As Fine (1997, 
7) suggested, the question ‘what is civil society?’ has produced various answers.   
 
Fine (1997) pointed out a number of features of civil society, such as free 
associations, social movements, and non-governmental organizations.  However, he 
argued that merely identifying its features is insufficient for understanding what civil 
society is, and thus further suggested a common ground of civil society theory, which 
places civil society “on the side of agency, creativity, activity, productivity, freedom, 
association, life itself” (Fine 1997, 9).   
 
In general, civil society and the state are put on opposite ends by scholars discussing 
the topic.  A civil society exists when individuals and groups are free to form 
organizations that function independently of the state and that can bridge citizens and 
the state (Hann 1996, 1).  In enlightenment thought, civil society is put between the 
poles of private property on the one side and the state on the other (Fine 1997, 16).  
The origin of civil society in Europe, from the perspective of the classical school, 
could be dated back to the Roman Empire, in which the removal of the centralized 
authority of the government placed power in the several set of hands (Hall 1995, 4).  
Hall (1995, 1) further explained that “civil society was seen as the opposite of 
despotism, a space in which social groups could exist and move – something which 
6 
 
exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence.”  
 
In contemporary studies, there are discussions on whether the economic domain 
should be part of the civil society.  As Khilnani (2005, 13) suggested, from a liberal 
perspective, the effective powers of civil society are basically residing in the 
economy.  In contrast, the radical perspective placed civil society in a position 
independent from the state and the economy.  As the current study focuses on state 
and non-state actors, the business sector and their representatives (e.g. pro-business 
groups or parties) would be treated as non-state actors under the civil society from a 
liberal position.  
 
Apart from the business sector, the definition of civil society would lead to confusion 
on the categorization of political parties.  Theoretically, political parties and the 
members who serve in the Legislature should be regarded as state-actors or part of 
the government.  However, in the political context of Hong Kong, the political 
parties, at least until now, cannot perform the full function of a “party” as understood 
in western democracies, as the current laws and regulations on elections do not allow 
them to rule and to govern.  In this regard, the Pan-democrats in Hong Kong have 
long been described as permanent oppositions.  Under an immature party politics 
environment (please refer to Section 1.2 below), the role of social activists, pressure 
groups and politicians are, to some extent, indistinguishable in the local context.  
With such consideration, the current study would regard the political parties in Hong 
Kong, especially the Pan-democrats, as non-state actors or located somewhere 
in-between the state and the civil society.    
 
Two other terms that need clarification would be “state” and “government”.  A state 
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is generally considered to have its own population, territory, sovereignty and 
government.  In contrast, the government is mostly referred to as an institution 
consisting of the executive, legislature and judicial branches that makes and enforces 
public policies for and on a society.  In addition, the state is relatively permanent 
and continues from time immemorial, but the government is temporary and changes 
frequently.  In Skocpol’s (1985, 4) words, “government was viewed primarily as an 
arena within which economic interest groups or normative social movements 
contended or allied with one another to shape the making of public 
policy…Government itself was not taken very seriously as an independent actor.”  
 
However, as opposed to the definitions adopted by political scientists, in Hong Kong, 
the terms “state” and “government” are very often used interchangeably.  In fact, 
the term “state” has two meanings, “government” in narrow and “country” in general.  
As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, interviewees or media reporters, 
as well as common people, may use the two terms in an identical sense, and to some 
extent there are overlapping areas in those concepts, especially in Chinese 
expressions.  Some local scholars also used “government” and “state” 
interchangeably.  For example, in Lee, et al.’s (2013, 9-10) recent work on “Civic 
engagement and state-society relations”, the authors argued that the current HKSAR 
Government is highly impervious to input from civil society, and is worsening the 
state-society relations after 1997.  In line with the common usage appearing in 
newspaper and other media discourses, the current thesis will use the terms 
“government” or “state-actors” to refer to the executive branch of the Hong Kong 
SAR Government. 
 
It is important to note that the State-society Interactive Framework proposed in the 
8 
 
latter part of this thesis is not aimed at dividing “state” and “civil society” into two 
competing groups.  Instead, actors within the state and the society would have 
different interactions during crises, a characteristic different from the managerial 
approaches of crisis management, which views the government as the sole agent in 
tackling crises.   
 
1.1.3  Hong Kong as a Sub-Sovereign State 
As a Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy under the Basic Law.  Obviously, from a normative perspective, the 
definition of state cannot be fully applied to Hong Kong as it is just a “region” under 
the rule of an internationally recognized sovereign state – the People’s Republic of 
China.  However, in reality, Hong Kong is very different from other Chinese cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai in terms of the degree of autonomy that Hong Kong 
enjoys.  For example, Hong Kong is allowed to issue its own currency (i.e. Basic 
Law Article 111) which is always viewed as an act of a sovereign state.  As stated in 
Article 151 of the Basic Law which is listed below, Hong Kong has the privilege to 
join certain international organizations.  
 
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using 
the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, maintain and develop relations and 
conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and 
relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, including 
the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, 
tourism, cultural and sports fields.” (Article 151)  
 
Hong Kong is currently entitled to independent membership (separate from China) in 
the International Olympic Committee and World Trade Organization.  However, in 
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recent years, the debate on Hong Kong’s “international identity” heated up on the 
occasion when Hong Kong tourists were being held hostage in Manila as Donald 
Tsang in his capacity as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, which is a special 
administration region or rather say a city of China, called the Philippine President 
Benigno Aquino directly on 23 August 2010.  The media had questioned on the 
appropriateness of Tsang’s action soon after the incident. 
 
As Simon Shen argued, on newspapers and in his works, Hong Kong is a 
“sub-sovereign state” which “refers to the power held by some parts of nation-states 
which normally belong exclusively to sovereign states, such as the issuing of postage 
stamps, membership of international organizations, the ability to negotiate and enter 
into treaties with foreign government, and the like” (Shen 2013a, 105).  Shen 
further substantiated his viewpoint in his later work that there is no clear 
differentiation between “foreign” relations and “external” relations in international 
law (Shen 2013b, 473).  In the case of Hong Kong, with endorsement from Central 
People’s Government, the SAR government is allowed to maintain some sorts of 
external relations with other sovereign states (i.e. Basic Law Chapter 7). 
 
To summarize, Hong Kong enjoys a comparatively high level of autonomy in 
internal affairs such as public policy and governance.  For the purpose of the 
discussions on the “state-society” interactions in this thesis, it is important to clarify 
at this early stage that the application of the word “state” as referred to hereinafter 
should be in line with Shen’s perspective on viewing Hong Kong as a sub-sovereign 
state under the rule of China. 
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1.2  The State-society Relationship in Post-1997 Hong Kong 
With some basic concepts of crisis management in mind, this section will provide an 
overview of the political situation in Hong Kong, especially after the return of 
sovereignty to China in 1997 - the focus of the current study.  More importantly, as 
this thesis focuses on the state-society interaction in crisis management, this section 
aims to discuss the state-society relationship in Hong Kong, with special attention on 
the incompatibilities between the executive–led government and the legislature, 
immature party politics (weak political parties), and the vibrant civil society.  In the 
latter part of this section, some statistical data from newspaper analysis and 
government documents will be presented to give a clear picture on the tense between 
the state and the civil society and provide a situational context for current study.  
 
1.2.1  Hong Kong in Transformation 
Hong Kong is located at the mouth of Pearl River on the southeastern coast of China.  
After one hundred and fifty years of colonial rule of the city by the United Kingdom, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reclaimed the sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1 
July 1997, and the city is now a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under the rule 
of China.  As promised by the late Deng Xiaoping, former leader of China, Hong 
Kong would generally maintain its capitalistic systems for at least fifty years after the 
handover under the principles of “One Country, Two Systems”, “Hong Kong People 
Ruling Hong Kong” and “A High Degree of Autonomy”. 
 
Prior to the handover, the Basic Law was passed by the National People’s Congress 
of the PRC to serve as the mini-constitution for Hong Kong SAR after 1997.  As 
stated in the Basic Law, except for foreign affairs (Article 13) and defense (Article 
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14), the Hong Kong SAR Government is vested with executive power of its own to 
conduct local administrative affairs (Article 16).  After fifteen years of Chinese rule, 
the Hong Kong SAR Government, headed by the Chief Executive, is still believed to 
maintain a relatively high degree of autonomy on economic and social affairs.  
However, the political autonomy of Hong Kong SAR is in doubt, as, since 1997, the 
Central People’s Government of the PRC (CPG, commonly known as “Beijing” or 
“the Beijing Government”) has exercised its powers to interpret the Basic Law in 
four occasions
3
 within its first sixteen years of rule.  The current situation is that, 
although Hong Kong will not have universal suffrage until or at least 2017, the city is 
still a relatively liberal society from a macroscopic perspective, as Hong Kong 
people are enjoying a high degree of freedom of press, freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly. 
 
1.2.2  The Executive-led Government under Semi-democracy 
According to the Basic Law (Article 43), the Chief Executive (CE) is the head of the 
Hong Kong SAR Government.  The Chief Executive is elected every five years 
through an Election Committee (EC), currently comprised of one thousand and two 
hundred members categorized into four sectors, with each sector consisting of three 
hundred members
4
.  However, most of the EC members are not selected by direct 
election but by the domination and appointment of different Pro-Beijing 
                                                 
3
 The first interpretation in 1999 was related to the controversies on the rights of residency.  The 
second in 2004 was on political development, regarding the path towards universal suffrage.  The 
third, related to the period of term for the next Chief Executive, was a result of the resignation of the 
first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa in 2005.  The fourth, in 2011 was on whether Hong Kong 
should follow the practice of Mainland China on executing the absolute immunity.  
4
 The four sectors include 1) Industrial, commercial and financial sectors, 2) The professions, 3) 
Labour, social services, religious and other sectors and 4) Members of the Legislative Council, 
representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress, 
and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (Basic Law Annex 1). 
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organizations and trade unions.  Thus, the Chief Executive elections were in fact 
strongly influenced by the CPG.  Further, the Chief Executive elected has to be 
appointed by the State Council of PRC before he/she could officially assume the post.  
Including the Chief Executive, all principal officials of the HKSAR Government 
have to be appointed by the CPG based on the CE’s nomination. 
 
The legislative power of the HKSAR is vested in the Legislative Council (LegCo).  
The LegCo is divided into two sections, namely the Geographical Constituencies 
(GCs) and the Functional Constituencies (FCs).  Each of the two constituencies 
contains thirty five members in 2012.  The GCs are further sub-divided into five 
constituencies, and the seats are elected directly by proportional representation.  On 
the other hand, the FCs consist of twenty nine constituencies categorized according 
to occupational and professional sectors in Hong Kong.  Except for the 
newly-introduced District Council (Second) sector, all other sectors are selected by a 
rather small number of electors
5
.  Not surprisingly, the FCs elections are mainly 
controlled by the Beijing government, and voters in some sectors would not even 
have the chance to vote as only one candidate would emerge after consultations 
among the stakeholders. 
 
From a policy-making perspective, Hong Kong is under an executive-led or 
executive-driven (Li 2007, 32) system, with the executive branch being dominant in 
the decision-making process as compared to the legislature.  The power of LegCo is 
tightly limited by the Basic Law:  
 
                                                 
5
 Apart from the District Council (Second) FC, the remaining twenty eight traditional FCs consist of 
around two hundred and forty thousand eligible electors in total.  But the total number of eligible 
voters in Hong Kong (i.e., those who can vote in the GCs) should be more than three million.   
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“Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region may introduce bills in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which do not relate to 
public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the 
government may be introduced individually or jointly by members of the 
Council. The written consent of the Chief Executive shall be required 
before bills relating to government policies are introduced” (Basic Law, 
Article 74). 
 
Thus, it is almost impossible for a Legislative Councilor to initiate a bill related to 
any policy issue, as it may be treated as a matter related to public expenditure.  
Further, bills introduced by legislators have to garner support from the majority in 
both GCs and FCs to be passed.  Given that the Pro-government camp always 
controls the majority in the FCs, those pan-democrat lawmakers elected directly 
through the GCs would not have much political influence in the decision-making of 
the SAR government.   
 
In this regard, the policymaking process is mostly held in the hands of Chief 
Executive and his cabinet (i.e., the executive branch).  Before July 2002, all 
principal officials, except for the Chief Executive, were under the civil service 
system.  They were tenured, and should be free from bearing political 
responsibilities.  In the beginning of his second term, former CE Tung Chee-hwa 
introduced the Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) due to critiques 
that government officials were being (politically) irresponsible.  Under the POAS, 
all policy bureaus are headed by a politically-appointed Secretary, while the original 
civil servant position of Secretary was retitled Permanent Secretary.  The POAS
6
 
was expanded in 2010 by adding politically-appointed Undersecretaries and Political 
                                                 
6
 The system was retitled “Principal Officials Appointment System” by Donald Tsang, the second 
Chief Executive (2005 - 2012) of Hong Kong.  
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Assistants to aid the Secretaries.  The team of political appointees is separated from 
the civil servants, and is responsible for political work including the design and 
promotion of government policy proposals, while civil servants are only responsible 
for execution and operation. 
 
The first ten years of implementation of the POAS (2002 - 2012) saw the resignation 
of several principal officials due to different reasons (C.-y. Cheung 2005).  Of these, 
the stepping-down of then-Financial Secretary Antony Leung and then-Security 
Secretary Regina Ip are widely accepted as consequences of the 500,000-people 
protest on 1 July 2003 against the legislation of Basic Law Article 23 regarding the 
National Security Ordinance.  Despite this, the effectiveness of POAS has been in 
doubt, especially regarding the performance of unprofessional politicians, unclear 
division of labour between the political appointees and senior civil servants, and the 
collective denial of responsibility among different officials. 
 
The dramatic changes in the political system in the past 20 years, to some extent, 
have led to the incapability of institutions in Hong Kong.  Great challenges can be 
found in the relationship between the executive and the legislature, as a 
non-democratic executive is now facing a more democratic legislature.  Christine 
Loh, a former lawmaker, suggested, “the executive branch’s fear of sharing power is 
stunting the development of the political system … (the ExCo) sees the legislature as 
an inconvenience that has to be overcome rather than as an active partner to build 
participatory governance” (South China Morning Post, 12 April 2000).  As Huque 
and Lee (2000, 118) observed soon after the handover, under the new political setting, 
“relationship between the executive and legislature emerges a critical element in the 
management of crises”.   
15 
 
 
In general, the institutional arrangement after the handover has proven to be 
incapable.  The SAR Government still relies mostly on the bureaucracy and 
advisory committees, and efforts to rebuild strong governance have ended largely in 
frustration.  “In the absence of more novel institutional means to link up the 
executive and legislature, the overall system has remained disjointed.  Old-style 
consultative politics no longer works” (A. Cheung 2009).  Besides, the Pro-Beijing 
bloc has controlled the appointment of personnel in almost all public sectors in such 
a way that even moderate Pan-democrats are largely excluded.  The state’s policy 
network is highly exclusive and centralized.  However, in return, the effectiveness 
of the executive-led government is declining, as the entire governance is highly 
impervious to input from the broader society by formal channels (E. Lee, et al. 2013).  
The above discussion shows that tension exists in the interactions between different 
actors in crisis management under the newly emerged Hong Kong political context.  
 
1.2.3  Political Controversies and the Immature Party Politics 
Hong Kong has adopted the representative political system since the 1980s.  Under 
institutional restrictions, the party politics in Hong Kong is not as mature as some 
other East Asian societies (such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan).  In general, the 
polity of Hong Kong can be divided into Pro-Beijing (or Pro-government / 
Pro-establishment) and Pan-democrats (or Anti-government, as some leftists call 
them).  Under the current political settings, the Pro-Beijing bloc, which includes 
political parties serving as Beijing delegates, trade unions and professional bodies 
with strong Mainland China background and connections, has the privilege of 
holding different formal and informal positions in the government and 
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semi-governmental bodies.  Statutory bodies, commissions, advisory committees 
and the District Councils with appointed members are mostly occupied by the 
Pro-Beijing bloc.  In contrast, the Pan-democrats have been actively participating in 
direct elections in the LegCo GCs and District Councils
7
.  Due to the presence of 
FCs, which are always in control by the Pro-Beijing bloc, the Pan-democrats have 
never been able to control the majority in the LegCo despite winning the majority of 
votes
8
 in past Legco elections. 
 
The conflicts between Beijing and the Pan-democrats are heated on the issues of 
universal suffrage and the democratization of Hong Kong, especially when the CPG 
demonstrated greater intention to intervene after the 2003 demonstration (Sing and 
Tang 2012).  First of all, according to the Basic Law Annex I and II, the Hong Kong 
SAR Government is able to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executive and 
forming the Legislative Council after 2007.  In this regard, the Pan-democrats had 
reasonable expectation of the democratization of Hong Kong or even the immediate 
introduction of universal suffrage.  However, the path of democratization in Hong 
Kong was not as smooth as the Pan-democrats had imagined.  In December 2007, 
the National People’s Congress announced that Hong Kong would be able to elect its 
Chief Executive and Legislative Council by universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020 
respectively. 
 
Owing to the great expectation gap between the two sides, the 2007 political reform 
package was voted down in 2005, and no amendment would be made on the methods 
                                                 
7
 Hong Kong is divided into 18 District Councils; they are local level administrative entities with 
some power on affairs related to local livelihoods.  District Councilors are either directly elected 
every four years, or are appointed by the Chief Executive (a practice to be discontinued in 2016).  
8
 The Pan-democrats won 56.6% of vote in the LegCo Election 2012.  See “Pan-democrats election 
setbacks blamed on infighting” South China Morning Post, 11-9-2012 
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of 2007 CE Election and 2008 LegCo Election.  Notwithstanding of the deadlock 
and the proximity of 2012 CE Election, the League of Social Democrats (LSD, a 
Pan-democrat party) called for the resignation of five lawmakers in July 2009 in 
order to imply a “de-facto referendum” on universal suffrage.  This “de-facto 
referendum” was criticized badly by Beijing9, and even the Democratic Party (DP) 
did not take part.  Nevertheless, the “cut-off” between DP and the “referendum” 
provided a common ground for Beijing and DP for further negotiation (Sing and 
Tang 2012).  Finally, they agreed on the proposal of having five FCs new seats in 
the LegCo - the District Council (Second) constituency
10
, which all popularly-elected 
DC members would be eligible to run for, and all Hong Kong eligible voters who do 
not have any other FC affiliation would be allowed to vote on. 
 
1.2.4  Hong Kong-Central Government Relations 
The Chinese Central Government has demonstrated its interest in affairs in Hong 
Kong since the establishment of the PRC.  Over the past 60 years, in regard to the 
political change in Mainland China and the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with the British, the Chinese Government’s strategies towards Hong Kong have 
experienced dramatic changes.  Loh’s (2010) work “Underground Front” examined 
the role the Chinese Communist Party has played in Hong Kong since the creation of 
the Party to the present day, with focus on the key targets of the party’s united front 
activities, which illustrated the strategies adopted by CCP in gathering political 
support from different sectors.  
 
                                                 
9
 No party form the Pro-Beijing bloc took part in the by-election brought by the resignation of the 
five Pan-democratic lawmakers.  
10
 See Sing and Tang (2012) for details regarding to the “de-facto referendum” and the negotiation 
process between Beijing and DP. 
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In the same vein, Sunny Lo (2008) identified Beijing as the most powerful patron 
that dominates over any political actor in Hong Kong.  In fact, the CE-Beijing 
relations and CE-Hong Kong people relations are in dilemma.  As Lo argued, the 
Chief Executive is bound to be politically loyal to Beijing.  Thus, comparatively, 
the CE is far more accountable to the central government than to the Hong Kong 
people (S. Lo 2008, 35), leading to the complicated interactions and tensions among 
CE, Beijing, and Hong Kong people during serious political crisis, as will be 
discussed in the case studies section. 
 
As suggested by Loh (2010), Beijing’s involvement in local affairs has become 
obvious after the 2003 Protest.  In line with Sing and Tang’s (2012, 153) argument, 
shocked by the withdrawal of the Liberal Party in the Article 23 legislation in 2003, 
Beijing has found the indirect control of Hong Kong via Pro-Beijing delegates 
ineffective.  The 2012 political reform controversies have further exposed the issue 
of whether the CPG wished to develop a “second governing team” through the 
Central Liaison Office of PRC in Hong Kong (J. Cheng 2013, 24), as Beijing 
officials directly took part in the political reform negotiation process.  The election 
of Leung Chun-ying as CE in 2012 was rumored to be the consequence of Central 
Liaison Office’s direct interference on the CE election (Apple Daily, 25 March 2012).  
 
In fact, the tension between Pan-democrats and the Beijing Government is deeply 
rooted.  Through the 30-year transitional period
11
, two major issues had significant 
impact on Hong Kong-Beijing relations.  First, the introduction of direct election in 
                                                 
11
 The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by the People's Republic of China and the United 
Kingdom governments on 19 December 1984 in Beijing.  As agreed in the Declaration, the PRC 
would resume its sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997.  The period between 1984 and 1997 
is commonly known as the “transitional period” in Hong Kong.  
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the Legislative Council in 1991 and 1995 had substantially sowed the seed of 
democratization in Hong Kong, as “democratization against Communism” was a 
notion that was widely whispered as a British tactic towards Hong Kong’s handover 
to China.  Chris Patten, the last Governor of British Hong Kong who attempted to 
introduce direct democracy to Hong Kong, was even named “wrongdoer who would 
be condemned for a thousand generations” by Chinese official Lu Ping for his 
aggressive political reform on LegCo soon before 1997. 
 
Second, the June-Fourth Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 was a triggering point 
that provoked the long-term distrust between Hong Kong people and the Chinese 
Communist government (which is extended to the HKSAR Government appointed 
by Beijing) (Li 2003, 619).  Even now, the Tiananmen Incident is still deeply rooted 
in the heart of many Hong Kong people, and a party’s stand on the Tiananmen 
Incident is still a clear watershed that distinguishes it between being the 
Pan-democrats or the Pro-establishments in the post-handover Hong Kong polity, as 
Pro-establishments leaders are rarely seen asking for vindication of the Incident in 
public or participating in the annual candlelight vigil after the handover.  In fact, 
some Hong Kong people consider a vote for the Pan-democrats in LegCo elections a 
protest to China (Leung 1993), and the Anti-China syndrome (Leung 1993, J. Lee 
1999, 38) brought by the Tiananmen Incident has provided consistent public support 
for the Pan-Democrats and the annual candlelight vigil at Victoria Park.   
 
In general, the distrust between Beijing (and its delegates) and Pan-democrats has 
developed a crisis-provoking politics.  The legitimacy deficit along the years of the 
HKSAR Government has made any sensitive political issues, be them public policy 
controversies or scandals on principal officials, provocative to the general public, as 
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well as the “permanent opposition” Pan-democrats.  Thus, it is crucial to include 
political factors (i.e., political interactions between the state and the society) that 
work to complicate the development process of the crisis event itself when studying 
crisis management in Post-1997 Hong Kong. 
 
1.2.5  The Corporatist Regime: Government-Business Relations 
The business sector has been acting as a middleman between Hong Kong and Beijing 
since the 1980s.  Since the colonial era, businesspersons, as political conservatives, 
have been actively engaged in different political institutions, such as the ExCo and 
the LegCo.  As Ma (2007, 70) suggested, the close relationship between Beijing and 
the business sector has been taken as a strategy to maintain the prosperity of Hong 
Kong under capitalist system after the handover. 
 
After the establishment of HKSAR, the business bloc continued to enjoy political 
prestige by holding positions in Election Committee, District Councils (as appointed 
members), advisory bodies and also the Functional Constituencies in the Legislative 
Council.  More importantly, C H Tung (the first Chief Executive who previously 
was an entrepreneur) was said to be an example of “businessman ruling Hong Kong”, 
leading to the formation of the “Corporatist Regime” (Ma 2007, 70, Ma 2012, 71). 
 
As mentioned, the political power of business elites is vested in different level of 
government institutions.  In the Election Committee, they control one-fourth of the 
votes in electing the Chief Executive, while in the Legislative Council, lawmakers in 
the FCs with business background account for almost half of the total seats in the 
LegCo.  With the aid of the separate voting mechanism, they can easily vote down 
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any bill and amendment proposed by the Pan-democrat lawmakers, who are mostly 
elected through direct election. 
 
However, as discussed in the previous section, party politics in Hong Kong is still 
immature.  In this circumstance, the business sectors in Hong Kong do not converge 
into a unified political force as in western democracies.  Instead, “eclectic 
corporatism” is emerging, in which business elites with diverse interests seek their 
own particularistic rents and favour: “The eclectic corporatism brought with (the 
state) a form of multilateral, ad hoc, particularistic bargaining, resulting in ad hoc, 
particularistic and eclectic interventions in various sectors after 1997 with no clear 
development goals” (Ma 2012, 80).  
 
The business sector is recognized as a key component of the Pro-establishment bloc.  
But in fact, the “political alliance” between the business bloc and the SAR 
Government has seen several challenges after 1997, as Pro-business parties, such as 
the Liberal Party, held different views from the government (and thus, voted 
differently), on some critical issues, some of which had finally led to policy failure.  
In this sense, the role of the Pro-business parties as a key minority has brought 
dramatic political consequences.  This will be discussed in details in the case study 
of Basic Law Article 23 legislation incident.   
  
1.2.6  A Vibrant Civil Society in the Post-1997 Hong Kong 
The development of civil society in Hong Kong can be traced back to the Chinese 
elites’ communities developed from the assembly in Chinese temples12 in the early 
                                                 
12
 Tung Wah Group of Hospitals (TWGHs, the largest Chinese charity in Hong Kong) was set up by a 
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colonial era (K.-m. Chan 2010, 148).  Prior to the Sino-British negotiation on the 
future of Hong Kong in the late 1970s, Hong Kong society was mainly described as a 
“refugee society” or “lifeboat” (Hoadley 1970).  The most famous illustration was 
Lau’s (1982, 72) “utilitarianistic familism”, which described Hong Kong people as 
family-oriented, economic interest-driven, and lack of intention to engage in politics.  
In general, as K.-m. Chan (2010, 161-163) argued, Hong Kong civil society in the 
1970s was diversified, uninterested in monitoring the authority, and void of active 
participation. 
 
The development of civil society in Hong Kong got a significant boost after the 1 
July 2003 Demonstration, and the huge demonstration was regarded as a 
breakthrough (Chan and Chan 2007).  From an institutional perspective, as 
guaranteed by the Basic Law, Hong Kong people enjoy freedom of speech, 
publication, and assembly, making the exchange of information and ideas possible 
without barriers.  In contrast with Chan’s (2010, 161-163) and Lau’s (1982) 
observations on the passive civil society in pre-1980s, Chan and Chan (2007) 
generalized three discourses to describe the post-handover civil society in Hong 
Kong:   
 
1) Civil society as a defender of its autonomy 
Chan and Chan (2007, 81-82) argued that this is “the most common function 
attributed to civil society”, especially after the National Security Ordinance 
                                                                                                                                          
group of Chinese elite in late 19
th
 century.  In fact, the TWGHs was a politically-influential Chinese 
organization that acted as a bridge between the British colonial government and the Chinese 
community.  Its establishment could be traced back to Kwong Fook I-tsz, a small temple on Tai Ping 
Shan Street on Hong Kong Island in 1851.  Temples were a place for making major decisions under 
Chinese traditions.  For the political role of TWGHs in pre-WWII Hong Kong, see Elizabeth Sinn 
and Thomas Lau (2006)-edited “A collection of commemorative works of Tung Wah in celebration of 
its 135th anniversary” (in Chinese), Hong Kong: Joint Publishing. 
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controversy in 2003.  This discourse shows the need for civil society to stand up 
against the interruption of civil rights and freedom enjoyed by the people.  The idea 
of civil society becomes clearer to the people as they gain awareness of the existence 
and importance of the civil society.  Civil society would be jeopardized if it is not 
defended by the public themselves. 
 
2) Civil society as third sector and social capital 
This discourse revealed the definition of Non-government Organization (NGO) - “the 
association of civil society with non-profit, voluntary associations as well as the 
notions of social capital” (Chan and Chan 2007, 83).  Civil society could be a 
problem-solving agency especially during economic downturns.  Initiated by former 
Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in his 2000 Policy Address, voluntary organizations 
would be helpful in finding solutions to problems then headstrong to both the 
government and market (Policy Address, 2000, para 98).   In the same vein, K.-m. 
Chan (2010, 187) identified the roles of Hong Kong civil society in response to 
different social crises, such as during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
outbreak in 2003.  He listed eight major roles of civil society in the fight with SARS, 
namely, initiating and monitoring the government, providing prevention guidance, 
supporting the patients, conducting research and development, providing public 
education, supporting health care workers, fund raising, and diminishing the damages 
of SARS.   
 
3) Civil society as a partner of governance 
As stated by Chan and Chan (2007, 84), it is a worldwide trend to acknowledge the 
role of civil society in governance, as it is increasingly desiring and demanding to 
have meaningful participation in the government’s decision-making process.  In 
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recent years, the Hong Kong civil society has become more pro-active in its 
engagement of the policymaking process, especially on environmental protection and 
conservation issues.  This is especially the case since 2003, when a number of urban 
policy issues have raised public attention on conservation, including the protection of 
Victoria Harbour from further reclamation, and the conflicts regarding the 
conservation of Lei Tung Street (also known as “Wedding Card Street”) in Wan Chai 
and the Queen’s Pier and the former Star Ferry Pier in Central.  Compared to 
Discourses 1 and 2, which are more self-interest oriented, the recent movements on 
conservation emphasized a sense of belonging, self-expression, and quality of life.  
In this regard, the Hong Kong civil society now believes that “post-materialist values” 
(Inglehart 1981) should be considered in policymaking process along with the 
principle of economic efficiency (Chan and Chan 2007, 87).  
 
1.2.7  Post-2003: the Crisis Provoking Politics and New Social Movement 
The discussion on civil society development in Hong Kong in the previous section 
was based on the change in people’s demands and concerns.  However, a number of 
scholars also suggested the evolution of civil society mobilization process – the 
usage of internet, especially with reference to recent social movements, since 2003.  
As argued by So (2008), recent developments in information technology, such as the 
popular usage of internet, have contributed to the growth of social movements - an 
observation in line with those of Chan and Chan (2007, 92) and Chan and Chan 
(2006).  Furthermore, So (2008, 246-247) suggested a post-modernist approach on 
social mobilization with four major characteristics:  First, activists depend on 
high-tech to spread information and mobilize people.  Second, instead of having 
systematic organization, social activists are disorganized and spontaneous.  So 
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(2008) drew this remark based on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, but it was also 
observed in the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in 2009-2010.  Third, the 
movements themselves are mainly not ideology-driven, but stay close with some 
local and community issues such as environmental protection and conservation.  
Finally, although activists are in general peaceful, they dare to have confrontation 
with the police, as seen in the recent rapid development of radical political parties, 
such as the League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the People Power.  LSD’s 
election publicity even suggested using radical politics to confront current 
institutions in order to fight for political changes
13
.   
 
The Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in late 2009 also brought a new term to social 
movement – the “Post-80s”.  While there is no single definition for Post-80s, when 
illustrating the formation and characteristics of the Post-80s, mass media and 
commentators usually refer to the discussion by Lui (2007), who defined the fourth 
generation of Hong Kong people as those who were born after mid-1970s, and Lam 
(2010), who illustrated the formation of Post-80s from a social movement 
perspective.  Despite the different perspectives on the phenomenon of Post-80s, it is 
generally agreed that the diminishing social upward mobility is a major reason for its 
formation.  Compared to their parents, the Post-80s are more educated but 
encountered difficulties in climbing the social ladder due to the lack of opportunities 
nowadays in contrast with 1970s to 1980s when the Hong Kong economy was 
rapidly developing. 
 
Lam (2010) conducted an in-depth analysis of the actions of the Post-80s activists in 
the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident and the reasons behind, and discovered some 
                                                 
13
 “Street Protest – Philosophy of Action”, League of Social Democrats, 28 Oct 2011.  
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new social movement strategies that distinguish the Post-80s from their predecessors, 
such as carnival-style assembly, ascetic practice and “secondary creation”14 on the 
internet.  Regarding the reasons behind, Lam shared similar views with So’s (2008) 
“post-modernist” mode of social movement and Chan and Chan’s (2007) idea of 
“post-materialist”, stating that Post-80s come from a diversified political background, 
have less organizational binding, lack a culture of seniority, feel dissatisfied with the 
current mode of political and social development, are full of creativities, and hope for 
a better Hong Kong (Lam 2010, 255-262).  With no doubt, the rise of Post-80s 
activist, along with the popularization of information technology, has speeded up the 
development of a fruitful and diverse civil society in post-handover Hong Kong. 
 
In summary, in line with the rapid development of civil society since the 2003 
Demonstration, rally and demonstration have become a major means for different 
non-state actors to express their ideas.  Social activists, regardless of their 
backgrounds, consider demonstrations a method of opposing controversial 
government policies, such as the National Security Ordinance legislation and 
construction of the high speed railway.  It is foreseeable that civic engagements in 
different social movements or collective actions will become a trend in pushing 
certain political agenda that fail to attract government attention using normal 
channels under the limited-democratic system of Hong Kong.  The observation by 
A. Cheung (2009, 6) would best conclude the current state-society relations of Hong 
Kong:  “As society becomes more differentiated and politicized, sometimes not just 
over conflicts in interests but also in values, and as new civil society activism 
                                                 
14
 Secondary creation is the local expression of parody or spoof.  Activists would make use of 
different media products, such as movie clips, advertisement, and news photos, etc., to make pointed 
fun of the politician regarding different social and political issues through online social network sites, 
such as Facebook.    
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emerges and escalates, the traditional form of absorption politics based on the 
co-optation of business and professional elites has proved insufficient to carry the 
public view and confer policy legitimacy.”  
 
1.2.8  Observations: Statistical Data on State-society Interactions  
Before defining the research questions for the current thesis, it is imperative to 
understand the choice of post-handover Hong Kong as case study.  According to 
conventional wisdom, crises happen regardless of time and location.  However, the 
transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China and the implementation of “One 
Country, Two Systems” have provided an unprecedented political context.  Hence, 
it is of interest to understand the extent to which civil society development and 
governance crises differ during and after the colonial era.  This section presents 
statistics on Hong Kong civil society development and governance crises, with an 
aim to demonstrate the rapidly changing situation in Hong Kong from a quantitative 
manner and to demonstrate the huge changes in crisis-provoking politics since the 
handover – the time frame of the current study.   
 
On civil society 
In an attempt to investigate the extent to which Hong Kong people are aware of their 
belonging to civil society, Chan and Chan (2007, 79-81) reviewed the number of 
times the term “civil society” was mentioned in local newspapers from 1998 to 2006. 
The current study uses the same method to extend the period of investigation to 2012, 
and the combined results are displayed in Figure 1.1
15
.  It can be seen that the use of 
the term gradually increased from 30 in 1998 to 179 in 2002, then almost doubled to 
                                                 
15
 Data in Figure 1.1 was obtained from WiseNews search on the term “civil society” between 1998 
and 2006 (Chan and Chan, 2007: 81) and between 2007 and 2012 (by author of the current study) 
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304 times in 2003.  In 2006, the term was mentioned 995 times (Chan and Chan 
2007, 79), whereafter the number maintained between 700 and 800 for the next five 
years until 2012, when the number reached a peak of 1191.  As suggested by Chan 
and Chan (2007, 19), the discourse of “civil society”, which was rarely discussed in 
the public a decade before, has now become an everyday expression.  The data is 
also in line with the developmental trend of civil society after the handover.  With 
reference to the “post-materialist” or “post-modernist” social movement, the civil 
society of Hong Kong reacted strongly not only during the 2003 Demonstration, but 
also in a number of issues, such as conservation of the former Star Ferry Pier (2006), 
Li Tung Street (Wedding Card Street) (2006) and the Queen’s Pier (2007). 
 
Source: Data from 1998-2006 was collected by Chan and Chan (2007, 81), while that for 2007-2012 
was collected by the current author using the same method as Chan and Chan.  
Figure 1.1 Number of mentions of “civil society” in newspapers, 1998-2012 
 
On social movements 
Studies on social movement in Hong Kong face a challenge, as the Hong Kong 
government does not release a full set of data on social movement activities, such as 
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individual numbers of demonstrations, public assemblies, and rallies, to the public, 
and, considering the huge diversity on social movement formats, newspaper 
discourse analysis often fail to reach a high validity
16
.  The Hong Kong Police does 
release “lump-sum” data of the number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong 
Kong to the Legco and local newspapers, and these are summarized in Figure 1.2 and 
Table 1.2. 
 
 
Source: Hong Kong Police Force (cited in Apple Daily, 22 Jun 2012) 
Figure 1.2 Number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong Kong, 1997-2011 
 
A comparison of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows that along with the rapid increase since 
2003 and the large number of public discourse mentioning “civil society” since 2006 
(Figure 1.1), the number of protests also started to rise after 2006 (Figure 1.2).  An 
interpretation could be that the civil society development has been represented in the 
                                                 
16
 Chan and Chan (2007: 80) produced a table by using WiseNews search on demonstrations, rallies, 
and petitions in Hong Kong.  The authors divided the data into sub-groups based on the participants’ 
demands (e.g., human rights, education and health, etc.).  However, their comprehensiveness on 
over-detailed classification casts doubts on their data validity, and thus their results are not quoted in 
the current study.  
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form of protests.  Although there is no data on the number of participants, a 
significant increase in protests is in the same vein as the characteristic of civil society 
diversities was discussed in the previous section.  
 
 
1997-2010 
Public assembly:  23,422 
Rally:  12,169 
Average per day:  7.5 
Source: LegCo document CB(2)205/10-11(04) 
 
2007-2009 
Public assembly:  9,340 
Rally:  2,990 
Average per day:  11 
Source: LegCo document CB(2)832/09-10(09) 
 
2009-2011 
Public assembly:  13,000 
Rally:  3,670 
Average per day:  15 
Source: LegCo document CB(2)2452/11-12(06) 
Table 1.2 Number of public assemblies and rallies in Hong Kong, 1997-2011 
 
Table 1.2 shows the number of public assemblies and rallies in different time periods 
after the handover.  It can be seen that the average number of public assemblies, 
rallies and all social movement activities per day has increased significantly between 
2007-2009 and 2009-2011.  Further, out of the total of 23,422 public assemblies 
from 1997 to 2010, 9,340 or 39.8%, were recorded in the three-year period between 
2007 and 2009.  Obviously, the civil society has become more active in social 
movement by using demonstrations as a means to express its opinions to the 
government, compared to the early post-handover era (prior to 2003).  The 
observations also imply that sudden crises and crisis management could be possible 
solutions to explain why Hong Kong has become a “city of protest”17. 
                                                 
17
 Many discourses have mentioned Hong Kong as a “city of protest”, see The Sun (Hong Kong), 1 
Nov 2011 and Apple Daily, 22 Jun 2012.  
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On governance crisis 
Data collected from discourse analysis of four local newspapers
18
 in “governance 
crisis” presents similar pattern to previous studies on “civil society” and social 
protests.  Indeed, the term “governance crisis” rarely appeared in public discourse 
before the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, with only less than 15 articles mentioning 
“governance crisis” per year.  This number recorded a dramatic increase to 328 in 
2003, reducing to 30 in 2006, and gradually increasing again in the recent six years 
(2007-2012) to 135 in 2012.  Figure 1.3 shows that the trend in the number of 
mentions of “governance crisis” could be divided into three periods – 1) the pre-2003 
period (i.e., 1998-2002), 2) 1 July 2003 Demonstration and its aftermath (2003-2006), 
and 3) the period from 2007 to 2012. 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from WiseNews search 
Figure 1.3 Number of mentions of “governance crisis” in newspapers, 1998-2012 
                                                 
18
 The four local newspapers are: Apple Daily, Ming Pao, Oriental Daily, and Wenweipo.   
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The data could be associated with the development of civil society with the 1 July 
2003 Demonstration as a watershed, as discussed previously.  Obviously, Hong 
Kong is now experiencing an unprecedented crisis-provoking politics, that is, the use 
of different kinds of crisis events to create a window of opportunity for government 
change, since the public is more aware of governance crises, and more protests could 
be seen with a proactive civil society under a limited democracy.  A comparison 
between the data pre- and post-1 July 2003 Demonstration shows the close 
relationship between governance crisis and the development of civil society in 
post-handover Hong Kong, and justifies the necessity and empirical importance of 
studying the state-society interactions in crisis management, especially in the 
socio-political context of Hong Kong - the focus of the current thesis.  
 
1.3  Research Questions 
Regardless of their nature, crises present challenges to the government in all aspects - 
the political consequences of scandals and policy failure can be explosive, for 
example.  Simultaneously, the public is also highly concerned with the performance 
of the government in crisis management during natural disasters.  Thus, the major 
research question for the current study would be: “How did the state-society 
interactions affect the development process and outcomes of crisis politics?”  
Answering this question requires a review of current crisis management literature to 
seek for potential analytical framework(s).  However, as briefly mentioned 
previously and would be detailed in the next chapter, current crisis management 
research is mostly based on western liberal-democracies, a system that Hong Kong 
has yet to achieve.  Therefore, a sub-question would be: “What are the strengths and 
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weaknesses of applying western crisis management theories to a limited-democracy, 
such as Hong Kong?” 
 
This thesis can be regarded as a theoretical inquiry on current crisis management 
theories.  The current literature, which will be thoroughly reviewed in following 
chapter, demonstrated that current theories are inadequate for non-democracies, as 
both the top-down and bottom-up crisis management approaches assumed that the 
government is fully accountable to its people through regular elections.  By 
adopting the suggested State-society Interactive Framework, this thesis aims to 
analyze the action and reaction processes between the state and different non-state 
stakeholders in crisis politics, given that the Hong Kong political system is not yet 
democratized, and the check-and-balance mechanism is not comparable to western 
countries.   
 
Nevertheless, it is unwise to claim that western theories by default could not be 
applied to non-democratic countries.  However, questions remain when studying 
crisis management in the absence of democracy.  First, leaders are not totally 
responsible to the people, as they are not constrained through regular elections.  
Thus, channels monitoring their crisis management performance are both insufficient 
and ineffective.  The weak linkage between leaders’ performance and their political 
accountability would lead to the seeking of alternative ways by non-state actors to 
influence the crisis politics.  Second, from a policymaking perspective, in 
non-democratic regimes, and to a large extent in Hong Kong, policymaking is a 
top-down process under a closed system.  The policy community (Kingdon, 1995) 
is controlled by a small group of political elites, and thus a gap exists between public 
opinions and government decisions - a political time bomb waiting to turn policy 
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failure into governance crisis. 
 
At the same time, considering the observations on current Hong Kong politics, 
another sub-question would be: “What was the reason behind the high frequency of 
crises after the handover?”  In the first few months after the handover, the 
newly-established Hong Kong SAR Government was already faced with mounting 
public dissatisfaction and political pressure, as cases such as the Bird Flu, chaos 
during the opening of the new airport, and the Asian Financial Crisis followed one 
another.  The poor crisis management of the government was associated with the 
incompetent administration of the first CE, Tung Chee-hwa (J. Cheng 2007, 25).  
However, his unpopularity did not prevent him from being “re-elected” for a second 
term as Chief Executive in 2002.  The crises, however, did not give a blessing to his 
newly-appointed cabinet under the POAS, as then-Financial Secretary Antony 
Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal, the outbreak of SARS, and some other serious crises 
exploded one after the other.  Thus, this research would also explore the relationship 
between the occurrence of crises and the Hong Kong political system that lacks full 
democracy.  
 
Last but not least, the thesis also attempts to answer a third sub-question: “Given a 
hybrid political system, what is the role of crises in Hong Kong politics since the 
handover?”  This question frames crises in a rather constructive angle - as events 
that would trigger political opportunities for non-state actors, including the 
oppositions and social activists.  Under the current political system, legitimacy is by 
default an institutional weakness of the Hong Kong SAR Government.  This thesis 
also studies the increasingly significant role of crises in influencing the political 
environment of post-1997 Hong Kong.   
35 
 
1.4  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
A brief introduction on crisis management concepts is followed by some background 
information on the Hong Kong political context.  More importantly, this chapter 
addresses the major research gaps in the field, and introduces the socio-political 
context that makes post-1997 Hong Kong a critical moment for studying crisis 
politics.  The chapter also serves as a blue print of the whole thesis by addressing 
the major research goals and research questions.  At last, it introduces the structure 
of the thesis by providing an overview on each chapter. 
  
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
This chapter is a review on the current literature on crisis management, and serves as 
a navigator for potential theoretical gaps in this field by pointing out the weaknesses 
of current theories and approaches.  It begins with the definition and typology of 
crisis, followed by an introduction of the major crisis management models and 
methods.  In the second section, some issue-based crisis study, including political 
scandal and natural disease, is presented.  The third section of this chapter covers 
literature related to crisis and public policy, followed by a review of literature on the 
role of mass media and political communication in crisis management.  The final 
part of this chapter discusses crisis research in the Hong Kong context.  Since the 
return of sovereignty to China in 1997, Hong Kong has experienced different types 
of crises of varying scales.  This part points out the major trend of crisis research in 
Hong Kong and discusses their focuses as well as the extent to which those works are 
theory-based.  
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Chapters Three and Four: Analytical Frameworks 
Three analytical frameworks are applied in this thesis, two of which are from current 
crisis management literature - Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s (2005) “Five-step 
Leadership Approach” (Leadership Approach), in which the authors identified five 
major tasks to be performed by decision-makers during a crisis: Sense-making, 
decision-making, meaning-making, termination, and learning, and Brandstrom and 
Kuipers’s (2003) “Pattern of Politicization Approach” (Politicization Approach). 
  
After a brief discussion on the weaknesses of the above-mentioned approaches, the 
third framework to be discussed will be the State-society Interactive Framework 
(Interactive Framework), which is developed in the current study, and serves as an 
alternate model to illustrate the crisis provoking politics in non-democratic or 
limited-democratic regimes, such as Hong Kong.  The Interactive Framework 
consists of four major components, namely, the Crisis Development Ladder, Crisis 
Strengthening Forces, Crisis Weakening Forces and the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.  
The Interactive Framework mostly concerns the development of crises as a 
battlefield for different political actors under the absence of regular elections as an 
effective check-and-balance mechanism.  This framework will fill the current 
research gap, and will be a useful contribution to the crisis management literature. 
 
Chapter Five: Research Methods and Design 
After explaining the three approaches, this chapter introduces the research methods 
(i.e., documentary and archival study, in-depth interviews and media discourse 
analysis) and research design of using two case studies (i.e., the 1 July 2003 
Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident).  Also, this chapter 
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would provide detail justification on the research methods and brief introduction on 
the case study arrangement.  
 
Case Study Part I: 1 July 2003 Demonstration 
Chapter Six: Antony Leung’s Car Gate Scandal 
Chapter Seven: The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Epidemic 
Chapter Eight: National Security Ordinance Controversy 
Case Study Part I consists of four chapters.  Chapters Six to Eight recount the three 
events that led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration respectively: Antony Leung’s 
Car-gate scandal, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and 
the controversies regarding the legislation of the National Security Ordinance (Basic 
Law article 23) legislation.  Each of these three chapters starts with a collection of 
news reports relating to each event, details of the decisions made, and a record of the 
critical moments.  The Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach is then 
applied to analyze the events.  The aim is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of these crisis management theories as applied to different types of real cases.  
Finally, a brief summary identifying the important issues that have not been 
addressed by the theories is given. 
 
Chapter Nine: The 1 July 2003 Demonstration - State-Society Interactive 
Framework Analysis 
The 1 July 2003 Demonstration, with more than half-a-million participants, was the 
most eye-catching historical event and the most serious social crisis in Hong Kong 
since the handover.  The demonstration was said to be the consequence of a chain of 
poor governance under former CE Tung Chee-hwa’s administration.  In the first 
attempt on crisis management literature to assess the multi-crisis effect for a chain of 
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crisis events, the State-society Interactive Framework is applied to analyze the effect 
of these crises.  In order to support the argument, data from newspaper discourse 
analysis is also presented to assess the changes in the different forces during different 
stages of the event. 
 
Case Study Part II 
Chapter Ten: Anti-High Speed Railway Incident 
This chapter analyzes the crisis brought by the Hong Kong section of Express Rail 
Link (High speed railway) project.  In a similar layout as the previous chapter, news 
reports is first presented, followed by Leadership and Politicization Approaches 
analysis and a brief summary on the analyses.  Apparently, the nature of this 
incident is different from that of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.  By applying the 
State-society Interactive Framework, this case serves as a comparison to emphasize 
the importance of catalytic effect in influencing the crisis politics. 
 
Chapter Eleven: Discussion and Analysis 
After making a detailed analysis of the case studies by adopting the three approaches, 
the major strengths and weaknesses of both Leadership and Politicization 
Approaches are presented respectively in comparison with the State-society 
Interactive Framework.  In this regard, this chapter explains the essential elements 
that distinguish the Interactive Framework from existing approaches and how it 
could possibly provide new perspectives for studying crisis management.  This 
chapter serves as an overall evaluation of the three approaches as it provides detailed 
theoretical discussion on crisis management literature. 
 
This chapter also presents interview data gathered from different non-state actors in 
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Hong Kong.  The interview findings are used to support the arguments in two ways.  
First, it provides important evidence for the State-society Interactive Framework 
regarding the changes on Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces and also the 
Catalytic Effect as a triggering point for governmental change.  Second, with 
reference to the current crisis provoking politics in Hong Kong, especially after the 1 
July 2003 Demonstration, a phenomenon known as the politicization process with 
anonymous party identity is observed, in which those non-state actors intend to 
create or frame a party identity-free context for escalating a social issue into a crisis 
in order to draw public support and government attention. 
 
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion 
This chapter presents closing remarks for the current study and is presented in three 
parts.  The first part summarizes the research findings obtained through answering 
the research questions and analyzing the case studies.  The second part reviews the 
major contributions by this research, especially on how the State-society Interactive 
Framework links the western theories with local context.  Finally, some possible 
directions for future studies are suggested, including an enhancement in the argument 
of the State-society Interactive Framework and the potential of carrying out 
governance crisis studies in non-democratic regimes. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature review serves as a foundation of this research as it presents the major 
theoretical discussions in the field in crisis management
19
.  This chapter will be 
divided into five sections.  First, this chapter starts with “Theories on Crisis and 
Crisis Management” which discusses the definitions and typologies of crisis.  In 
fact, there is no single universal definition of “crisis”.  This section briefly reviews 
the classical studies in crisis management and tries to draw a possible definition 
which suitable to the current study in this thesis.  More importantly, the two 
dimensional approaches in crisis management will be presented as they will come up 
with the two theoretical frameworks (i.e. Leadership Approach and Politicization 
Approach) which will be applied in the later case study research.  It will be 
followed by the alternative approaches in crisis management studies (from the 
management school) to enrich the literature which also in line with the 
interdisciplinary nature of crisis management. 
 
Second, it comes to the review of “Issue-based crisis studies”.  In this section, three 
issues will be discussed, namely political scandal, health crisis and technological 
challenges to crisis management.  This section aims to provide some thoughts to the 
case selection of this research as most of the current crisis management studies are 
issue-based.  In the third section, it covers another major area of crisis study which 
relates to public policy.  Policy failure is one of the reasons that lead to governance 
crisis while policy change is always presented as a form of post-crisis reform (i.e. 
policy window).  
                                                 
19
 A condensed version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management under the title of “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: How Crises Catalyse 
Changes under the State-society Interactive Framework”, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2013, pp. 
200-210.  
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The fourth section of this chapter discusses a major component in crisis studies – the 
role of media.  Crisis communication, a form of political communication, points out 
the dramatic power of media in directing the outcomes of crisis through “spin 
doctoring”, mediation and “mediatization”.  The media effect would serve as one of 
the major component of the State-society Interactive Framework which will be 
introduced in the later chapters.  
 
Different with the above four sections, the fifth section of this Literature Reviews 
focuses on the governance studies – a common form of crisis studies in Hong Kong.  
It starts with reviewing the crisis and governance related studies in Hong Kong.  
This section aims to demonstrate the various perspectives of “governance crisis” 
mentioned by different scholars and to distinguish the “crisis” which suggested in 
this research.  
 
2.1  Theories on Crisis and Crisis Management 
People encounter crises at all times: A forest fire or disorder in a city-state could be a 
crisis a thousand years ago.  The term “crisis” or “disaster”, which appears in the 
research of many academic disciplines, refers to an abnormal situation that casts 
challenges to people.  As defined in the editorial statement published in the first 
issue of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, a leading journal in 
the field, crisis management is an academic arena which is multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary in nature (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 8).  In previous studies, 
numerous scholars had tapped into the topic of “crisis situation” when they 
conducted research on hot topics or ad-hoc issues in their areas of expertise (Wong 
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and Zheng 2004, Powers and Xiao 2008).  However, the field of crisis management 
has long been led by researchers in democratic nations.  In the absence of 
democracy (i.e., in authoritarian regimes or limited democracies), there should be a 
justifiable ground to doubt the applicability of existing theories. 
 
Extended research has been carried out by an increasing number of scholars since 
1990s, and this trend will definitely continue into the 21st Century.  Political 
occurrences such as the 911 Incident (Parker and Dekker 2008), scandals and riots 
that led to the Arab Spring
20
 in the Arabic world, or natural disasters such as tropical 
storms, catastrophic earthquakes, and tsunamis provide more than sufficient case 
studies for academic research.  Obviously, crisis management represents a crisis 
situation that needs to be “managed”.  However, the effect of crisis may not 
necessarily be negative, as it can lead to either threats or opportunities (Rosenthal 
and Kouzmin 1993, 1).  This introduces new topics to crisis studies, such as what 
crisis is and how crisis and crisis management can be studied. 
 
2.1.1  Crisis: Definitions and Typologies 
There is no conclusion as yet on what defines a crisis.  The current study considers 
crisis as an abnormal situation, an event or a process of a public issue that pressures 
an entity (mostly, but not solely, the government) to respond to it.  However, as 
Boin (2008) mentioned, the field is ill-defined, as there has been no concrete 
definition on the exact meaning of a crisis, or to what extent a situation could be 
labeled as a crisis (or an “issue” in contrast).  He even suggested that “crisis” and 
                                                 
20
 The Arab Spring refers to a chain of revolutionary demonstrations, protests, and wars that happened 
in the Arab world since late 2010.  It began with the Mohamed Bouazizi's (a Tunisian street vendor) 
self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill-treatment, which led to mass demonstration that 
overthrew then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in January 2011.   
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“disaster” are often interchangeable.  In fact, in addition to the common reference of 
“crisis”, other similar expressions, such as “contingency”, “disaster” and “tragedy”, 
can be found being used in various studies in the field.  For instance, the 911 
Incident was recognized as a crisis in Parker and Dekker’s (2008) work, but the same 
case appeared as a ‘Lesson of Disaster’ in Birkland’s (2006) book. 
 
Traditional wisdom perceives natural disaster as “an act of god that is unwanted, 
unexpected, unprecedented and almost unmanageable, causing widespread disbelief 
and uncertainty” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001, 5).  The authors further 
criticized that crisis should be something beyond a discrete event, as it is an on-going 
process that features “complexity, interdependence and politicization” (Rosenthal, 
Boin and Comfort 2001, 6).   
 
To the government, crisis should be something unfavorable (Kimenyi and Mwabu 
2007), but it could be argued whether other stakeholders would view crisis as truly 
unexpected and unwanted.  This interpretation is substantiated by the multiple 
realities of crises as suggested by Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993, 4), who pointed out 
that crises are heterogeneous in nature as the perceptions and definitions for a crisis 
is diverged.  Crisis does not bear any connotation or orientation until human beings 
provide them with a meaning - a crisis to someone may be an opportunity to another 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 4, Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin 1991).  
 
This is especially true in the case of governance crisis.  For example, the dismissal 
of a cabinet can be a governance crisis, but it may also be an opportunity for the 
opposition to gain power.  In this respect, Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin, and 
Kakabadse’s (2002) interpretation, though still not concrete, is recommended, as it is 
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more neutral by attempting to define crisis in a more practical (resource distribution) 
manner: 
 
“Crisis events occur whenever there is seizure of the existing 
mechanisms of functionality; a need for a major resource (re)distribution; 
and/or a constituency’s recognition (perception) of one or both of those 
events” (Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin and Kakabadse 2002, 39, Kouzmin 
2008, 159). 
 
This definition deviates from the historical argument on the nature of crisis by 
focusing on the outcomes.  The three criteria mentioned are basically observable 
results in a crisis situation, and are highly reflective in the politics of crisis 
management.  Nevertheless, the question of “to what extent” remains, as the 
meaning of “seizure of the existing mechanisms of functionality” (Korac-Kakabadse, 
Kouzmin and Kakabadse 2002, 39, Kouzmin 2008, 159) is unclear.  It could be as 
serious as a change of a regime, such as from authoritarian to democracy, or as 
simple as the stepping-down of a principal government official.  In fact, some 
previous studies in politics and public policy, such as policy fiasco (Bovens and 't 
Hart 1996) and political scandal (J. Thompson 2000), shared similar features with 
crisis. 
 
Apart from difficulties in defining crisis, the discussion on crisis typology - if people 
attempt to conceptualize crises - will also guarantee to be an endless debate. The 
complexity of this debate is best seen in Gundel (2005), who started the discussion 
by analyzing previous typologies, including the most common distinction between 
“man-made” and “natural causation”, as suggested by Rosenthal and Kouzmin 
(Gundel 2005, 107, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 2), and by extension, “social 
45 
 
crises” (Gundel 2005, 107, Rike 2003).  Gundel pointed out that this kind of 
definition may not be mutually exclusive, as there may be more than one origin for 
crises.  In addition, he also disagreed with other detailed distinctions, such as 
nuclear crisis, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, as decision-makers could only choose 
among limited instruments in tackling the great number of possible crises with 
similar characteristics (Gundel 2005, 107, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 1-2).  
Thus, it is impracticable to differentiate crises in such a detailed manner.  
 
Typology I: Crisis matrix by Gundel 
Instead of focusing on the nature itself, Gundel saw crisis as a relentless development, 
and this view led to his two classification criteria for crises, namely, the predictability 
of a crisis and the influence possibilities before it occurs or while it is occurring 
(Gundel 2005, 108).  He defined predictability as a crisis that should be noted by at 
least a third party and the probability of occurrence should not be ignored.  For 
influence possibilities, he defined crisis responses, such as ways of “antagonizing the 
causes to reduce damages are known and possible to execute” (Gundel 2005, 
108-109).  In this regard, Gundel concerned to what extent a crisis can be tackled.  
 
Based on the two classifications, Gundel established a four-area crisis matrix and 
distinguished between four types of crises, namely, conventional crises, unexpected 
crises, intractable crises, and fundamental crises (Table 2.1).  Conventional crises 
are known for being predictable and influence-possible, such as the use of 
ill-structured technological system.  The challenges faced by decision-makers in 
this type of crises are minimal as countermeasures are handy.  Unexpected crises 
are rare compared to conventional crises.  They are sensitive to influence, but are 
mostly unpredictable, resulting in the impossibility to formulate preventive measures 
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in advance.  Intractable crises are those that are difficult to respond due to technical 
limitation or conflict of interest, and are apparently more dangerous.  Social unrests 
or nuclear crises often create serious damage apart from unexpected crises.  
Fundamental crises are the most dangerous crises, as they are neither predictable nor 
influence-possible.  Reponses to such crises would be slow, as the outbreak comes 
suddenly without warning. The 911 terror attack would be a very convincing 
example (Gundel 2005, 110-113).   
 
 Predictable 
 
Influenceable 
 Easy Hard 
Easy Conventional crises Unexpected crises 
Hard Intractable crises Fundamental crises 
Table 2.1 Crisis matrix (Gundel 2005, 112) 
 
Gundel considered the crisis matrix elastic and broad enough, such that all crises 
could be allocated to one of the four typologies, and they could be reallocated and 
readjusted to different typologies as new insights appear in the future.  Using 
Titanic as an example, Gundel (2005, 114) illustrated the transformation of a 
shipwreck from an unexpected crisis to a conventional one.  Specifically, as the 
most advanced sea vessel in 1912, the Titanic was not expected to sink.  However, 
one hundred years later, sea vessel collisions are still common, and therefore, can be 
regarded as conventional crises.  Nevertheless, the major function for crisis 
typology is to assist decision-makers in managing a crisis, though it is doubtful 
whether conventional crises and fundamental crises contribute much to crisis 
management studies, as they are either too simple or are impossible to tackle.  
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Typology II: Crisis development and termination patterns by 't Hart and Boin  
As opposed to Gundel, 't Hart and Boin’s (2001, 31-35) proposed two classifications 
focusing on timing factors – the speed of development and speed of termination of 
crises, which also resulted in four possible typologies (Table 2.2).  A “fast-burning 
crisis” implies that the crisis has ended as it began.  Examples include plane hijacks 
and hostage-takings - crises that are short, sharp, and decisive.  On the other hand, a 
“slow-burning crisis” takes years to reach the status of crisis and more years to 
resolve.  The status of AIDS as a crisis in the western world would qualify as an 
example for this type of crisis, as the disease took years to spread, and is expected to 
fade off with breakthroughs in science and medicine.  “Cathartic crises” are those in 
which tensions built up slowly until they reached a critical point when something 
snapped or some parties decided to force a break through.  Finally, “long-shadow 
crises” are incidents that suddenly occurred and raised critical issues of a much wider 
scope and significance.  Sometimes, this type of crises could become a trigger for a 
political crisis. 
 
 Speed of development 
 
Speed of 
termination 
 Fast: Instant Slow: Creeping 
Fast: Abrupt Fast-burning crisis Cathartic crisis 
Slow: Gradual Long-shadow crisis Slow-burning crisis 
Table 2.2 A typology of crisis development and termination patterns 
('t Hart and Boin 2001, 32) 
 
There is no doubt that speed matters in crisis management. However, 't Hart and 
Boin’s typology ignored the nature of crises completely.  According to their 
typology, long-shadow crisis covers nearly all kinds of crises that happen in daily life, 
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such as political scandal, earthquakes, and terror attacks.  On the other hand, crisis 
management scholars may be less interested in studying slow-burning crises, such as 
global warming - a long-lasting ‘crisis’ with effects extending to future generations. 
 
Discussions on typologies 
Classifying crises is the first step in studying crisis management, as it is adequate as 
an analytical framework (Gundel 2005, 106).  The two typologies introduced in the 
previous section did not mention the nature of a crisis.  Ideally, there should be 
fundamental differences in crises that are man-made or of natural causation.  
However, in real cases, all crises involve human.  Thus, instead of natural causation, 
it might be more rewarding to redefine the two categories as man-made crisis and 
man-facilitated crisis.  Man-made crises are merely power struggles between people 
(i.e., political actors), and may refer to crises such as political scandal and policy 
failure.  These crises are considered as “pure”, as they do not involve natural 
causation.  In contrast, crises that have certain relationship with the natural world, 
regardless of them being initiated by human or not, would be classified as 
man-facilitated crises.  Examples include nuclear crises, earthquakes, and diseases. 
 
The component of “nature” distinguishes man-made crises from man-facilitated 
crises, as the previous group represents crisis situations that are created or 
manipulated by people.  Following Gundel’s (2005) idea of predictability as 
suggested in his crisis matrix, since an act of god implies unpredictability and 
uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001, 5), natural causation represents a 
situation that cannot be predicted, even though it may be initiated by human beings.  
However, compared to the crisis matrix that emphasizes the level of hardship, it is 
more convincing to concern the causes behind the predictability of crises.  
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Man-made crises are mainly related to responses and interactions of actors and 
stakeholders, whereas man-facilitated crises are associated with the unpredictability 
power of nature. 
 
Another important criterion is speed.  In 't Hart and Boin’s (2001) typology, crises 
are differentiated on their development and termination speeds.  While terminating 
a crisis or identifying the termination of a crisis
21
 are to some extent a matter of 
interpretation worth studying, it is not easy to understand the speed of development.  
If the development of a crisis were expressed as a bell-shaped figure, how would a 
fast or slow developing crisis look?  Since crisis recognition is very important for 
defining a crisis, a better alternative to the speed of development could be the speed 
of recognition, which could either be instant recognition in cases such as earthquakes 
and political scandal, or gradual recognition in crises such as disease and policy 
failure.  Certainly, the public expects strong and timely response on instantly 
recognized crises, and long-lasting interactions between actors in gradually 
recognized crises. 
 
The cases selected for the current research is based on the typology suggested above.  
This research will focus on purely man-made and non-instant crises instead of 
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and nuclear crisis, as these involve 
technical knowledge rather than interactions among actors.  Thus, chaotic crises, 
interactive crises and indefinite crises will be the main focus, followed by detailed 
case selection for further investigation. 
 
                                                 
21
 Please refer to Boin, 't Hart, and Stem, et al.’s (2005) illustrations on political and operational 
termination of crisis 
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2.1.2  Two Dimensional Approaches in Crisis Management 
Crisis management is politically significant, as crisis calls for immediate response 
from the government.  By revisiting current crisis management literature, two 
dimensions of crisis management studies involving the political aspects of crisis 
could be distinguished.  The first one is the popular top-down versus bottom-up 
approaches, differentiated by who the key men are in a crisis.  Specifically, the 
top-down approach emphasizes the leadership of government in a crisis, whereas the 
bottom-up approach stresses the importance of different political actors working 
together to shape the response of the government in a crisis.  The second dimension 
is managerial versus political oriented approach, meaning that crisis is either a matter 
of matching problem(s) with solution(s), or how the government interacts with its 
people during a crisis. 
 
Top-down Managerial Approach 
't Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) noted three features of crisis that may 
threaten bureaucracy: Severe threat, time pressure and high uncertainty, which work 
together to disrupt the routine operation of bureaucrats.  In this case, leadership and 
centralization of decision-making are important, and the top-down managerial 
approach, which focuses on the question of what should be done, would be most 
effective in tackling the situation.   
 
This approach views crisis management in two ways.  First, it should be carried out 
step by step.  One way to visualize this is to plot a graph of crisis situation versus 
time: At time zero, crisis situation also starts from zero. The situation grows until it 
reaches the peak as crisis, and falls back to zero again as time passes.  Regarding 
the management of a crisis, Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) proposed five major 
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tasks that a leader should accomplish during a crisis: Sense-making, decision-making, 
meaning-making, termination, and learning.  The first three tasks were considered 
essential by 't Hart, Tindall, and Brown (2009), as sense-making is helpful for leaders 
to get a clear and exact picture of the event in addition to its impact and significance.  
The authors also drew attention to decision-making, also known as coordination, 
which refers to the assembling and enabling of government’s established crisis 
response system and network, and meaning-making, which signifies the 
government’s responses and announcements to calm the public. 
 
There is no standard solution for the myriad of crises happening around the world, 
but it is useful to distinguish an individual crisis from a public crisis: A single 
hijacking case may only affect the hostages; however, a terrorist hijacking may 
threaten the whole society.  Crisis management scholars, from a managerial 
perspective, tend to study the pattern of responses ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 
1993), standard policy actions (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007), and steps (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin 1997).  As a prerequisite for crisis management, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 
(1997, 290) proposed five heuristic steps for crisis management scholars or 
practitioners: 1) “Does a serious threat exist to the social political system?” 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997, 290); 2) the need for response to threat; 3) the need 
of government decision; 4) understanding the promptness of decision; and, 5) the 
government’s actual action. Nevertheless, they failed to advise on the consequences 
of actions, and what can be done. 
 
On the other hand, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007) suggested three standard policy 
actions during a crisis. First, shock therapies are treatments for emergency case.  
They either cure or kill, and have no intermediate result.  Second, a radical action 
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or policy may pose a change in almost an opposite direction.  However, while 
achieving the intended goals, a radical policy often creates extra problems.  Third, 
instrumentalism or gradualism is a practice that is contrary to the radicalism.  It is 
a type of policy-making characterized by making minimal changes to the existing 
policy.  These three measures are not mutually exclusive, and, as Kimenyi and 
Mwabu (2007, 16) pointed out, “an appropriate response in a crisis situation is one 
that addresses the urgency of the moment while at the same time searching for a 
better and long-term solution”.  These three policy actions provide a foundation for 
understanding different crisis management practices, and form a base for evaluating 
government crisis management techniques. 
 
The second way of viewing crisis management is as patterns.  In this case, scholars 
focused on different crisis management measures available.  Even though the 
personality, skills, and style of leaders were distinguished in a crisis, the advisory 
configurations, as highlighted by 't Hart, Tindall, and Brown’s (2009), also play an 
important role in determining the performance of leaders in a crisis.  The authors 
further suggested that the advisory body should be empowered with three capacities, 
namely, analytical capacity for shaping the sense-making of leaders; managerial 
capacity for facilitating the leaders’ decision-making; and, communicative capacity 
for strengthening the meaning-making process of leaders. 
 
An idea that follows from the importance of the advisory body is the centralization 
thesis ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993), which proposes that major decisions 
tend to be made within the small group of elites comprising the chief executive and 
his/her advisors during a crisis.  The central government, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency in the United States, which always intervenes 
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during crises, would be a typical example.  The identification of the level of a crisis 
(either local or national crisis) may alter the level of centralization and the outcomes 
of crisis decision ('t Hart, Tindall and Brown 2009). 
 
There is no contradiction between viewing crisis management as steps (tasks) or as 
patterns.  Rather, it is a matter of perspective.  Steps (tasks) are effective in 
identifying the important issues that should be taken into account during the different 
stages of a crisis, while patterns are being supported by crisis manager as they reveal 
trends that could, to some extent, present a causal relationship between different 
actions and outcomes.  
 
Top-down Political Approach 
This approach views crisis in a highly politicized context.  The term “politicized” 
here refers to an issue that is over-influenced by politics as a result of the deliberate 
actions of different stakeholders in the society.  Scholars have, for a long time, 
acknowledged the importance of stakeholders (i.e. actors in the civil society) in using 
public relations techniques to direct public opinion.  In democratic societies, their 
actions are even more influential during the election period, as both crises and 
scandals are sensitive issues that would threaten the legitimacy and popularity of the 
ruling party or leader, especially in the electoral system. Thus, the top agenda for 
leaders should be to avoid major threats that may jeopardize the acquisition of the 
majority votes (McConnell and Stark 2002). 
 
As mentioned before, it is commonly assumed that the government should take the 
lead in managing crises, and this approach emphasizes on the political tactics that 
aim to “salvage” individual official(s), the ruling party, or even the legitimacy of the 
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whole government.  Through “spin doctors” in a government, three types of 
symbolic “crisis handling devices”: Framing, ritualization, and masking, as 
suggested by ‘t Hart (1993), are performed. 
 
Within those crisis response patterns, extra credit should be given to McConnell’s 
(2003) argument on agenda management, whose logic is simple: Governments do not 
like to deal with difficult issues.  In case there is no way for a government to avoid 
dealing with them, the government would frame the political agenda to a direction 
that is beneficial or less harmful (McConnell 2003, 399).  This can be achieved by 
suppressing initial demands for government actions, isolating demands from some 
groupings, performing symbolic actions, and manipulating scientific and statistical 
measurements. 
 
The strength of the Top-down Political Approach over the Managerial Approach is 
that stakeholders are also taken into account.  However, the Top-down Political 
Approach puts the government and public in an imbalanced relationship; the 
government merely acknowledges the public opinion without carefully consider the 
reaction of stakeholders.  This deficiency could be solved by the bottom-up 
approach. 
 
Bottom-up (political) approach 
Compared with the top-down approaches, some scholars saw crisis management as 
something different from situational management.  The bottom-up approach is 
known to be political oriented, as it is almost impossible to “manage” from the 
bottom in any real situation.  Rather, crisis communication becomes important, and 
it is imperative for decision-makers to have a deliberate intention to provide 
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explanations to the public during crises (Olson 2000).  In this connection, 
government officials are faced with three political questions: 1) What happened? 2) 
Why were the responses inadequate?  3) What is going to happen?  
 
Crisis responses are shaped by many political factors, including general elections, 
powerful pressure groups, bureaucratic politics, and international pressure.  As 
McConnell and Stark (2002) suggested, governments, especially the ruling party, are 
super-sensitive to crises, as their popularity is linked to their performance.  Thus, 
different non-state political actors would take the opportunity to influence 
government decisions during crises, and these interaction and interference are the 
main reason for the politicization of crises (Stark 2010). 
 
Besides, some scholars had also focused on the impact of representative institutions 
on crisis response.  For example, Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) mentioned that, 
by viewing crisis as a phenomenon of social deliberation, representative institutions 
have performed their functions by challenging the accountability of government 
officials during a crisis, and Stark (2010, 11) claimed that “party political 
relationships between an executive and a legislature should be considered as a 
significant source of variation which affects a legislature’s response to a crisis”.  
This is because in most countries, the congress or national assembly holds the power 
of investigation towards the executive branch at least to some extent.  Thus, it 
should also be treated as an active player in managing crisis. 
 
Moreover, the framing and blaming process should best represent the politicization 
of a crisis in the bottom-up approach.  In developing the decision tree of 
constructing blame by framing political crises, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) 
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identified three elements to cast blame, including constructing severity, agency, and 
responsibility.  Constructing severity refers to the consideration on whether an event 
has violated core values of the society, and whether it can draw public attention and 
political debates.  This is followed by the discovery stage known as the agency 
dimension.  In the politicization process, actors may seek to extend the time frame 
of the event backwards, which, according to Bovens and 't Hart’s (1996) 
interpretation, means going up the hierarchy.  Ultimately, the responsible party 
needs to be identified to enhance accountability and lay blame on.  A dispersed 
blame implies that sanction is avoided (D. Thompson 1980).  Conversely, if an 
event is framed as a failure of single actors, scapegoating will be the most likely 
outcome (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003). 
 
Table 2.3 is a summary of the three approaches.  Although it is inaccurate to 
conclude that these approaches are mutually exclusive, it is also undesirable if not 
impossible to simply combine them and develop a “comprehensive model”.  
However, it is worthy to reiterate that the major drawback of the top-down 
managerial approach is the government’s omission of the reactions and responses of 
other stakeholders.  This phenomenon is common in crisis studies related to natural 
disasters and external threats.  On the other hand, the bottom-up approach, with its 
focus on the politicization process of crisis, is valid for explaining some man-made 
crises such as policy failure or political scandal.  However, the effort (i.e., practical 
measures) of the government in crisis management is seldom appreciated. 
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 Managerial oriented Political oriented 
Top-down Steps Pattern  Three types of symbolic “crisis handing 
device” ('t Hart, 1993) 
 Foot-and-Mouth 2001 (McConnell and Stark, 
2002) 
 The Use of Inquiries at Times of Crisis 
(Resodihardjo, 2006) 
 Government crisis decision-making: 
Five heuristic steps (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin, 1997) 
 Process model of crisis management 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993) 
 Leadership in crisis: five critical 
tasks (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al., 
2005) 
 Operational challenges in each crisis 
management phase (Boin, 2004) 
 Pattern of crisis responses 
(McConnell, 2003)  
 The centralization thesis 
qualified: seven response 
patterns ('t Hart, 
Rosenthal, and Kouzmin, 
1993) 
Bottom-up   Framing and Re-framing failures: Patterns of 
Politicization (Brandstrom and Kuipers, 
2003) 
 Understanding policy fiascoes: A political 
process (Bovens and 't Hart, 1996) 
 The Relationship between Representation and 
crisis management (Stark, 2010) 
 Foot-and-Mouth 2001 (McConnell and Stark, 
2002) 
Table 2.3  Summary of the approaches in crisis management
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2.1.3  Crisis Management: Alternative Models from the Management School 
Crisis management study is interdisciplinary in nature.  Compared with the crisis 
management studies in business administration, there is a lack of crisis management 
model in the field of politics and public administration.  As presented in previous 
sections, scholars in public administration mostly focus on developing 
decision-making structure ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 35) and typological 
frameworks, and are less likely to construct a model.  Even though their 
contemporaries in management studies have created different kinds of “models”, 
such as the “Coombs’s fifteen characteristics of a crisis management plan” (Seeger, 
Sellnow and Ulmer 2003, 170) and Mitroff’s (2001, 31) “best practice model”, which 
includes types/risk, mechanism, system and stakeholders interconnected in a circle 
linked with “scenarios” placed outside the system, they are only loosely developed as 
an analytical framework for further studies, and most of them lack empirical research 
support.  It seems crisis management studies in the management school focus 
mainly on listing key solutions, but lack explanation on the process of crisis 
management and the consequences.   
 
Nonetheless, some scholars from the management school did attempt to develop or 
redefine some crisis management models for use in the public administration field.  
An example is the “Diamond Model of Crisis Management” (Figure 2.1) developed 
by management scholars Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green (2004) based on Boin’s (2004, 
168) observation of the three phases of crisis management – before, during, and after.  
The diamond model involves four broad clusters of variables, namely, crisis types, 
crisis mechanisms, crisis systems, and crisis stakeholders, and can be applied to 
understand crisis management in public sector.  Through step-by-step guidance, the 
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model suggests actions to be taken during different phases of a crisis.  The model 
begins with “threat sensing”, that is, to recognize potential threat(s).  Based on the 
results of crisis audit, crisis assessment is performed in the next phase, and plans and 
training are necessary to ensure the capability of an organization to face crises.  
This is followed by the “during” phase of crisis, where damage control must be done 
to minimize harm and to recover.  The final phase is the “learning” stage, in which 
the redesigning of the system would possibly be carried out to prepare for the next 
crisis (Mitroff, Alpaslan and Green 2004, 181). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Diamond Model of Crisis Management: Interactive Systems 
Thinking (Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green 2004, 181)  
 
To conclude, models developed by the management schools are useful in providing 
insights and comprehending the theoretical foundations of the field, and they are 
valuable as references for the development of a crisis management analytical model 
for use in the public sector.  
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The above discussed crisis management definitions, theories, models and approaches 
are useful to decide the analytical framework of this research.  Moreover, this 
section also discovers the potential areas which provide directions for making 
theoretical contributions in the later chapters.   In the coming section, different 
issue-based crisis studies will be introduced as it serves as important reference for 
case selection of this research. 
 
2.2  Issue-based Crisis Studies 
The field of crisis management studies is both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).  Scholars in fields as diverse as nuclear technology, 
public health, and international relations can be researching on the management of 
nuclear meltdowns, natural diseases, and terror attacks.  Moreover, most studies in 
this field are issue-based, the advantage of which is the ability to focus on particular 
crisis component or crisis management measure helpful in reflecting unique features 
of specific types of crises.   
 
Of the wide variety of subjects that can be investigated, natural disasters hold an 
iconic position as it has long been a well-developed arena in crisis management 
studies.  Conversely, political scandals and policy failure, two topics not bearing the 
exact wording of “crisis”, is seldom discussed in main stream crisis management 
studies but unwise to be ignored.  Comparatively, natural disaster can be considered 
as iconic in crisis case selection as it has long become.  In their canonical work 
“Coping with Crises: The Management of Disaster, Riots and Terrorism”, Rosenthal, 
Charles, and 't Hart (1989) proposed three main kinds of crises, which will be 
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discussed in details in the following section to help comprehend the literature from 
alternate perspectives.   
 
2.2.1  Political Scandal 
Political scandals are no longer strangers to the public. From the well-known 
Watergate scandal to the most “dramatic” sex scandal in the 20th century involving 
former United States President Bill Clinton, political scandals have become a 
pervasive feature of modern society.  Markovits and Silverstein (1988) provided a 
rather restrictive view of political scandal by defining it as the overlap of the logic of 
due process with the logic of power.  That is, a “scandal” that merely involves 
political leaders cannot be considered as a political scandal.  There has to be an 
abusive use of power at the expense of the process and procedure.   
 
This definition is not agreed by Thompson, who argued power scandals (J. 
Thompson 2000, 94) mentioned above is merely a kind of political scandals.  He 
adopted a broader approach in defining political scandals by proposing four 
characteristics: 1) An event or action that transgressed certain norms and values in 
moral sense; 2) the said event or action, which is supposed to be secret, is exposed, 
or is strongly believed to exist by non-participants, such as general public; 3) the 
non-participants criticize and express their disapproval by publicly condemning the 
event or action; and, 4) the reputation of the responsible individual(s) shall be 
damaged.  In his view, merely defining political scandal as a scandal that involves 
political leader or government official was “not particularly helpful and illuminating”.  
Rather, social relations and institutions by virtue should be taken into account as the 
individual is granted with or meant to acquire political power (J. Thompson 2000, 
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91).  Furthermore, Thompson added that the existence of opposition parties and 
other interest group have created a challenging political environment in liberal 
democracies, increasing the likelihood of political scandal as compared to the 
authoritarian regime.  Political scandals could be a powerful weapon to attack and 
to discredit opponents, particularly during election period (J. Thompson 2000, 94), 
and they are no doubt events that may deteriorate into a legitimacy crisis of 
government. 
 
Obviously, the consequences of political scandals can be very serious.  On the 
individual level, political scandals can destroy one’s political career as well as the 
institution and policy related to him/her.  On the societal level, it can heighten 
politicians’ sensitivity on their “private”’ and political life.  More importantly, 
political scandals point out the importance of accountability and transparency of the 
government, and contribute to the upholding of good and clean governance (J. 
Thompson 2000, 234-245).  J. Thompson (2000, 266-268) considered the best way 
to respond to political scandals and crises is to create a more open government, 
establish clear moral standard for public officials, and comprehend the investigating 
mechanism on alleged cases. 
 
Scandal as a mediated event 
J. Thompson (2000, 60-63) further described scandal as a mediated event that 
involves “interactions”, the focus of the current research.  He differentiated a 
mediated scandal from a localized scandal by type of publicity, mode of disclosure, 
and mode of disapprobation.  Localized scandals mainly involve face-to-face 
communication, and are spread by word-of-mouth, which is an implication that 
people should have some prior knowledge about the individuals involved.  In 
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comparison, mediated scandals are shaped by interactional mediated communication 
(J. Thompson 2000, 60-63).  For example, the sex scandal of Bill Clinton has 
spread all over the world through news media.  Therefore, someone located in 
another part of the world may know nothing about Clinton but his sex scandal. 
 
The relationship between media and politics is undoubtedly close, as will be further 
discussed in later sections.  Political scandals, while unique in nature, share some 
characteristics with other crises.  As mentioned before, political scandals are highly 
mediated and thus are politicized by opposition and other interest groups, making it a 
kind of pure man-made crisis, as defined previously.  As a political weapon, the 
political orientation of a scandal is quite clear: Attacking the contestant in election 
and harming the legitimacy of the ruling party.  The mediating effect of political 
scandals is of concern to scholars championing the interactive framework (i.e. the 
role of representative institute) of crisis management, and thus a topic worthy of 
investigation in the field.    
 
2.2.2  Health Crisis: Man-facilitated Natural Disease  
Contrary to political scandal, natural disease is a kind of non-pure man-made crisis.  
Alkan (2001, 277) described the golden rule for dealing with natural disease: “As 
viral epidemics emerge and re-emerge, it is preparedness, a high degree of suspicion, 
and rapid appropriate response that will limit the spread of these diseases in the 
future”, and called it cruel dilemmas under conditions of uncertainty that involves 
complex network of actors, including government, media, and professionals.  With 
its own uniqueness, crisis management on natural disease emphasizes the role of 
professionals and their mathematical models, as they are the ones who provide 
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information and suggestions, whereas the final decision is made by government 
officials, who, apart from normal crisis dilemmas, face huge challenges of having to 
make decisions based on incomplete database.  A complex situation that involves 
includes both political and scientific judgment makes natural disease an arena worthy 
of studying (Alkan 2001, 277).   
 
By applying the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis as a case study, 
Powers and Gong (2008) proposed five frames describing the responses of different 
social actors in Hong Kong to the crisis: 1) The natural disease was treated as a state 
secret, reflecting its unwelcome nature to many (local) government officials; 2) it 
was taken as a scientific mystery to be solved by the scientist; 3) it was viewed as a 
medical epidemic that legitimized the use of emergency power on large scale 
collective action; 4) it could serve as a warning to the current public health and 
hygiene institutions; and, 5) it was perceived as a government failure that leads to 
social unrest and chaos. These five frames are useful in reflecting major issues in 
relation to disease management.  
 
2.2.3  New Challenges to Crisis Management 
Political scandal and natural disease are nothing new in nature.  However, they pose 
new challenges on crisis management under the modern fast-changing world 
characterized by globalization.  A crisis is globalized as it is trans-boundary in 
nature. Not only does it have the ability to spread across geographical borders and 
threatens multiple cities, regions, and countries (Boin 2009), as in the case of SARS, 
which drew global concern (Buus and Olsson 2006), but it can also cut cross 
functional borders, such as from private sector to public sector (Boin, 2009, 368).  
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The combination of the spread of a crisis in both the geographical and functional 
spectrums can easily create a “power vacuum”, which allows familiar tensions to 
build up and feed off each other: Nations versus international organization; central 
authorities versus local respondents; and, public versus private interest.  The 
modern world is becoming more vulnerable to relatively small disturbances as 
societies have become tightly linked to one another.  Boin (2009) also emphasized 
the important role of technology enhancement, especially in information technology, 
as speed matters in trans-boundary crisis management.  This will be further 
discussed in later sections.  
 
Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort (2001) discovered some critical trends in crisis 
management.  First, apart from trans-nationalization, “mediazation”, that is, the 
media’s recognition of crisis, plays a critical role at the time of confusion and 
uncertainty (Buus and Olsson 2006, 78).  Second, technological developments 
contribute to collective actions, such as in the case of 1 July 2003 Demonstration in 
Hong Kong (So 2008).  Third, dissipation of state authority, as the government gets 
smaller and the civil society becomes bigger.  Finally, there is the phenomenon of 
“emotization”, the battlefield of subjective construction on emotion and feelings 
during crisis, as the role of individuals becomes more important in crisis 
management.  These new trends are evidence that, under the current environment of 
increased interactions between government and public, the government can no longer 
dominate the crisis management process.  
 
To summarize, this section discussed the studies which relevant to crisis management 
although they may not exactly bear the name “crisis”.  In the coming section, crisis 
and public policy, a major area in crisis studies in fact, would be discussed to see 
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how crises are interrelated to public policy in a public administration perspective. 
 
2.3  Crisis and Public Policy 
Crisis is in fact closely related to public policy, as policy failure may lead to 
governance crisis, while the crisis-aftermath learning process may induce policy 
change (Boin, McConnell and 't Hart 2008).  In other words, change can lead to 
crisis (policy failure), and crisis in turn induces change (crisis learning).  Further, 
crisis and policymaking share similar characteristics.  For instance, both of them are 
highly politicized processes that involve many actors and stakeholders.  Both take 
time to develop and terminate, and, except for fast-burning crises, crisis management 
is a process that involves uncertainty, and so is policymaking.  Therefore, observing 
the policymaking process is a constructive method to study crisis management, and 
this will be described further in the research framework for the current study. 
 
2.3.1  Policy Failure as Governance Crisis 
Policy failure, also known as policy fiasco
22
 by Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 15), was 
defined by the authors as “a negative event that is perceived by a socially and 
politically significant group of people in the community to be at least partially caused 
by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymaking”.  A “semantic tool” 
used in political contestation and arguments about controversial policy episodes, 
Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 9) further described it as a very negative label that “serves 
to contest claims, to diminish power, and to weaken position”.  Policy failure is 
                                                 
22
 Boven and 't Hart differentiated policy fiasco from policy failure, stating that the former 
emphasized on subjectively significant social damage and highly politicized but not the latter. 
However, this study will treat these two concepts as the same, under the consideration that 
policymaking is an entirely politicized process with subjectivity. See Mark Bovens, and Paul 't Hart. 
Understanding Policy Fiascoes. [London: Transaction Publishers, 1996]: 15.    
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sometimes used in conjunction with terms such as “crisis”, “disaster”, and “scandal”, 
and Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 20) has noted the relationship between crisis and 
policy failure: 
 
“Ironically, some policy episodes assume a crisis character precisely 
because they become labeled as a policy fiasco becomes apparent (e.g., 
re being “scandalized”), since authorities may then be forced to engage 
in damage control under severe public and political pressure, placing 
them in a crisis-like predicament”  
 
Rather than perceiving it as a “crisis-like predicament”, policy failure should be 
regarded as a type of crisis which may harm government legitimacy.  
Meaning-making is an important process to ‘discover’ policy failure, and, similar to 
other kinds of crises introduced at the beginning of this chapter, policy failure 
engages with different stakeholders in the society, including citizens, the media, and 
politicians, especially the lawmakers in the legislature (Bovens and 't Hart 1996, 10).  
As a social construction, Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 11-13) proposed the following 
four interrelated layers involving the notion of policy failure: 
 
1) Assessing events: How bad is bad? 
2) Identifying agents: Who or what brought this about? 
3) Explaining agents’ behavior: What prompted their actions? 
4) Evaluating agents’ behavior: Who is to blame?  
 
The authors further illustrated the four layers with an example of algae pollution:  
An extraordinary large piece of algae was found covering most of the surface of a 
lake in a long, hot summer.  The lack of oxygen thus caused had led to a massive 
rise in fish mortality.  Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 11) pointed out that the assessment 
of this event (first layer) is open to subjective interpretation, as what is upsetting and 
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generating strong negative feeling to some may just be regular happening to others.  
In this algae example for instance, fishermen might consider it a major disaster, 
while marine biologists, for example, might simply regard it as a common cycle in 
the ecosystem.  The second layer concerns the identification of agents (Bovens and 
't Hart 1996, 12): What was causing the overgrowth of algae in the lake?  Was it an 
act of god? Was it the consequence of the long and hot summer?  Or was it related 
to the farming activities nearby?  On the third layer, explanations should be given 
on the policy process producing the negative event (Bovens and 't Hart 1996, 13).  
In this example, the water department should provide reasons for its failure to purify 
waste water, and the agriculture department had to explain its negligence in limiting 
the amount of fertilizers used in the area.  The final layer would involve identifying 
the entity to be blamed.  Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 13-14) argued that the case could 
only be considered a proper policy failure when a successful claim was made stating 
that the situation was serious and avoidable.  In practice, the blaming process might 
include inquiries on the possibilities and reasons for ignorance of the problem by the 
decision-maker, the correctness of the policy instrument chosen, and also the 
likelihood of implementation fault.  In the algae example, the implementation gap 
due to an absence of sufficient personnel on law enforcement might be a possible 
reason. 
 
“Failure” is seen as artifacts, as it is not inherent in the policy itself (Bovens and 't 
Hart 1996, 21), but a judgment about the event (Hyatt 1988, 31-33).  It should be 
identified as a political act instead of recognition on fact (Edelman 1988, 31).  
Policy failure might not necessarily become a political crisis automatically.  
However, it can be a political process for actors to name and to blame on 
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 280). 
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Policymakers and government will be in great problem once an incident attracts the 
attention of actors who are willing and able to politicize it (Brandstrom and Kuipers 
2003, 281).  From a crisis management perspective, by examining the pattern of 
politicization, Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003, 282) study suggested how actors use 
framing mechanisms to allocate or refract blame. 
 
Framing and blaming 
Based on the two case studies of navy failure in Sweden, and the Dutch and the 
Srebrenica massacre, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003, 302) developed a “decision 
tree” (Figure 3.1) for constructing blame by framing political crises, proposing three 
dimensions of blame-casting.  The first level is “constructing severity”, which refers 
to the consideration of whether an event has violated core public values (Brandstrom 
and Kuipers 2003, 209) enough to draw public attention and political debates.  For 
example, issues related to officials’ conflict of interest or corruption can be regarded 
as violating core public values.  The crisis status is a vital factor, as the public is 
forgetful, and public attention on a specific event is not long-lasting.  Therefore, an 
issue has to “catch on” as soon as possible.  Otherwise, public interest on the crisis 
may divest quickly and shift to another “hottest” topic of the moment (Brandstrom 
and Kuipers 2003, 291, Kingdon 1995, 104).  
 
The second level is the discovery stage known as the “agency dimension”.  Crisis 
can be an ad hoc individual event or may be a symptom of bigger systematic fault 
behind the scene.  In the politicization process, actors may try to broaden the time 
frame of the event and go back in time to search for the “powerful underlining causes” 
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295), as the saying goes: Going back in time means 
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going up the hierarchy
23
.  By travelling back in time, the horizon of investigation 
would be broadened, leading to possible discovery of the involvement of more 
people or even higher ranking officials.  Obviously, systematic failure shocks the 
current institution more seriously than an individual fault.  Therefore, from the 
government’s perspective, it is politically safer to position a case as an “ad hoc” 
failure at technical and subordinate level.  However, once the case has been 
identified as a systematic failure, policy, institution, and top level officials will be 
involved (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295). 
 
The final stage, “responsibility dimension”, follows directly from the agency 
dimension. The core question in this dimension is: Should blame be concentrated or 
dispersed?  If defenders argue that the problem is due to systematic failure, they are 
trying to frame the blame to the chain system of complexity with many actors 
interplaying.  This is a case of dispersed blame: A conclusion of bearing collective 
account means no one is accountable, and sanction is avoided (D. Thompson 1980).  
On the contrary, if an event is framed as a failure of single actors, scapegoating will 
be the most likely outcome ( (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 298).  
 
The decision tree model provides fruitful analyses on frames and blame from a 
highly politicized and interactive perspective.  However, by starting with “The 
problem occurs” (see Figure 3.1), the model seems to limit the crisis management of 
policy failure to a “blame game” (Hood 2002) between wrongdoer (government) and 
its opponents.  While studying a failed policy is essential in this field, scholars are 
more interested in the process of failing of a policy.  As Bovens and 't Hart (1996, 4) 
argued, a policy that seems to be good in the beginning may fail later – if there is an 
                                                 
23
 See Bovens and 't Hart’s Understanding Policy Fiascoes. 
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implementation gap between the policy content and the execution. 
 
2.3.2  Crisis Aftermath: Learning and Policy Change 
Learning the lesson after a crisis is a common expectation for people.  There is no 
doubt that a government should learn from a crisis, correct anything that went wrong, 
and prevent similar crises from happening in the future (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 
2005, 116).  According to the authors, the key to crisis learning is the “capability to 
learn appropriate lessons and implement the lessons learned”. However, in reality, 
different instructional barriers can make this difficult to achieve.  
 
Learning and change are two closely-linked concepts in crisis aftermath studies, as 
scholars see crisis as an opportunity for policy and instructional change.  On the 
positive side, crisis makes unthinkable and politically undesirable changes possible, 
as institutions and systems, which tend to be stable under normal situation, find their 
constraints loosened during crises, especially in highly politicized ones.  Moreover, 
crisis is a time for alternatives – a time for the non-functioning old methods to give 
way to new changes, arrangements, and innovations.  It should be noted that the 
political condition for change should affect all levels of the government, from its top 
leaders to street-level bureaucrats (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 122).  
However, as pointed out by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005, 122) and Stern (1997, 
69), there can also be change without learning.   
 
The extent to which change is happening is also of concern, and can be dealt with 
through two approaches, namely, the conservative approach and the reformist 
approach.  The conservative approach focuses on maintaining the core element of 
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status quo by introducing incremental changes to the current institution.  On the 
other hand, the reformist approach tends to redesign the current institution in order to 
respond to entirely new environment in the aftermath.  The crisis mood is puffed-up 
in order to legitimate the new system as a kind of crisis resolution.  Boin, 't Hart, 
Stern, et al. (2005, 128) claimed that incumbent leaders are more likely to be 
conservative, as they would like to maintain their vested interest. 
 
Crisis as ‘policy window’ 
Crises are often conceptualized as a window of opportunity
24
 that creates political 
space for new policy proposals.  In his multi-stream model, Kingdon proposed three 
streams: Problems, policies, and politics
25
, which combine to shape political agendas, 
and the “policy window”, which serves as an opportunity of coupling in order to 
produce policy outcome.  Kingdon (1995, 165) defined “policy window” as “an 
opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solution or to push attention 
to their special problems”, and he further illustrated the idea by applying it on 
different crises and disasters.  For example, a collision of a commercial airliner with 
a private aircraft over San Diego became a policy window (i.e., political opportunity) 
to impose controls over private planes (Kingdon 1995, 175), and the collapse of the 
Penn Central Railroad provided a window to regulate the financial condition of 
                                                 
24
 For the term “policy window” and other related interpretations, see Kingdon (1995, 165); John 
Keeler. "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making." 
Comparative Political Studies, 25, no. 4, [January 1993]: 433-486.  For studies mentioning the 
possibility of crisis bringing a policy window, see Stern, 69-86; Boin “The New World of Crises and 
Crisis Management”, 367-377.; Boin, 't Hart, et al., 115-136; Sander Dekker and Dan Hansen. 
"Learning under Pressure; The Effects of Politicization on Organization Learning in Public 
Bureaucracies." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14, no. 2 [2004]: 219.; Arjen 
Boin and Paul 't Hart. "Institutional Crises and Reforms in Policy Sector." In Government Institutions: 
Effects, Changes, and Normative Foundations, by Hendrik Wagenaar, [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000]: 9-31. 
25
 Problem stream concerns problem framing and identification, policy stream concerns the 
presentation of feasible and commonly accepted solutions, and political stream concerns the level of 
support from the people and different political actors in the government (i.e., “national mood”).  For 
details, please see Kingdon (1995). 
73 
 
railroad companies (Kingdon 1995, 174). 
 
Keeler (1993) also saw crisis as a policy window, albeit in a different way than 
Kingdon (1995), Dekker and Hansen (2004).  Rather than viewing politics stream 
as being ready before the opportunity came, Keeler (1993, 437) suggested the 
crisis-mandate mechanism, stating that the severity of crisis might alter the results of 
elections, which in turn could directly or indirectly affect the existence of window of 
reform.  Using Kingdon’s typology, crisis as policy window (problem window 
(Kingdon 1995, 173) initiated from the problems stream) may also affect the 
“national mood”26 (Kingdon 1995, 146) in reverse through elections by producing 
impressive mandate for opposition parties (Keeler 1993, 440). 
 
2.3.3  Summary 
This section introduced two angles from which to view the relationship between 
crisis and public policy.  People who view policy failure as governance crisis will 
agree with the argument of “reform-induced crisis”, whereas policy scientists who 
consider crisis as a window of opportunity for changes will support the idea of 
“crisis-induced reform”.  In fact, these two statements are not mutually exclusive 
and are open to interpretation.  In Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s (2005, 134) words, the 
study of crisis and public policy “remains an open question whether crises trigger 
systemic change or whether they forestall such change and to what extent these 
process can be channeled by good crisis governance”.  This statement contains a 
very important component in the current research: Process.  Unlike the current field 
                                                 
26
 Kingdon (1995, 146) defined “national mood” as “the notion that a rather large number of people 
out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood changes from one 
time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts 
on policy agendas and policy outcomes”. 
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of policy study, there is a lot of unknown in crisis management process and 
consequences, and a research gap exists in the current literature, which has mostly 
focused on analyzing crisis as a window for policy change and as an aftermath 
learning opportunity. 
 
The next section will briefly discuss the importance of media in crisis management.  
Crisis communication is an inevitable element of an effective crisis management.  It 
also severs as theoretical foundation to the “forces” which directs the development 
process of crises and will be discussed in the State-society Interactive Framework. 
 
2.4  Media and the Politics of Crises 
The active role of the media in monitoring the government has long been discussed 
in literature, as Cater’s (1959, 7) classical study called it the “fourth branch of 
government”.  Cook (1998, 3) concurred, adding that the media is not only part of 
politics, but also part of the government.  Jamieson and Waldman (2003, 95) further 
described the power of the press to “both cover events and, in choosing what to 
report and how to report it, shape their outcomes”.  
 
Baumgartner, Jones, and Leech (1997, 349-350) suggested that since only the most 
newsworthy story can stay on the headlines, and “old stories must make way for new 
stories”, government officials would attempt an “imitation of media attention” by 
choosing the most promising issue on the media and paying attention to it.   
 
As a “problem” when identified, a crisis always draws the attention of various media 
as it happens.  The significance of the role of the media in crisis management had 
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been identified as early as in 1920s, as Lippmann (1922, 362) mentioned that the 
media is “in charge with the duty of translating the whole public life of mankind”.  
This is especially the case in recent years, as the media is moving from a top-down 
watchdog telling the audience what they should know towards magnifying the 
conservations within the society (Deuze 2005, 455, Salleh 2008, 242), leading to the 
increase in complexity of crisis management as a process as the mass media becomes 
a battlefield for different actors to create and direct frames in controversies - 
“pictures inside the heads” (Lippmann 1922, 30), that could direct public opinion and, 
to a certain extent, construct crises. 
 
2.4.1  Crisis Communication: the Mediation and ‘Mediatization’ of Crises  
Political communication, in its broadest sense, refers to the interrelationship between 
politicians and the journalists.  Specifically, “journalists needed politicians for news 
about government and for information about what took place in the policy process; 
politicians needed journalists for news about society and for media exposure” (de 
Beus 2011, 19).  Mazzoleni and Schulz distinguished the commonly used 
“mediation” from “mediatization”, as the former simply describes the transmission 
of message by the mass media, while the latter suggests that political institutions are 
now more dependent and influenced by the mass media (Brants and Voltmer 2011, 5, 
Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, 247).  Brants and Voltmer (2011) further suggested 
that as contemporary political communication can be seen as the changes taking 
place in the two dimensions of mediatization and de-centralization.  As a horizontal 
dimension, mediatization describes the closely-related but competitive relationship 
between politicians (political institution) and journalists (the mass media), while the 
vertical dimension of de-centralization addresses the interaction between the public 
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and the politicians and journalists on the one hand, and the public as the ultimate 
audience of these messages on the other (Brants and Voltmer 2011, 3).     
 
‘Spin doctor’ 
‘Spin doctor’ refers to those communication professionals who are employed by 
politicians in order to “generate publicity, boost their images and manage the news” 
(de Vreese and Elenbaas 2011, 75).  Spin doctors become exceptionally important 
during a crisis situation as they use the power of language to manipulate media 
coverage in order to protect their boss – the politicians - from negative publicity, as 
the politicians themselves prefer not to be associated directly with a crisis or a 
scandal (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 299).  Spin doctors can definitely play 
important roles in mediatization, as they are experts in framing media coverage in a 
direction that favors the politician they serve.  One of the tactics that is always 
applicable is scapegoating, which can transfer and reduce the blame towards the real 
power-holder. 
 
Crisis communication 
By definition, crisis communication supports crisis management through reducing 
uncertainty about response, public perception, resolution, blame, and consequences 
(Palttala and Vos 2012, 39).  It should cover the whole crisis period starting from 
the pre-crisis perpetration to the crisis aftermath, and should be stakeholder-oriented 
(Palttala and Vos 2012, 41).  Miller and Goidel (2009, 267) argued the media is 
performing better than the government in communicating and satisfying the growing 
hunger for information in the public during a disaster, as the media is supposed to 
work under professional norms and procedures. 
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In summary, communication is crucial to crisis management.  People are eager for 
information and directions, especially in natural disasters.  However, from a 
political perspective, crisis communication should be more than message 
transmission.  It should be an important component of political communication, 
which, with an emphasis on mediatization, reflects the using of media to serve 
political agenda.  Nevertheless, crisis communication maintains its uniqueness in 
delivering emergent information, which is not always as ‘mediatized’ as political 
communication.    
 
In the coming section, the local Hong Kong studies on governance and crisis will be 
presented.  It would provide directions to what kinds of crisis studies in Hong Kong 
should be enriched.  It would be closely related to the justification on case selection, 
the research themes and focuses of the entire thesis.  
 
2.5  Studying the Governance of Hong Kong 
Crisis management studies in Hong Kong were insufficient (C.-k. Lo 2007).  
Alternatively, some studies focus on the “governance” of Hong Kong would be to 
some extent relevant.  Regarding political research in Hong Kong, Lau, Wun, and 
Shum (1999) identified four major areas of study, namely, 1) political system and 
institutions; 2) organization and process; 3) external relations (including with 
Mainland China); and, 4) regime transition.  In a later work, P. Cheung (2005, 35) 
suggested six major research themes in the field of political science in Hong Kong, 
including: 1) Political and administrative institutions; 2) state-society relations; 3) 
political participation and democratization; 4) public administration and public 
policy; 5) Hong Kong’s governance since 1997 and the implementation of the ‘One 
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Country, Two Systems’ policy; and, 6) China’s reform and open door policy, and 
mentioned that “governance problems” is a prospective area for future study (P. 
Cheung 2005, 41).  This, to some extent, reflects the potential of conducting 
governance crises and crisis management research in the Hong Kong context.  
 
As previously mentioned, studies on crises and governance crises can be found in a 
wide variety fields besides crisis management, and studies in the Hong Kong context 
is no exception.  In fact, scholars from various fields have addressed the “challenges” 
faced by the political and administrative institutions of Hong Kong before and after 
the handover.  For example, Burns (2004) discussed the relationship between Hong 
Kong civil service and governance, while Scott (2005, 2009) and Cheung and Lee 
(2001) are works on public sector reform in Hong Kong.  An institutional study of 
Hong Kong by A. Cheung (2008b, 126-128) found that the institutional erosion after 
1997 is a result of state-society disconnection, and, from a policymaking perspective, 
Scott (2007, 29) suggested the policy arena of the post-1997 Hong Kong has largely 
been “one of failure and paralysis”.  A. Cheung (2007) explained this with the 
mismatch of outdated (colonial) policy system and current political environment.  
Finally, Chiu and Wong (2012) touched upon critical sociopolitical issues in Hong 
Kong such as on state intervention
27
 and the development of democracy
28
 in Hong 
Kong, which, to some extent, suggested that the governance of Hong Kong is now in 
crisis. 
 
Obviously, the challenge that stands out in recent years is the unprecedented political 
                                                 
27
 Ma Ngok suggested that Hong Kong is now entering a corporatist regime that “the 
business-dominated and corporatist nature of the regime had led to a new legitimacy crisis for Hong 
Kong.” (Ma, Eclectic corporatism and state interventions in post-colonial Hong Kong 2012, 88) 
28
 In the line with Ma (2012), Ku argued that “the context for governance and citizenship has become 
much more complicated in present-day politics” (Ku 2012, 145).  
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context under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle after the handover, which 
has made the governance of Hong Kong SAR under Beijing influence a hot topic for 
investigation.  An example is Y.-c.Wong’s (2004) study that highlighted the major 
events and political and legal changes that shed light on the practice of “One Country, 
Two Systems” and Hong Kong's relationship with international players.  M. Chan 
(2008) is a collection of work that illustrated the major dynamics faced by Hong 
Kong in different aspects, one of which is a study by A. Cheung (2008a), suggesting 
that Hong Kong is paying a lot of effort in attempting to find a role under “China’s 
overall trajectory towards affluent and strong nationhood”.  Finally, So (2011) 
attempted to illustrate the swing between “One-country” and “Two-systems” in Hong 
Kong polity due to different crises from a crisis-transformation perspective.  
 
The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph reflect the uniqueness of 
investigating the political environment in Hong Kong after 1997.  In fact, the 
government was faced with a number of crises of different natures during the first 
one and a half decade of Hong Kong SAR.  In studying these crises, scholars mostly 
view them as political issues for case studies instead of conducting crisis 
management research.  For example, A. Cheung (2005a) focused on crises and the 
institutional system of Hong Kong, while some researchers considered those crises 
evidence of poor governance under a non-democratic political system (Y.-c. Wong 
1998, 492).  In any case, it will be helpful to review the different crises studies in 
Hong Kong. 
 
2.5.1  Issue-based Research on Crises in Hong Kong 
Crisis related studies in Hong Kong are mostly issue-based.  Huque and Lee’s (2000) 
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work had chosen the crises of Retirement of an Immigration Chief, Bird Flu and the 
Opening of Hong Kong International Airport as case studies which happened during 
the period of handover of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China.  They provided 
insights and suggestions to manage crises in the provision of public service. 
Especially, they have pointed out the changing political system would lead to an 
adversarial relationship between the government and the legislature (Huque and Lee 
2000, 118) in which turn out to be true after 15 years of HKSAR establishment.   
 
After the handover, more studies had mentioned the SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak in 2003 as an example of crisis (A. Cheung 2005b, 
Lee and Chan 2009, Powers and Xiao 2008, Baehr 2006).  The outbreak of SARS 
from March to June 2003 was a serious public health issue, as almost 300 people 
died in Hong Kong as a result of the disease.  Three investigation reports
29
 were 
published after SARS was controlled, but none of them paid serious attention from 
the crisis management perspective.  Despite the fact that the Hong Kong 
Government has learnt important lessons on prevention, communication, leadership, 
and accountability, SARS was considered one of the direct causes of the 1 July 
2003-500,000 people Demonstration, a critical event in post-handover Hong Kong, 
and an example of a public health crisis-turned governance-related political crisis.  
 
Considering the shocking effect of the Demonstration, there is no surprise that it has 
become the main focus of a huge amount of scholarly work, from J. Cheng (2007), 
who provided a general account on different aspects that contributed to the 
                                                 
29
 After the SARS outbreak, three major investigation reports were conducted by the SARS Expert 
Committee appointed by the government, the Legislative Council and the Hospital Authority 
respectively.  The reports provided detailed and comprehensive account and analysis on each 
response taken by the government and the Hospital Authority.  See chapter 4.3. 
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Demonstration, to Chan and Chan (2007, 78) and So (2008, 239), who respectively 
described the Demonstration as a watershed of Hong Kong civil society development 
and an even that “raised Hong Kong social movement to a new height”. 
 
With reference to the SARS crisis, K. Lee (2009) developed a framework to study 
crisis communication of the HKSAR Government, and argued that the poor 
performance of the government has led to a loss of public trust, as it has failed in:  
 
1) Demonstrating effectiveness of government authorities in prevention 
/containment;  
2) Improving its communication management;  
3) Minimizing media scrutiny;  
4) Reassuring the public in its ability to take preventive measures in the 
future; 
5) Demonstrating strong leadership; 
6) Demonstrating strong commitment to public good; 
7) Showing flexibility and good communication between government 
agencies; and,  
8) Minimizing the effects of external crisis environment on government 
decisions (K. Lee 2009, 74-76). 
 
Although K. Lee’s study has provided ample results on political communication (4 
viewpoints out of the 8 above), a comprehensive evaluation of government 
performance in crisis management is still lacking. 
 
Apart from the SARS crisis, the Hong Kong SAR Government has seen a series of 
social and political crises affecting its governance in its 15 years of existence, which 
in turn has become the focus of studies on either ad-hoc incidents or political crises 
that rooted in the unique “One Country, Two Systems” polity of Hong Kong.  An 
example is Wong and Kwan (2002), who evaluated the learning process of the 
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HKSAR Government in the three waves of “Bird Flu”30 and addressed the potential 
threats from other food scares.  Their conclusion was that the “poor co-ordination 
and inefficiency … damaged the Hong Kong Government’s creditability” (Wong and 
Kwan 2002, 1).   
 
On the other hand, in studying the institutional or political system of Hong Kong, Lui 
and Chiu (2007) pointed out that the present governance crises could not be 
explained simply in terms of rapid civil society development.  Rather, through a 
political-economy perspective, they discovered that the main reason is a failure to 
build a new state-business alliance.  In addition, A. Cheung (2005a, 146) accounted 
for the many failures of the government and relevant departments and agencies by 
the lack of contingency planning and a clear command and coordination structure, 
especially in-between departments, which he considered the major loopholes of the 
government on crisis management. 
 
There are also studies associating the rising number of crises in recent years with the 
gradual increase in political influence from Beijing.  For example, Y.-c. Wong (2006) 
argued that the Article 23 legislation, which led to the 2003 Demonstration, was a 
strategy adopted by the Beijing government to change the fundamentals of Hong 
Kong polity gradually – a strategy that he called “Leninist integration”.  So and 
Chan (2002, 363), on the other hand, described five major crises in Hong Kong SAR 
in areas of democracy, constitution, governability, development, and legitimacy that 
has shifted the Hong Kong polity towards soft authoritarian developmentalism
31
.  
                                                 
30
 The avian flu (also known as “Bird Flu”) was caused by the H5N1 virus from chicken, and was 
first found to infect human in 1997, leading to the mass slaughter of chicken in Hong Kong. 
Outbreaks occurred again in 2001 and 2002. 
31
 The idea of soft authoritarian developmentalism refers to Beijing’s strategic concerns on 
maintaining “an executive-led government that facilitated the state’s capacity to embark onto the 
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Scholars on crisis management in Hong Kong have been studying governance and 
the performance of the government as a whole, while treating crisis study as simply 
one of the elements of studying governance.  That is, they have paid a lot of 
attention on the overall loopholes of the government (institutions) without carefully 
investigating and discussing the actions and responses taken.  Considering the 
importance of government responses in crisis management, it is justified to conduct 
crisis management research on state-society interactions in post-1997 Hong Kong. 
 
2.5.2  Studies on Civil Society and Social Movement in Hong Kong 
According to Chan and Chan (2007, 81-82), civil society has its autonomy, and can 
be taken as a third sector to provide services to the public, as it is not free from the 
influence of the government, and it has played an active role in government policy 
process (Chan and Chan 2007, 81-82).  These features are closely related to the 
government’s crisis management in two senses: First, civil society aims to fill the 
loopholes left by the government during crisis (mainly in disaster) by providing 
immediate and appropriate services to the public, and, second, to make its opinions 
matter in the policy process, civil society works to communicate and interact with the 
government.  In short, since civil society tends to involve in government 
policymaking process, it could impact on government crisis management.   
 
Some of the social issues that draw the attention of the civil society may become 
potential crisis for government. For example, historical heritage conservation cases 
(Chan and Chan 2007, 90-91) are related to civil society development.  From the 
                                                                                                                                          
development track, and to lay the foundation of soft-authoritarianism” (So and Chan, 2002: 382), 
resulting in a weakened role of key players in the civil society by self-constraint.     
84 
 
government’s perspective, it can be a potential crisis if the cases were being poorly 
tackled.   
 
The 2003 Demonstration is a prime example of the reaction of civil society on the 
government’s intention to tighten freedom (Y.-c. Wong 1998, 493), and its effect on 
the government’s decisions and actions (Chan and Chan 2007).  Although the 
“transformation of a single anti-government rally into a continuous pro-democracy 
movement was not a matter of chance” (Chan and Chan 2007, 114), it, along with the 
development of the new and important channel of mobilization that is the internet 
(So 2008, Ma 2009, 59), at least provide the political opportunities for the 
pan-democrats to form a close-alliance with social forces outside the formal 
institution (Chan and Lee 2007), and help facilitate the transformation of social 
movement.  Obviously, civil society should have a role on crisis management from 
the very beginning of framing the crisis and until the end.  
 
2.6  Conclusion: Avenues for Crisis Management Research in Hong Kong 
Through a review of current literature, the various definitions on the concepts of 
crisis are presented and definitions from different schools are evaluated.  Even 
though the common perception for crisis is always negative, different people have 
different standards for good and bad.  Thus, accepting crisis as a situation that 
demands (government) responses is a more reliable alternative.  Further, the 
theoretical limitations of current typologies on crisis are discussed.  Defining crisis 
typology is essential for conducting academic research on the topic, as different types 
of crisis may have different features and patterns, and a clear typology is helpful in 
determining the possible outcomes for different kinds of crisis. 
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The theoretical limitations on current theories for crisis studies are also explained 
through a discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches in crisis management.  
The top-down approach mainly focuses on the managerial issues on crisis, while the 
bottom-up approach views crisis as a political process that exerts political pressure 
on government.  In fact, these two approaches are neither mutually exclusive nor 
directly compatible, so, a new research framework is developed for the current study 
using them as foundation and reference. 
 
Besides studying conventional crisis studies, the current research also devotes 
attention to research on related topics, such as political scandal and policy failure.  
This serves two purposes: First, discovering similarities in related topics could be 
helpful in defining, refining, developing, and expanding the field of crisis 
management; and, second, by organizing and gathering thoughts and ideas from 
studies on related topics, this thesis attempts to put different kinds of (potential) 
governance crisis on the same platform for analysis.  For example, incorporating 
ideas from media and communication studies on the state-society interactive 
framework in crisis management is helpful for the development of a more 
comprehensive argument. 
 
Lastly, a review on crisis studies in Hong Kong recognizes a lack of theory-based 
academic research in the Hong Kong context, as most crisis theories and models are 
based on Western democratic society, and may not be applicable to a non-democratic 
regime with a relatively high level of liberty like Hong Kong.  The unique 
socio-political background in post-1997 Hong Kong makes the discussion on 
state-society interactions valuable in explaining crisis and crisis governance.  By 
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using Hong Kong examples, the linkage among government, different political actors 
and the civil society, that is, the politicization in crisis management, is investigated.   
 
In the next two chapters, analytical frameworks of this thesis will be introduced.  
Frist, the two contemporary crisis management approaches, namely, the Leadership 
Approach and the Politicization Approach will be introduced in Chapter Three.  
Second, in Chapter Four, the State-society Interactive Framework, a useful 
contribution developed in this research, will be illustrated.  
87 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART I – 
CONTEMPORARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
 
Analytical framework is best described as the backbone of a research.  The current 
study applies the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach as the pillars 
for the research framework, details of both are explained in the first part of this 
chapter.  This is followed by deliberations on the theoretical discussion on the two 
approaches and to gives elementary analysis on their potential weaknesses in 
applying to Hong Kong – a limited democracy.  The discussion here also forms the 
theoretical bases of the useful contribution of the current work - the State-society 
Interactive Framework which will be presented in the next chapter.  
 
Analytical Framework: Selection of Two Crisis Management Approaches 
The analytical framework for the current research is constructed on two crisis 
management approaches currently available, namely, Leadership Approach and 
Political Approach.  The Leadership Approach is based on Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et 
al.’s (2005) “Crisis management in political systems: Five leadership challenges”, 
while the components for the Political Approach are generated from Brandstrom and 
Kuipers’s (2003) arguments on selective politicization of policy failure.  As briefly 
discussed in the literature review, the first approach can be classified as the top-down 
managerial oriented approach, and the second one as bottom-up political oriented 
approach. 
 
Both approaches are based on the western democratic system, in which governments 
are accountable to their people through periodic election, and the people generally 
enjoys a high level of liberty in many aspects, such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
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press, and freedom of assembly.  However, the political system in Hong Kong is 
complex.  As a partial democracy, Hong Kong’s executive branch is led by the 
Chief Executive, who is elected by an Election Committee with 1,200 members.  
More importantly, most of the committee members are indirectly selected by the 
Beijing government through a “coterie”, or “small-circle”, election system.  On the 
other hand, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong consists of two constituencies, 
namely, the Geographical Constituency and the Functional Constituency.  Even 
though both constituencies have an equal number of seats in the LegCo, only the GC 
adopts direct election under a proportional representative system. Most of the 
constituencies (“sectors”) in the FC are won by members elected through the 
“small-circle” election under strong Beijing influence. 
 
Owing to the special features in the Hong Kong political system, there may be some 
problems in applying the two approaches to study crisis management in Hong Kong.  
Regarding the applicability of western crisis management theories in the Hong Kong 
context, three sub-questions are raised in this thesis: First, how does a 
non-democratically elected executive branch execute crisis management when it 
cannot be held accountable by the general public?  Second, how does the 
semi-democratic legislature perform its check-and-balance role on the executive 
branch during crises?  Third, with a high level of liberty, how do other stakeholders, 
such as the opposition parties and mass media, contribute to the crisis framing 
process? 
 
3.1  Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s Five Tasks Leadership Approach  
The Five Tasks Leadership Approach (Leadership Approach) suggested by Boin, 't 
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Hart, Stern, et al. (2005, hereafter BHS 2005) can be interpreted as “how crisis 
leadership contributes to defending, destroying, or renovating” the established 
political and organizational orders.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are 
five crucial tasks to complete when dealing with a crisis: Sense-making, 
decision-making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (BHS 2005, 10). 
 
3.1.1  Sense-making 
BHS (2005, 18) defined sense-making as “grasping crises as they unfold”.  Using 
the 911 Incident as an example, the authors illustrated the importance of early 
recognition of a crisis.  However, decision-makers always overlook available 
signals before the threat, which, according to BHS (2005, 28), could be due to 
psychological reasons that are beyond the scope of the current research, or 
organizational limitations, which best reflect the barriers to crisis recognition.  
Specifically, organizations are set up to perform tasks under normal situation, and are 
not designed for crisis (BHS 2005, 20).  Further, their performances are measured 
by whether they have achieved the goals assigned to them, and thus, they may 
choose to ignore or have no interest in problems that are out of their mandates (BHS 
2005, 21).  Also, the size and complexity of modern organization makes it difficult 
for messages from frontline officials to reach the top levels, even if those are signals 
of a crisis, and with the adoption of the rational-scientific approach, some routine 
crises are taken as acceptable risk, thus, potential threats are possibly ignored.  
Recall that crisis is a name given by people. Therefore, crisis status would not be 
granted without the recognition of a large amount of people, and as a result people 
may pay no heed to it. 
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3.1.2  Decision-Making 
In general, leaders are not the sole decision-maker in a crisis - they manage the crisis 
with the assistance of their crisis teams.  It is impossible for the leaders to control 
the whole crisis response process on their own, and thus a certain degree of 
delegation and decentralization is important.  In reality, a small group is usually 
formed to coordinate the crisis response effort, which was recognized as a 
disadvantage by BHS (2005, 45) due to the presence of group dynamics such as 
newness and conformity, excessive cordiality and conformity, and centrifugally and 
politicking.  In this regard, coordination within the crisis management network is 
important.  However, as BHS (2005, 64) stated, “an effective crisis response cannot 
be forced; it is to large extent the result of a naturally evolving process.  It cannot be 
managed in linear, step-by-step and comprehensive fashion from a single crisis 
center”.  
  
3.1.3  Meaning-Making 
Meaning-making in crisis management is about political communication.  Unlike 
the Politicization Approach that will be detailed later, crisis communication in the 
Leadership Approach is an attempt to reduce the political uncertainty caused by the 
crisis (BHS 2005, 69).  It is mainly a top-down process, as it creates a “persuasive 
story line that explains what happened, why it had to be in that way, what its 
repercussions are, how it can be resolved, who can be relied upon to do so, and who 
is to blame” (BHS 2005, 69-70).  Under the high pressure exerted by the mass 
media as the fault-finder, the government is obliged to release information.  BHS05 
(76-77) described three factors that are particularly important in government crisis 
communication: The degree of preparedness, the degree of coordination of outgoing 
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information, and the degree of professionalization.  Crisis communication is a battle 
of credibility for leaders, and the three meaning-making strategies of framing, 
ritualization, and masking ('t Hart 1993) are usually adopted, as detailed in the 
literature review. 
 
3.1.4  Terminating 
Terminating a crisis is an implication that the time to assign accountability has 
arrived.  There are two dimensions to crisis closure, namely operational closure and 
political closure.  BHS (2005, 97) described the key challenges facing the two types 
of closure, specifically, “to make an accurate and balanced assessment of the need to 
keep the crisis response infrastructure in place” for operational closure, and “to 
recognize when the breakdown of symbolic order has been restored” for political 
closure, in which “leaders must also assess the political expediency of crisis 
termination.  When a crisis reaches the stage of assigning accountability, the 
government would try to avoid the blame game, though usually without success.  In 
this situation, government officials will defend themselves by claiming that “they 
made no mistake”.  
 
3.1.5  Learning 
Although crisis can be an opportunity for reforms (Boin and 't Hart 2000), in reality 
reform does not always follow, unless government performance deficit is discovered 
during the crisis, and the old routine has proven to be unfeasible in crisis.  However, 
learning after crisis does not necessarily lead to changes, as changes can be a gesture 
of responsibility, a forceful action, or merely a public relations tactic, in which case 
the government is making changes just to please the public, rather than having learnt 
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a lesson.  In some cases, the change process cannot be seen, as the enabling factors 
are aborted or subverted (BHS 2005, 122).  This is in fact learning without change. 
 
3.2  Brandstrom and Kuipers’s Pattern of Politicization Approach 
Crisis, as an abnormal situation, does not only affect the government, but also other 
political actors and the general public.  During a crisis, different actors compete for 
the chance to “name” the failure, and the event becomes politicized when “influential 
actors in the political arena succeed in framing them as blameworthy violations of 
crucial public values” (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 208).  The politicization 
process is important to crisis management, as it can transform a normal incident into 
a governance crisis.  As raised by Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003, 282), the major 
question to ask in the politicization process is “how do actors use framing strategies 
to (re)allocate blame for politicized incidents?”  Obviously, political outcomes do 
not necessarily reflect the real performance of the government in certain crises 
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 280), as the identification of failure is not the 
recognition of a fact (Edelman 1977), but a man-made process. 
 
Figure 3.1 is an illustration of Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003, 290) three 
perspectives of framing and blaming in the Pattern of Politicization Approach: 
 
1) Depicting the events as a violation of core public values (constructing 
severity); 
2) Depicting the events as an operational incident or a symptom of 
endemic problems (constructing agency); and, 
3) Allocating accountability and blame for the occurrence and/or 
“mismanagement” of crisis (constructing responsibility). 
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3.2.1  Constructing Severity 
Based on political crisis and policy failure, the Politicization Approach was 
introduced to assign responsibility and blame.  At the heart of the Politicization 
Process is the difference between an incident and a crisis, which is undoubtedly a 
matter of framing.  Thus, as a first step, the violation of core public values serves as 
the watershed to distinguish a crisis from accidents or incidents.  Specifically, when 
political actors frame an incident as a violation of public core values, the event 
becomes a crisis, and vice versa.  The timing is important in this situation, as 
Kingdon (1995, 104) argued that people tend to forget an incident in a short time if 
there were no further decision.  Political actors are easily attracted by hot topics. 
Therefore, the more serious the event is, the more likely they will get involved into 
the coupling process.  For example, as Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) argued in 
their Sweden and the Netherlands examples, credibility and integrity should be core 
values for all governments.  If those values were violated, the issue would probably 
become politicized and gain the status of a crisis.  
 
3.2.2  Constructing Agency 
In constructing the status of a crisis, political actors would try to find out the reasons 
behind.  A crisis can either be a stand-alone, ad hoc disturbance in a system, or a 
symptom of a much larger systematic failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 295).  
Political actors would try to frame a crisis as systematic failure instead of an 
accidental fault, so that a severe blame can be imposed.  In order to make such a 
claim, it requires backward investigation over a broader time frame and upward 
investigation to senior-level officials.  Specifically, going back in time is to discover 
the fundamental reasons behind, while going up the hierarchy of decision-making is 
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to query the entire governance system (Bovens and 't Hart 1996).   
 
3.2.3  Constructing Responsibility 
Regardless of the reasons behind and the level of seriousness, the most important 
question in the final stage of the framing and blaming process would be: Who should 
be punished?  In this respect, a crisis can be divided into either actor failure or 
network failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 302).  As discussed in the 
construction of agency in the previous section, if a crisis were framed as an 
accidental event, it is being narrowed down to an occasional wrongdoing of an 
individual, which is the slightest level of blame, and the result would be an actor 
failure, meaning scapegoating.  On the other hand, the crisis would be an 
organization mishap if it were framed as a network failure, and the blame would be 
endured collectively.  However, the system would not be hurt if the crisis were 
framed as an operational or technical fault that happened sporadically. 
 
The blame would be tough if the crisis were found to be a symptom of a much larger 
systematic failure.  If it were being framed as an actor failure at this stage, the 
decision-maker will bear the blame.  However, if it were framed as a network 
failure, the whole institution would be responsible, as it implies an overall failure of 
the system.  This is the most serious blame that could be framed, as the government 
is found to be violating public core values in a systematic manner.  In this situation, 
the collapse of the current government may be a possible outcome. 
 
In applying the Politicization Approach, Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) selected a 
military incident in Sweden and the Netherlands respectively for illustration.  The 
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current study attempts to testify this approach by applying it on crises with different 
natures.  Specifically, since Hong Kong is a semi-democratic system, as opposed to 
the parliamentary system in Sweden and the Netherlands, the validity of the 
Politicization Approach in various crisis natures and political systems can be 
testified. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Constructing Blame by Framing Political Crises 
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003, 302) 
 
3.3  Theoretical Void in Crisis Management Approaches 
The limitations discussed in this section will demonstrate the theoretical gap in the 
field of crisis management.  These limitation would become the foundation of 
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constructing the State-society Interactive Framework which would be introduced in 
the next chapter . 
  
3.3.1  Absence of Multi-crisis Analysis 
As discussed in the literature review, the field of crisis managements is currently 
diverged.  In general, approaches and models in this field could be divided into 
managerial and political ones.  Some models are developed for specific types of 
crises, and thus, their applicability on other crises cases is doubtful.  Of the more 
famous studies, J. Thompson’s (2000) work on political scandal has become popular, 
especially after the Clinton sex scandal in the United States in 1998, and Bovens and 
't Hart’s (1996, 20) study on policy failure (they used “policy fiasco” as more serious 
failure) discussed the “crisis-like predicament” for unsuccessful policymaking.   
More importantly, major political crises are usually not due to sole reasons, but a 
consequence of a basket of crisis events that has led to severe public dissatisfaction.   
Thus, multi-crisis analysis is important as a connection between different areas of 
crisis management.     
 
3.3.2  Severity: the Prerequisite  
Most current crisis management theories and models, including the Leadership and 
Political Approaches, put their focus on positive cases, that is, serious crises leading 
to chaos and instability to the state and society, since their strength is in post crises 
assessment, but not in explaining why a crisis happened or was being “manipulated”.  
Thus, one of the major tasks for the State-society Interactive Framework is to study 
how different actors intensify or distort the crisis.  To do this, both significant cases 
and latent crisis have to be involved, so that questions on why and how crises 
emerged could be solved.  In addition, it is of interest to study, especially in 
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man-made crises, why some crises could be successfully politicized and could exert 
sufficient political pressure on the government change, and why others could not.    
 
Referring to the case studies which will be discussed in the later chapters, the 
Anti-High Speed Railway incident is a latent crisis, in which the perpetually 
eye-catching denotations and rallies could not lead to any change in the decision of 
the government.  This is evidence that current crisis management approaches are 
not completely applicable to latent crises, which is one of the major limitations in 
this field.  However, even though the severity dimension is important, it should not 
be treated as a threshold, as further discussion on non-crisis cases would be limited.  
 
3.3.3  Analyzing Crises: Process versus Aftermath 
Another significant attempt of the State-society Interactive Framework introduced in 
this research is to strengthen the explanatory power of the two theories, although the 
Politicization Approach seems to be able to better explain political outcomes (i.e., 
blame construction) than the Leadership Approach.  Even though crisis 
management has been considered by scholars as a process of development, current 
theories and approaches have not considered this point seriously, as most of them 
view crisis management as the study of aftermath.  Severity is always used as a 
threshold to eliminate latent crises, which should not happen if crisis were viewed as 
a process.  Instead, the severity of crises could be a possible outcome of crisis 
strengthening process, as would be detailed in the next chapter. 
 
The useful contribution of this thesis is to illustrate why only certain crises could 
lead to government change.  In order to achieve this, crisis should be viewed as a 
process but not an aftermath, since not every one of them could gain its crisis status 
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from the very beginning.  The SARS incident and the Basic Law Article 23 
controversy, for example, did not gain a crisis status until the incident unfolded and 
became serious.  The Anti-High Speed Railway movement could not even reach 
such level of severity.  Thus, the State-society Interactive Framework, which will be 
introduced in the next chapter, should be constructed so that it has the strength to 
explain the process of crisis politics, and at the same time, coincide with the “crisis 
as development” principle in crisis management theories.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART II – 
THE STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIVE FRAMEWORK
32
 
 
In view of the fragmented political structure with limited democracy in 
post-handover Hong Kong, in which there is a lack of effective check-and-balance 
mechanism through regular elections of the executive branch, and the comparatively 
liberal and pro-active civil society, especially the development of crisis-provoking 
politics in the city since the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, the State-society Interactive 
Framework is presented as an useful theoretical contribution of this thesis.  With an 
emphasis on the out-of-institution channels of interaction between the government 
and other non-state actors during crises, the State-society Interactive Framework is 
able to fill the gap where the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach of 
crisis management are found to be inadequate – in non-democratic regimes such as 
Hong Kong. 
 
Interview data has contributed vastly to the development of the State-society 
Interactive Framework.  Interviews with the respondents (see Appendix II) have 
provided ample information and first-hand observations for understanding the 
interactions between state and society during crises, as the interviewees have not 
only shared their personal experiences on the two crises, but also their opinions on 
crisis politics of Hong Kong.  This section provides a summary of their views to 
facilitate the introduction of the State-society Interactive Framework.   
 
The State-society Interactive Framework is a development-oriented and 
                                                 
32
 Another version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management with the title of “Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: How Crises Catalyse Changes 
under the State-society Interactive Framework” Volume 21, Issue 4, 200-210. (H.-y. Chan 2013). 
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multi-dimensional crisis management framework consisting of four key elements, 
including the Crisis Development Ladder, the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening 
Forces and the most important Catalytic Effect of Crisis, each of which is detailed in 
the following.  
 
4.1  Crisis Development Ladder  
Crises can be private (corporate) or public (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).  Public 
crisis, regardless of their nature, poses a challenge to the government, as they are 
occasions that demand instant actions and responses (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007).  
Specifically, the term “governance crisis” refers to a crisis that may possibly lead to 
government change - a “change” that is not merely a remedial measure, but a major 
and observable transformation of (or an attempt to transform) policy, government 
personnel and/or government structure/system.  For instance, initiating an 
impeachment is a strong enough trigger to establish the governance crisis status.  
However, the advancement of a crisis to a governance crisis is not a necessity, as it 
depends on the case itself and the related “Strengthening Forces”, such as 
politicization.  Further, the gaining of the governance crisis status could be 
immediate or at the latter stages of crisis development.  When the first aircraft 
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in the 911 Incident, it was 
apparently taken as a crisis of air transportation.  However, soon after the second 
plane crashed into the South Tower, the US government realized that it was a terrorist 
attack, and the governance crisis status was achieved.  
 
The term “governance crisis” adopted in this Interactive Framework, in some cases, 
is different from the general usage which can be found in newspapers and other 
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related studies.  In mass media, reporters and commentators always describe the 
poor performance of government or government wrongdoings, such as policy failure 
and political scandal, as some sort of “governance crisis” (in Chinese: 管治危機; 
Guan zhi wei ji).  In this case, governance crisis is used as an expression without 
accurate definition (please refer to Chapter 1.2.7 – Figure 1.3 for analysis on the 
usage of “Governance crisis” by newspaper). However, the “governance crisis” 
illustrated in the Crisis Development Ladder is specific to a necessary condition that 
leads to government change (i.e., the third level).  Governance crisis in the 
Interactive Framework can be treated as a warning that the Crisis Strengthening 
Forces are dominating as compared to the Weakening Forces.  At the same time, an 
opportunity for government change is foreseeable, subject to the presence of 
Catalytic Effect.   
 
Governance crisis might in part represent that the government has lost control of, or 
that the root of the crisis is an attempt to challenge, the status quo.  The status of 
governance crisis could be granted, in the case of an internal crisis, when most 
people are pointing their fingers at the government, and its legitimacy is in doubt (as 
in the case of political scandal or policy failure), and in the case of an external crisis, 
when the country is facing a serious threat from an external source (e.g., terrorist 
attack or natural disaster).  The Crisis Development Ladder (Figure 4.1) can be used 
to explain the development process from “crisis” to “governance crisis” and further 
on to “change”.  Under the State-society Interactive Framework, a major change 
will be accomplished if the Crisis Strengthening Forces (detailed in the next section) 
are strong enough.  
 
Governance crisis would not indubitably lead to change, but would probably open a 
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window of opportunity for change, especially for policy change in democratic 
systems, as described by Kingdon (1995).  In contrast, the presence of “governance 
crisis” is particularly important in authoritarian regimes.  In a democratic system, 
“changes” such as the stepping-down of a cabinet member or the withdrawal of 
controversial policy bills so as to avoid negative (electoral) consequences is often 
observed.  However, in a non-democratic system, there is no direct relationship 
between the performance of the government and change.  Most of the time, it is 
almost impossible for the government to make major concessions actively without 
“upgrading” a crisis to a governance crisis, such as in the cases of the 1 July 2003 
Demonstration and the Siege of Wukan Village in Lufeng, China in 2011
33
.  The 
demonstration and siege rang the alarm on the legitimacy of the governments, and 
major changes were introduced as a result.  Specifically, the demonstration has led 
to the stepping-down of three principal officials and the withdrawal of the legislation 
of Article 23 of the Basic Law regarding national security in Hong Kong (J. Cheng 
2005).  Concessions in the form of the dismissal of two local officials and the 
redistribution of land confiscated by the local government were observed in the Siege 
of Wukan Village, Lufeng. 
 
4.2  Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces 
In the political context, the framing of a crisis is an interaction between two “forces”, 
hereby named the “Strengthening Forces” and “Weakening Forces” (Figure 4.1).  
These two forces push a crisis from one step to another on the Crisis Development 
Ladder, and may lead to different consequences, such as a resolution or a significant 
                                                 
33
 The Siege of Wukan was a series of anti-corruption protests in Wukan Village in Guangdong, 
China. Beginning in September 2011, the event escalated to a crisis in December 2011 with the 
ejection of officials by villagers.  Please refer to BBC News reports available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16192541 for details. 
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government change.  One of the strengths of the State-society Interactive 
Framework is its ability to explain how crises unfold at different levels.  
Specifically, why some crises can eventually lead to government change whereas 
some are forgotten shortly, and how crises that do not have a clear ending may be the 
symptoms of another serious crisis. 
 
4.2.1  Crisis Strengthening Forces  
There are three major sources for the Strengthening Forces, which would result in the 
intensification of a crisis.  First, the nature of the crisis itself may worsen the 
situation, especially in the case of a natural disaster or disease.  It could be also 
associated with man-made factors, such as the poor efforts of government in carrying 
out rescue operations.  Second, it can be the deliberation of stakeholders, such as 
the politicization of an issue or problem by opposition parties and the “mediatisation” 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) by the mass media.  As mentioned in the literature 
review, the relationship between the media and politics is close (Davis 1994, Kahan 
1999), as it was described as the “fourth branch of government” (Cater 1959) that 
wields political power far beyond that of an observer.  The role of the media on 
crisis management is significant, as it has transformed from a watchdog telling the 
audience what they should know to fostering communication within the society 
(Deuze 2005).  Third, direct responses of the people either by voting or collective 
actions, such as mass demonstration, may lead to governance crisis in many 
non-democratic societies. The Arab Spring
34
 is a prime example.  The second and 
third sources are also referred to as the bottom-up approach in crisis management. 
                                                 
34
 The Arab Spring refers to a chain of revolutionary demonstrations, protests, and wars that happened 
in the Arab world since late 2010.  It began with the Mohamed Bouazizi's (a Tunisian street vendor) 
self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill-treatment, which led to mass demonstration that 
overthrew then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in January 2011.   
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4.2.2  Crisis Weakening Forces 
The Weakening Forces refer to the crisis management measures taken by the 
government.  As mentioned, there are two types of top-down approach in crisis 
management, namely, managerial oriented and political oriented.  The managerial 
oriented aspect focuses on the steps and solutions taken to solve the problem, while 
the political oriented aspect is sometimes described as a gesture of public relations 
initiated by “spin doctors”35.  Regardless of their nature, these two approaches 
represent actions taken by the government in restoring the situation from crisis back 
to normal. 
 
Moreover, the ruling and pro-government parties, particularly in one-party states, 
may try to uphold the popularity and legitimacy of the government by various means, 
such as defending the decisions of the government in the congress, or influencing 
news coverage with the aid of pro-government mass media.  The ultimate goal for 
those Weakening Forces is to achieve an operational (and also political) termination 
of the crisis (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 97).   
 
In each crisis, there can be multiple sources of Strengthening Forces and Weakening 
Forces.  Also, the same source can provide both Strengthening and Weakening 
Forces on different occasions depending on its nature.  As A. Lee (2008) suggested, 
the internet can be seen as a Weakening Force during the outbreak of SARS, as it 
provided timely information and warnings to the public.  However, people could 
also challenge and monitor the crisis management performance of the HKSAR 
                                                 
35
 Spin doctor’ refers to those communication professionals who are employed by politicians in order 
to “generate publicity, boost their images and manage the news” (de Vreese and Elenbaas 2011, 75). 
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government through the internet, which proved to be a significant Strengthening 
Force in turning SARS into a governance crisis eventually.  The power of the 
internet should not be underestimated, as online forums have played a significant role 
in the organization of social movements, such as mass demonstrations (So 2008). 
 
As mentioned previously, crisis passes from one level to another as a result of the 
interaction between forces.  A stronger Strengthening Force may intensify a crisis 
into a governance crisis, or even lead to major governmental change eventually.  A 
significant Weakening Force, on the other hand, may sometimes lead to the 
termination of a crisis.  However, compared to an operational termination, a 
political termination is always more difficult to achieve, especially when public 
dissatisfaction is deep.  Specifically, an intensive Weakening Force does not 
necessarily mean the complete drop-out of the crisis status, as people would not 
completely forget the pain brought by a crisis.  Instead, a pool of public 
dissatisfaction would be generated until a critical point is reached.  This is known as 
the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.  
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Crisis Weakening Force: 
● Effective crisis management of the government 
● Operational elimination of the crisis (e.g. crisis 
under control)  
● Pro-government parties or organizations 
support (e.g. positive mass media coverage) 
Crisis Strengthening Force: 
● Ineffective crisis management of the government  
● Opposition parties or organizations manipulation 
(e.g. organize collective actions) 
● The crisis itself becomes more serious 
● Negative mass media coverage (e.g. blame and 
critique) 
Government 
Change 
Governance 
Crisis  
Crisis  
The Catalyser  
 
 
Figure 4.1 The State-Society Interactive Framework 
 
4.3  Generating the Forces I: Effective Crisis Management 
The government, with no doubt, is the key actor in crisis management, as illustrated 
in the Leadership Approach.  The effective crisis management effort performed by 
the government is an important source of Crisis Weakening Forces, although such 
effort is sometimes unobservable.  From the theoretical perspective, Boin (2009, 
370) suggested that there are three types of challenges during a crisis.  First, there 
are political administrative challenges as government agencies prepare to deal with 
the sudden adversity.  Second, crises test the fabric of society – its citizens and 
institutions must demonstrate resilience if a society is to “bounce back” after a crisis 
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and re-establish some sense of normality.  Third, crises and disasters pose 
challenges for policy-makers, therefore deep thinking is required.  Boin’s (2009) 
ideas provide a framework on which challenges faced by government during a crisis 
can be examined.  Failure in tackling these three challenges by a government would 
definitely affect the effectiveness of crisis management.  
 
Regarding crisis management effectiveness, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2007, 14-15) 
suggested three standard policy actions during a crisis.  The first is shock therapy, a 
type of treatment for emergency case that is either cure or kill with no intermediate 
outcome.  The second is a radical action or policy, which changes the course of 
action to an almost opposite direction. While achieving the intended outcomes, a 
radical policy often creates many other problems.  The final action is 
instrumentalism or gradualism.  Characterized by marginal changes in existing 
policy, it is, to an extent, the opposite of radicalism.  The above-mentioned 
measures are not mutually exclusive and “an appropriate response in a crisis situation 
is one that addresses the urgency of the moment, while at the same time searching for 
a better and long-term solution” (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007, 16).  In addition, their 
effectiveness would directly alter the “power” of the forces. 
 
It should be noted that government crisis management measure is also associated 
with the people’s expectation, and could potentially generate Crisis Strengthening 
Forces in contrast.  As Boin et al. (2005, 1) stated, during crises, citizens look to 
their leaders – the government officials and administrators.  People expect these 
policy makers to avert the threat, or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand.  
The officials should lead their people out of the crisis, and they must explain what 
went wrong and convince the people that similar incidents will not happen again.  
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Policy making in times of crisis is even more complicated because the demand for 
action is very high.  Policy makers are expected to act fast when dealing with the 
crisis, and the public demand for results exerts political pressure (Kimenyi and 
Mwabu 2007, 13), which are linked to the “interactions” between forces emphasized 
in the current State-society Interactive Framework. 
 
4.4  Generating the Forces II: Government’s Public Relations Tactics 
As discussed in the literature review, through “spin doctors” in a government, three 
types of symbolic “crisis handling devices”: Framing, ritualization, and masking, as 
suggested by ‘t Hart (1993), are used as government’s public relations tactics during 
crises.  Framing refers to the creation of an “official story” that favours the 
government.  Ritualization can be standardized measures that are symbolic to let the 
people become aware of the “efforts made” by the government during crises.  
Masking refers to the external communication strategies of crisis stakeholders, and is 
different from denial, which is related to their personal beliefs and perceptions.  The 
effectiveness of the above-mentioned strategies, especially masking, are, to a large 
extent, related to the influential power the government exerts on mass media, 
especially the pro-government ones.   
 
From the observation of the practitioners, the interviews carried out in this study had 
collected first-hand information on how the government applied public relations 
tactics (by influencing the media) as a kind of crisis weakening measure, which is in 
the same vein with the theories. 
 
“When there is a crisis or scandal, the government would directly contact 
our senior management or chief editor… as they have maintained a close 
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relationship for years.  The chief editor even makes contact with the 
Press Secretary of CE daily… [When crisis occurred], some government 
senior officials would call us and request the editor to ‘play the 
government’s angle’… For example, they would say ‘under great social 
pressure, [someone from the Pro-establishment camp] is really brave to 
express their support for the government [on national education], which 
is opposite to the majority of public opinion’”. (Respondent O)   
 
Respondent N considered this a “spinning” of the journalists during crises.  In 
operation, according to Respondent O’s personal experience, the boss decided that 
some other news was more important, and that the scandal news should be moved to 
inner pages, in order to “play it small” (put it lightly).  However, the “playing it 
small” strategy is not applicable to some extraordinary controversies.  “We may 
simply choose to ignore the government’s angle, as we cannot handle it [considering 
the great public dissatisfaction]” (Respondent O).    
 
In general, it could be deduced from the responses of the interviewees that the mass 
media could provide both Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces, depending on 
their political preference.  Specifically, Respondent O’s interpretation is in line with 
Lee and Chan’s (2006) argument of the media’s political parallelism under energized 
public opinion
36
.  Moreover, with reference to Lau (2012, 67), political spinning is 
“adding flower to the embroider” (in Chinese: 錦上添花; jin shang tian hua) rather 
than “sending charcoal during a snowfall” (in Chinese: 雪中送炭; xue zhong song 
tan), meaning that it is difficult for the mass media to lend a hand to the government 
during severe political crises.  In fact, no mass media would want to bear such a 
heavy political burden when the government is under heavy attack.  These 
                                                 
36
 Based on a content analysis of newspaper coverage of 1 July 2003 Demonstration, Lee and Chan 
(2006, 72) found out that “in the state of energized public opinion, political parallelism in the mass 
media diminishes and the discourses of political and social issues among the media tend to converge”.   
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observations also imply a swopping of the above-discussed Crisis Strengthening and 
Weakening Forces (brought by the mass media) that was seen in the 2003 
Demonstration Incident (Please refer to Chapter Nine).  
 
4.5  Generating the Forces III: The Power of the Media  
As discussed above, due to the institutional barriers of Hong Kong as a regime 
without full democracy, formal institutional channels of crisis politics, such as 
motion of no-confidence and impeachment, are almost unavailable.  Thus, the role 
of the opposition parties in the crisis politics of these regimes is minimal as 
compared to democratic states that have an effective check-and-balance mechanism.  
Therefore, non-state actors need to make use of some out-of-institution channels to 
push forward their criticism on the government’s poor crisis management.  In this 
regard, the media, including traditional mass media and new media such as the 
internet, plays an extraordinary role.  Theoretically, the media provides a platform 
to generate Crisis Strengthening (and sometimes Weakening) Forces.  However, in 
reality, negative (or positive) discourses appearing in the media do not generate those 
Forces directly.  Rather, the key for creating real forces to influence the crisis 
politics is collective action.  While this does not imply that media coverage does not 
bear any political influence, in real cases, such as the case studies discussed in this 
thesis, the Crisis Strengthening Forces generated by the collective action could be 
enough to escalate a crisis towards the next level on the Crisis Development Ladder.  
 
4.5.1  Traditional Mass Media 
The traditional mass media plays a significant role in crisis politics, as newspapers, 
television and radio news are still the major sources of information in daily life.  
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Regardless of the form of presentation, be it print media or broadcast through 
electronic devices, tradition mass media influences crisis politics through agenda 
setting.  For instance, the headline on Page A1 of a newspaper is limited, and the 
decision on the material to be put there would be crucial, especially when there are 
scandals or crises.  Newspaper is certainly more influential than television and radio 
news, in a sense that the former would carry more information with deeper analyses 
due to the coverage.  Also, personal refection and commentaries commonly found 
in newspapers would not be possible in television news, and even though they are 
possible in radio programs (e.g., phone-in program), the depth is limited due to 
schedule constraints.  Newspapers can include extra pages for big news, but a day is 
always 24 hours for the television and radio. 
 
The influential role of the mass media in crisis politics is agreed by almost all 
interviewees, regardless of their background.  Respondent D, who was a journalist 
before joining the polity, has coined a term called “mediaucracy” – a combination of 
the words “media” and “bureaucracy” - to describe the strong political power of mass 
media resembling that of the bureaucrats.  Respondents E and L, both from 
Pro-establishment parties, agreed with this view, and further suggested that the mass 
media’s role is very significant, and are now acting like opposition parties.  In some 
extreme cases, political parties even have to follow the public opinion.  In fact, 
mass media interacts with public opinion in various ways, such as taking an active 
role in agenda setting by reflecting public opinion from the civil society (Respondent 
F).  As Respondent D added, the mass media, both actively and passively, interacts 
with public opinion, which, to a large extent, reflects and leads the public opinion. 
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Every one of the five respondents who is a current or former journalist has had 
experience of working in more than one mass media companies. Some even have 
worked in companies with totally opposite political orientations.  As they revealed, 
different companies report crisis politics in a different way, which is highly 
dependent on the company’s background, or in the words of Respondent K, the 
political preference of the boss.  However, their opinions regarding whether the 
mass media has a clear political agenda of its own were diverged, especially when 
the political influence of mass media reaches the highest point during crises, or more 
specifically, in political scandals. 
 
“Mass media sometimes do not have an obvious political agenda [on 
news reporting], but ‘is provided with’ some political dirt [regarding CE 
candidate Henry Tang’s unauthorized construction scandal]…In fact, at 
the same time, we were unable to have balanced coverage on CY 
Leung’s scandal due to resource constraints.” (Respondent H) 
 
Respondent H added that, technically, there is a pushing process in exploiting 
government scandals, although it may or may not mean that a particular mass media 
company has a very clear political agenda.  Nevertheless, Respondent K, currently a 
reporter working in the political news section of a well-known Pan-democrat media, 
had a different interpretation.  
 
“My chief editor has a very strong political agenda… For example, we 
were asked to explore possible political dirt in the new cabinet... in an 
attempt to attack the popularity of the new chief executive CY Leung, as 
he lacks legitimacy.” (Respondent K) 
 
The mass media not only takes on a reporting role, but also assists by strongly 
pushing forward an issue with the aid of the headline.  Respondent K further 
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mentioned that the chief editor believed that the media should take on an educating 
role (on civil education), and therefore, some related messages would be presented 
through the newspaper in order to convince the general public.  As Respondent H 
mentioned, the reporting angle of certain media companies could be driven by their 
political agenda, since they know their reports would make a difference on the real 
politics, or at least, as Respondent E reported, make the government tired from 
responding to critiques from the mass media.   
 
In regard to the State-society Interactive Framework, mass media, regardless of their 
mode, would contribute to the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces by asking 
the following questions when there is a crisis. 
 
1) What is the “hottest” topic at the moment?  
As crisis status is granted by the people, it would be important to identify the most 
eye-catching issue.  The mechanism employed is simple – the more newspaper 
coverage there is, the more salient the issue becomes.  The cooling down of the 
issue or event might be an indication of effective crisis management by the 
government.  When the crisis no longer poses a threat to the daily lives of the 
people, it would soon be forgotten and the people will turn their attention to other 
important matters. 
 
2) Where are the fingers pointing at? 
In a crisis, the assignment of blame is a commonly-agreed procedure both in the 
leadership approach and politicisation approach.  The first step is to identify the 
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‘culprits’ (Lee and Chan, 2011).  If energized public opinion exists37 (Lee and Chan, 
2006, i.e., public opinion that is strong and unique), there would be a deterioration of 
media’s political parallelism, and the culprits would easily be identified.  
 
3) What are the people asking for? (Solution versus Request) 
Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. (2005) pointed out that the state-society interaction in a 
crisis could be an endless process unless there is an operational and political 
termination.  As a crisis unfolds, the action of the government would lead to 
reactions from different actors in the society whom demand further responses from 
the government.  During the action and reaction cycle, Crisis Strengthening and 
Weakening Forces would push the crisis through different stages.  The gap of 
expectation between the solution of the government and request of the public is an 
important factor in determining the Strengthening and Weakening Forces.  
 
The mass media, to a large extent, reflects the public opinion, especially when people 
are unhappy with the government during crisis.  Although pro-government mass 
media exists in every society (as will be discussed in Chapter Eleven), energized 
public opinion can still be a warning for the government.  However, the existence of 
media coverage is not enough, as civil society champions the interaction and 
communication between different actors.  Thus, the recent rapid development of 
new media on the internet has provided a synergy effect in generating Crisis 
Strengthening Forces.   
 
                                                 
37
 Lee and Chan (2006) define energized public opinion as a dramatic incident that receives serious 
debate in the general public.  If public opinion was found to be strong, the divergence of political 
preference of different mass media on may temporarily be reduced. 
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4.5.2  The Internet: The New Media 
The internet does not directly produce Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces, 
but it provides a platform for stimulating the Forces.  Compared to the civil society, 
the government’s early usage of internet was conservative, and was difficult to be 
identified as “Forces”.  Electronic brochures (Coleman and Blumler 2009) could be 
taken as a good description of traditional one-way e-communication between 
government and public.  Owing to early technological constraints, the internet was 
merely a “tool of government”, as described by Margetts (2009).  Governments 
have dominated the communication process by distributing information, notifying 
the public, and gathering feedback via the internet.  E-petition, submission of 
comments through the internet, and online consultations were common moves by the 
government to respond to the rapid development of the internet.  Nevertheless, the 
initiative of such gesture can be understood as the government’s attempt to influence 
social behaviour and shapes the outside world (Margetts 2009), in the sense that the 
government is still the one who set the agenda, and the internet merely serves as a 
means to facilitate the overall policymaking process.  In this regard, government 
begins to learn the power of internet on influencing public opinion.  However the 
government may oversee the potentially huge political effect of internet. 
 
The former Premier of China, Wen Jiabao, was one of the pioneers in 
non-democratic regimes to broadcast through the television, as he regularly hosted 
dialogues with users of the internet.  After screening, some questions and comments 
from the people were picked, and Premier Wen would answer them on television.  
Similar mechanisms were observed in Hong Kong.  People are being informed and 
consulted, but their ideas are not taken into account seriously.  However, as people’s 
expectation increase, they are no longer satisfied with such kind of standardized 
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political participation through the internet.  The development of the internet is in 
line with civil society development in Hong Kong.  As suggested by Coleman and 
Blumler (2009, 114), people are no longer satisfied with merely participating in the 
policy process as co-decision-makers.  Instead, they want to influence those who 
have a power to make policy decisions.  Heller (2003, cited in Coleman and 
Blumler 2009, 115) referred to this kind of top-down e-participation as something 
that makes people feel involved, although there is no evidence to suggest that online 
consultation would lead to output of policy decision.  Coleman and Blumler (2009, 
115) concluded that it “can be read as a strategy for disciplining civic energy within 
the constraining techno-political sphere of managed cyberspace”. 
 
As illustrated above, the internet has gradually become an alternative political stage.  
Compared to the conventional ideas of polity, the internet platform is fairer to its 
participant, as the differences between resources are not a top priority.  Instead, 
spreading ideas and information through the internet can be rather handy and cheap.  
Users of social networking sites, such as Facebook or Twitter, can “market” 
themselves and their opinions at no cost.  Moreover, people may respond to them 
instantly, which may lead to a snowballing effect – a huge number of people may 
discuss or even readily react to a particular issue in a short period of time.  The 
political influence (as Crisis Strengthening Forces) of the internet is far beyond an 
“electronic brochure” distributed by the government online.  
 
In operation, stimulating Crisis Strengthening Forces from the internet platform 
consists of two major steps.  First, when people became aware of an issue and 
discuss about it, they have initiated the formation process of “Forces”.  In Hong 
Kong, the Hong Kong Golden Forum (HKGF, HKGolden.com) and the Hong Kong 
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Discussion Forum (HKDF, discussion.com.hk) are two popular online discussion 
forums in Hong Kong.  According to Alexa
38
, a web information company, the 
Hong Kong Discussion Forum (HKDF) was the thirteenth most popular website in 
Hong Kong, while The Hong Kong Golden Forum (HKGF) was at the 
twenty-seventh place.  Apart from these two online forums, Facebook also placed 
second in the Alexa site ranking, and serves as a major platform for e-participation.  
The “event”, “page”, and “group” functions are always used for expressing 
agreement or disagreement on different social and political issues.   
 
4.6  Generating the Forces IV: Collective Action 
The intensive and rapid discussion on different media should be followed by the 
second step – a transformation from online to offline participation, in which 
internet-organized social movements are turned into real political pressure.  One of 
the main goals of social movements is to gain publicity and public exposure through 
the mass media, which is powerful in constructing political messages (Wicks 2010). 
Therefore, one of the aims of social movements would be to get reported by the mass 
media.  In this connection, some traditional political icons, such as political parties, 
pressure groups, and the like will join hands with those activists to attract more 
people to participate, which in turn will exert more pressure on the policy makers.  
When the social movement is large enough to become a potential governance crisis, 
it forms a policy window for government to make the policy change as discussed in 
the State-society Interactive Framework.  
 
Comparatively speaking, the internet provides a platform for the exchange of ideas, 
                                                 
38
 For the full ranking list of top 500 sites in Hong Kong, please visit: 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/HK 
118 
 
and is free from the control faced when using traditional means.  It provides the 
sufficient condition for developing a bottom-up e-participation, contributing to the 
mobilization power of the internet.  In the beginning, people merely share their 
point of view toward a specific social or policy issue.  However, as time goes by, 
they may organize themselves for collective action.  This transformation from 
online participation to offline participation (Man 2010) constitutes a new form of 
social movement – the internet-organized social movement, as well as a 
post-modernist mode of social movement (So 2008, 241).  This kind of new social 
movement has certain characteristics making it different from the traditional one.  
First, it significantly reduces the cost of mobilization.  With the aid of the internet, 
the organizers can now create an event page through Facebook or online forum.  
They can spread the details of the planned protest through e-mail.  People will then 
be able to meet each other at the designated time and venue.  The idea of 
cyberactivism suggested by McCaughey and Ayers (2003) is a demonstration of the 
influence of the internet in collective action.  In a sense, the internet has regulated 
the political control, and provides an opportunity for collective social movement.  
 
However, internet-organized social movements also have its weakness.  Most 
importantly, such movements have a loose organization (So 2008, 241) compared to 
traditional social movements led by interest groups, pressure groups, or political 
parties with well-known leaders.  The parties mobilize people to take part in the 
social movement through their membership network, which could be considered a 
top-down approach in mobilization.  As mentioned, the traditional means of 
mobilization no longer dominate the process.  Social movement in the internet era 
tends to be disassociated, non-hierarchical, and have a high feasibility network (So 
2008, Coleman and Blumler 2009, Bennett 2003) that everyone can host.  Details of 
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a planned collective action can be spread shortly through the internet even though 
participants may have no idea about who is hosting the event.  It is common for 
participants in an internet-organized collective action to have no idea about any other 
detail, such as specific goal or exact protest activities, apart from showing up on time.  
The major goal of internet-organized social movement is to provide sufficient 
political pressure, and to gain public exposure in order to influence the government 
decision-making.  Such a kind of a social movement shares some similarities with 
traditional social movements once it is transformed from online participation to 
offline participation.  On the other hand, such a new mode of social movement has 
some fundamental loopholes, specifically, in its influencing power due to its 
internet-organized nature. 
 
From the perspective of the State-society Interactive Framework, the 
internet-organized social movement has its own pros and cons regarding to the above 
mentioned two features.  First, the internet is good at gathering a large group of 
people in a short period of time, as it provides instant information and real time 
communication.  The rapid information flow would help in developing the Crisis 
Strengthening Forces, as mass incidents that happen suddenly always pose great 
challenges to the government.  However, in contrast, internet-organized social 
movements are poorly organized, and it is difficult to find a coordinator or a leader.  
Thus, such movements would turn out to be rather short-lived.  Unlike those 
conventional social movements led by political parties, it is difficult for an 
internet-organized social movement to maintain a large number of participants or 
supporters over a long period time due to the lack of systematic organization.  
Nonetheless, online participation would act as a warning to the government – the 
prelude of potential crisis.  Thus, this thesis will discuss the role of the internet in 
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altering the development of crisis politics, and how it interacts with the real politics 
offline in the case study of the Anti-high speed railway movement.  
 
4.6.1  How are People Being Mobilized? From Social Issue to Crisis 
Besides understanding the role of mass media in crisis politics, the grey area between 
a social issue and a crisis is also an important issue worth studying.  Most crises do 
not happen in a sudden.  As mentioned previously, 't Hart and Boin (2001, 32) 
categorized crises based on their speed of development and termination, i.e., 
fast-burning and slow-burning crises.  In this regard, a logical expression would be, 
some crises are developed and intensified from a social issue or problem. 
 
The interview data would be helpful in understanding the process of the 
intensification a social issue or problem, as it was widely discussed by the 
respondents, especially by those who are social activists and members of political 
parties.  For example, Respondent C suggested that, under the current Hong Kong 
political environment, the political influence of a social issue is hard to sustain, 
especially if those issues were separated from the mainstream public opinion.   
Usually, people are more concerned with ad-hoc issues that are highly relevant to 
their daily lives instead of political arguments, such as political conflicts related to 
institutional reforms (Respondent M). 
 
“Exposing an ‘issue’ is very important but difficult… Unlike many 
foreign countries, Hong Kong people prefer a separation between politics 
and livelihood issues… They want ‘de-partization’ (downplaying the 
party identity in an issue)”. (Respondent C)     
 
121 
 
In dealing with different social issues, political parties and social activists would 
want to push forward their political agenda to attract public concerns.  However, the 
driving forces are diverged among different non-state actors.  As shared by 
Respondent M, a Pan-democrat social activist:   
 
“Social activists, political parties, and the mass media sometimes share a 
same target but achieve it with diverged strategies… they seldom 
complement with each other.” (Respondent M) 
 
“I would say they are simply ‘out of sync’ - social activists, general 
public, and political parties, they are disconnected… In some cases, there 
would be immature cooperation between them.” (Respondent C)  
 
According to Respondent M, political parties in Hong Kong are mostly 
election-oriented.  They are concerned with a lot of different issues, but do not have 
a clear political vision and mission.  Therefore, some social activists would refrain 
from cooperating with political parties, so as to avoid the possibility of being 
“milked”39 for vote.  Nevertheless, some social activists recognize the role of 
parties as a source for resources: 
 
“We need support from political parties…. We don’t really care how they 
are going to milk the story as long as they are helping us.” (Respondent 
J)   
 
The relationship between social activists and political parties is complicated in 
projecting a social issue.  The process and rationale of making an issue “big” was 
                                                 
39
 “Milking the story” was a term mentioned by Respondent D.  It is to describe how do the political 
parties’ making use of an issue to gain publicity for election without significantly contributed into it.  
In Hong Kong, it is often called as “hijacking” (qi jie) or “water plumbing” (chou shui) in Chinese.   
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systematically addressed by Respondent G, a Pan-democrat District Councilor and an 
social activist.  
 
“It is not my intention to ‘make things big’…. However, if I follow 
formal government procedures… the success rate [of moving the 
government to take note on particular social issues] is almost zero 
without the aid of the three parties [i.e., social activists, political parties 
and the mass media]… If we don’t ‘make the case a crisis’, it is 
impossible to achieve this point.” (Respondent G)   
 
As Respondent G observed, the government will be frightened if discussions on the 
issue were loud, as it would need to seriously consider how to respond to the public.  
Respondent F, from a Pro-establishment party, also shared similar views with his 
counterparts. 
 
“Framing an issue into a crisis is useful in influencing government 
decision-making... [The oppositions] will try to use social conflicts to 
link up a social issue…in order to intensify the public dissatisfaction.” 
(Respondent F) 
 
There are different strategies to make an issue loud.  With reference to the case 
study on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, protesting may be a way to visualize 
political pressure.  Unfortunately, as some respondents believed, it might be the 
only possible way under the current Hong Kong political context.  However, as 
Respondents C, G, and I observed, the political influence of protest in Hong Kong is 
diminishing, meaning that more participants might be needed in order to significantly 
politicize an issue through protest or demonstration.  
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In summary, politicization is an integrative process, in which social activists, 
political parties and mass media all play an irreplaceable role.  By investigating the 
interactions among them, important clues can be concluded, which is helpful in 
accessing the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces in the State-society 
Interactive Framework.  Some might agree with Lau’s (2012, 7) view that part of 
the governance crises in post-1997 Hong Kong are framed or facilitated by the 
oppositions in response to the non-democratic political system.  However, most of 
the respondents in the current study, regardless of their political orientation, thought 
that crises are not created by the public or the public trouble-makers.  Rather, the 
politicization of an issue into a crisis is a strategy to press the government, given that 
the Hong Kong has yet to implement universal suffrage, and the government is, to a 
large extent, not responsible to the public.  
 
4.7  The Catalytic Effect of Crisis 
Another major finding from the interviews contributes to the formulation of a major 
component of the Interactive Framework: the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.  
Respondent C was the first interviewee to mention the word “catalyse”, saying that 
catalyser is a critical event that would seriously attack the status quo when there is 
severe public dissatisfaction.  The catalyser might not be directly related to a 
specific crisis, but is a combination of different issues. 
     
“You cannot know whether this issue will become ‘big’, but you need to 
try until you succeed… You need to wait for a critical point to build it up 
[into a social crisis].” (Respondent C)  
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Similar to the usage of disease-as-war languages by some scholars in studying health 
crises (Baehr 2006, 42; Sontag 1999), for the Pan-democrats, catalyser is a critical 
moment that leads to significant changes, be it a great step in pushing forward an 
issue or a fissure of government in the battle of crisis politics.  To express a similar 
situation, the Pro-establishments used the word “bottom line”.  As part of a loose 
alliance
40
 with the government, their reactions could be used to assess the presence 
of the Catalytic Effect of Crisis.  
 
“If the bottom line were reached… using NGOs or “satellite 
organizations” [instead of the party itself], voicing out and imposing 
political pressure on the government would be a feasible alternative.” 
(Respondent E)  
 
There is a Chinese saying - “look on with folded arms” (in Chinese: 袖手旁觀; xiu 
shou pang guan).  If the catalytic effect appears, the cooperative partnership 
between the Pro-establishment parties and the government would be suspended.  As 
Respondent F said, if the public opinion were too strong, the Pro-establishment camp 
would become hesitant on whether they should still side with the government.  In 
general, the Pro-establishments would support the government through different 
means (e.g., distributing leaflets or explaining for the government publicly) when 
there are controversies.  However, due to the political reality, especially on election 
concerns, this support is not a guarantee. 
 
“For sure we should ‘sustain the right and blame the wrong’ (in Chinese: 
是其是，非其非 ; shi qi shi, fei qi fei)… we should remind the 
government on their wrongdoings [when the political pressure is huge].” 
(Respondent L) 
                                                 
40
 Respondent E, from a Pro-establishment party, commented themselves as “Three-Not” – not a real 
political party, not a loyal alliance, and not merely a pressure group.  
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The identification and assessment of Catalytic Effect of Crisis is of vital importance 
in the State-society Interactive Framework.  However, although “boiling water” 
could be a metaphor for the catalytic effect, it is difficult to determine the exact point 
of its occurrence, that is, the critical and irreversible point when public 
dissatisfaction explodes, in an objective way.  An alternate method that could be 
derived from the interviews is by observing the actions and reactions of the 
Pro-establishment camp (i.e., political parties and mass media).  If catalytic effect is 
activated, the Pro-establishment camp would probably withdraw their support for the 
government and side with the mainstream public opinion due to different political 
calculations.  
 
How the catalytic effect works in the Interactive Framework 
In the State-society Interactive Framework, the catalytic effect frames and upgrades a 
governance crisis (provided that the most salient issue can always get immediate 
response from the government) to government change.  As such, crisis can act as a 
catalyser for reforms (Resodihardjo 2006, 203), social unrests and changes (Powers 
and Gong 2008).  Public dissatisfaction accumulates due to different kinds of 
government failure and grievances, until a level where any issue related to 
government wrongdoing may easily become a catalyst for serious governance crisis.  
Although the catalytic effect of crisis shares some characteristics with Kingdon’s 
(1995, 165) and Keeler’s (1993) policy window, as both of them represent an 
opportunity for change, they should be clearly differentiated.  First, the catalyser 
may not serve any particular public agenda, but is a trigger point that ignites different 
sources of public dissatisfaction - a huge demonstration with a million participants 
could be a catalyser, but the action (i.e., demonstration) itself might not be directly 
associated with a particular social problem.  Second, as compared to the policy 
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entrepreneur in Kingdon’s (1995) model that does the coupling, in most cases, 
different actors within the civil society would initiate the bottom-up crisis 
management process.  They can be leaders of opposition parties, social activists, or 
owners of major mass media companies.  
 
The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is salient in directing government decision-making in 
non-democratic regimes, as it can be a means to influence government decisions 
normally unachievable through formal channels in the institution.  There are two 
levels of change that can be brought by the catalytic effect: The elementary level, in 
which the government is willing to make a major change in the current policy 
towards the issue(s) that caused the crisis, and the advanced level, where the 
legitimacy of the government, a particular leader or even the whole regime is being 
challenged.  The concessions made by the provincial government on land sold after 
the Siege of Wukan Village in Lufeng, China would fall in the former level whereas 
the self-immolation Mohamed Bouazizi (a Tunisian street vendor) in protest of police 
corruption and ill-treatment followed by the mass demonstration that overthrow 
then-Tunisian President Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia would fall in the latter. 
 
Referring to Figure 4.1, the catalytic effect is represented by a dotted line, as it is not 
necessarily present in every crisis.  It shares some features with Kingdon’s (1995) 
policy window, as it is an opportunity that can appear and disappear suddenly.  The 
catalytic effect can to a large extent explain why some crises could “float” in the air 
for a certain period of time, gained certain level of mass media coverage and 
attention, but finally faded away.  
 
In line with 't Hart and Boin’s (2001) typology on crisis development and termination 
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patterns, the catalytic effect is relevant to the four types of crisis with varying speeds 
of development and termination.  Fast-burning implies that a crisis ends almost as 
soon as it began, for instance, acute and decisive cases such as a plane hijack or 
hostage-taking.  In this regard, using the 911 Incident as an example, the catalytic 
effect was activated almost immediately, resulting in the War on the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan.  A slow-burning crisis may take years to reach the status of crisis 
and years to resolve.  For example, the spread of AIDS over the years is an 
on-going crisis that would fade off in the future with breakthroughs in science and 
medicine.  Cathartic crises describes cases in which tensions are built up slowly 
until a critical point (i.e., the occurrence of the catalytic effect), at which something 
may snap or some parties decide to force a break through.  Long-shadow crisis can 
be an incident that suddenly occurs and raises critical issues of a much wider scope 
and significance.  Sometimes, it can become a trigger point for a political crisis, 
playing the same role as the catalytic effect.  
 
Before moving on to the case studies, the research method and design for the current 
study will be illustrated in the next chapter.  Specifically, discussion on, and 
justification for, the research methods used (i.e., documentary and archival study, 
in-depth interviews and media discourse analysis) and the research design of using 
two case studies (i.e., the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed 
Railway Incident) will be briefly introduced and explained.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
5.1  Research Methods 
In describing social science research, King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994, 4-5) 
claimed that there is no fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative 
methods, as “both quantitative and qualitative research can be systematic and 
scientific”, and suggested that, in general, qualitative research does not rely on 
numerical measurement, as it “has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, 
to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive 
in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some 
event or unit”.  Qualitative analysis can be used to understand a process (Marshall 
and Rossman 1999), and is in fact applied in numerous studies related to particular 
events, decisions, and issues.  Examples include Kingdon’s (1995) influential 
streams model in policymaking and Brandstrom and Kuipers’s (2003) studies on 
political crises.  
 
However, that is not to say that qualitative research is better than quantitative 
research, or vice versa.  Instead, choosing amongst different research methods is a 
matter of appropriateness, and is dependent on the research topic (Babbie 2007, 286).  
Qualitative field research, as Babbie (2007, 287) pointed out, “is especially 
appropriate to the study of those attitudes and behaviors best understood with their 
natural setting, as opposed to the somewhat artificial settings of experiments and 
surveys”.  Lofland and Lofland (1995, 101-113) considered field research a suitable 
method for studying relationships (behavior appropriate to pairs or set of roles), and 
therefore, an appropriate method for the study of state-society relationship.  
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The current research is conducted mainly through qualitative methods supplemented 
with quantitative data from newspaper discourse analyses.  The newspaper 
discourse analysis intends to provide a multi-dimensional perspective on 
understanding the crises events chosen as case studies in this research, with reference 
to Lee and Chan’s (2011) study on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, and serves to 
testify the validity of the proposed State-society Interactive Framework.  As 
different sources may lead to different interpretation of the data, this study also aims 
to map a comprehensive picture of crises by integrating both research methods in 
order to provide a foundation for the theoretical arguments.   
 
5.1.1  Source of Data I: Documentation and Archival Records 
In general, there are six major sources of evidence for conducting case study research, 
including: 1) Documentation; 2) Archival records; 3) Interviews; 4) Direct 
observations; 5) Participant-observation; and, 6) Physical artifacts (Yin 1994, 80).  
Specifically, documentation and archival records
41
 share similar strengths on stable, 
unobtrusive, exact, and broad coverage, and are thus united into the same category 
for this study.  Hong Kong government is renowned for its transparency, and 
government documents, including reports from different departments and committees, 
press releases, and gazettes are available online.  Also, the Legislative Council 
online archive provides helpful sources of data, such as minutes of meetings, draft 
and amendments of the bills, and reports by the special committees.   
 
                                                 
41
 Yin (1994: 81-83) defined “documentation” as data from letters, memoranda, agendas, 
announcement, minutes, reports, administrative documents, and newspaper clippings, and “archival 
records” as data from service records, organization records, maps, charts, and second-hand survey 
data.  Following this definition, some data in the current research may fall into both categories 
concurrently, such as the investigation report by the Hospital Authority on the SARS incident was a 
report (i.e., documentation) with organization charts and service records (i.e., archival records).  
Thus, documentation and archival records are united into one category for easy understanding. 
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Information and data related to the case studies in this study come from four sources 
of documents and archival records: First, press releases from the Hong Kong SAR 
Government, including transcripts of announcements and press conference from 
specific government officials or bureaus, are very important source of data, 
especially in Antony Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal.  Second, minutes and papers from 
LegCo meetings provide valuable information, as the monitoring role of lawmakers, 
to a large extent, forces the government to provide more details and materials on 
specific issues.  Without the fruitful data from the LegCo, pattern-matching would 
be difficult, if not impossible.  Third, the setting up of investigation committees and 
panels is a foreseeable consequence in the aftermath of crises, and their investigation 
reports, such as the three SARS reports written by the HKSAR government, LegCo, 
and Hospital Authority respectively, are valuable reference material.  Finally, a good 
method of ensuring the validity of the data would be crosschecking with newspaper 
coverage, since the role of the mass media is particularly important in the early 
stages, when incidents are published and the politicization process starts (Brandstrom 
and Kuipers 2003, 282).  Therefore, besides using data from the government, 
articles and reports from different newspapers would be utilized to provide a better 
understanding of the issues. 
 
In this study, articles from one local English newspaper - South China Morning Post 
(SCMP) and four local Chinese newspapers - Ming Pao, Oriental Daily, Wenweipo 
and Apple Daily, are used as reference.  Past editions of these newspapers can be 
found on Wise News, an online newspaper search engine available from the 
electronic library of Lingnan University.  In addition, specific pieces of articles 
from other newspapers will be cited if necessary.  
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As mentioned in the literature review, mass media tend to “mediatize” a crisis in 
three steps: Framing the issue, identifying the culprits, and addressing blames.  This 
is an unavoidable process in the political context of crisis management.  
Considering the large numbers of media outlets in Hong Kong, it may be impractical 
to analyze all media discourses for a crisis (Lee and Chan 2011, 67).  In their study 
of media discourse on the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, Lee and Chan (2011) chose to 
focus on newspapers, claiming that their reports are more valid as they “contain 
richer and more detailed contents than television and radio newscasts, which are 
much shorter in duration and thus provide fewer materials for analysis.”  C.-c. Lee 
(2000) suggested that the local Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong can be divided 
into several categories.  The first one is the elite-oriented newspapers, which 
emphasize a sense of professionalism, and the traditions of objectivity and neutrality.  
This is represented by Ming Pao in Lee and Chan’s (2011) study.  The authors 
selected Wenweipo as the representative for the next category: Pro-Beijing 
newspapers directly under the control of Chinese Communist Government.  The 
final category contains several of the most popular newspapers in Hong Kong.  
With their large number of readers, their approaches in reporting news could reflect 
market reality, and to a large extent, represent their readers’ perceptions.  For this 
category, Lee and Chan (2011) chose Oriental Daily, a pro-Beijing media due to the 
background of its top management
42
, and Apple Daily, which is well-known for its 
firm support of the Pan-Democrats, as well as the democratization of Hong Kong. 
 
5.1.2  Source of Data II: Interviews 
Field research is good for studying dynamic or rapidly changing situations (Singleton 
                                                 
42
 The Oriental Daily is owned by the Ma family in Hong Kong, Ma Ching-kwan, the former 
chairman of the company, was a member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.  
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and Straits 2005, 308), which are major characteristics of a crisis.  In this research, 
apart from the documentation and archival records mentioned in the previous section, 
data is collected through in-depth interviews with social activists, political party 
members, and journalists.  The advantage of using multiple sources of evidence is 
that the validity and reliability of the case studies could be enhanced (Yin 1994, 90).  
It should be made clearly at this point.  The data collected from the interviews were 
mainly used for the construction of the State-society Interactive Framework.  With a 
view to gather as much data as possible, and to prevent any potential sensitivity 
issues of the respondents, the interview questions (see Appendix III) mainly focus on 
the overall crisis politics in Hong Kong.  The justification is that some of the 
interviewees were employees of media companies or political parties, they may not 
be in a good position to disclose the exact details and name of the persons who 
involved in a particular crisis event.  Thus, asking them for their observations on 
general crisis politics operates in Hong Kong would be more beneficial to current 
study on theory construction.  However, in certain possible circumstances, some 
interviewees were feeling free to share their information which was relevant to my 
case studies.  The data collected may act as supplemental evidence to enrich the 
research findings, and to verify documentary materials for the case studies. 
 
Interviewees were selected on purpose based on snowball sampling.  In total, 17 
respondents have been interviewed (please refer to Appendix II).  Except the first 
two pilot interviews (i.e., Respondents A and B), which provided insights and 
directions for this research, all other interviews were recorded.  Following 
Solinger’s (2006, 159) suggestions, the interviewer responsible for the in-depth 
interviews should have a very clear understanding on the literature and documentary 
materials, so that the respondents could gain awareness of the interviewer’s 
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knowledge and preparation on the issue, which would facilitate the conversation 
(Solinger 2006, 163).  The interviews continued until no significant findings could 
be drawn from the new respondents.  
 
To minimize the potential threats of selection bias and to ensure that they come from 
different backgrounds and status, the profiles of the interviewees were pre-screened 
according to three major requirements (Please see Appendix II for profiles of the 
respondents).  First, social activists with and without political affiliation are both 
included, on the assumption that there are strategic differences between the two, as 
those who are members of political parties are either engaged in or aiming to enter 
formal governmental institutions, such as District Council or Legislative Council, 
and those with no party affiliation are mostly fighting for their interest outside the 
institution (through demonstration), or acting as pressure groups to influence political 
parties (through lobbying).  In this regard, two District Councillors, and one former 
and one current member of the LegCo, one of whom is also currently a District 
Councillor (that is, three District Councillors in total) were interviewed. 
 
Second, to reflect the differences in roles and level of engagement in 
decision-making in political parties, interviewees were selected from different 
positions (level) within political parties, including those in leadership positions 
(Chairperson or Vice-chairperson), and committee members or frontiers, such as 
convener of regional committee or supervisor in the party’s district office.   
 
Finally, interviewees from different political backgrounds were invited.  Among the 
17 respondents, 10 are affiliated with a political party, with a ratio of 50:50 between 
Pan-democrat and Pro-establishment.  In addition, four respondents are current or 
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former journalists from the three largest news groups in Hong Kong.  It should be 
noted that some of the respondents may have multiple identities.  For example, a 
former lawmaker can be currently a commentator and journalist.  Interviewing 
respondents with a wide variety of experience is helpful for viewing an issue from 
different angles and forming a comprehensive picture on crises, and these 
respondents contributed hugely by suggesting alternate crisis management 
perspectives. 
 
Considering the fact that most of the respondents are elites with a relatively high 
social status (e.g., LegCo member or well-known politicians), the interview 
questions were drafted, and rundowns planned, based on the works of political 
scientists who are experts in conducting elite interview such as Aberbach and 
Rockman (2002), Berry (2002) and Leech (2002).  Following their advice on 
question order, the usage of prompts, coding methods and issues on validity and 
reliability in elite interviewing, a semi-structured interview was planned, with a basic 
set of interview questions as listed in Appendix III.   
 
5.1.3  Source of Data III: Media Discourse Analysis 
Media discourse analysis is an important method useful in assessing the severity of 
crises.  Altheide (2002) discussed the relationship between news and the 
construction of crisis on the dimension of framing and creating fear, and suggested 
six elements that need to be considered when conducting discourse analysis on news: 
 
1) A comprehensive information base that is readily accessible; 
2) A rationale for comparative searching over time; 
3) Enumerating shifts and trends; 
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4) Examining denotative and connotative shifts; 
5) Combining words into meaningful patterns and themes; and, 
6) Expanding patterns into other mass media and popular culture.  
 
Media discourse analysis is also useful as an alternate source of data for assessing the 
Strengthening Forces and Weakening Forces as suggested in the State-society 
Interactive Framework.  In selecting among different possible methods, their ability 
in analysing the interaction between the state and society, and also between the 
Strengthening and Weakening Forces, are considered.  Obviously, the political 
outcomes do not necessarily reflect the real performance of the government in certain 
crises, as the identification of failure is not the recognition of a fact but a man-made 
(i.e. mediatization) process (Edelman 1988). The three elements below should be 
identified to apply the State-society Interactive Framework. 
 
1) Crisis management and its effectiveness: The action of the state 
2) Politicization of a crisis: Reaction of the society to the crisis and to 
the state 
3) The existence (or not) of the Catalytic Effect of Crisis 
 
It may be impractical to analyse all media discourses as there are large numbers of 
media outlets all over the world.  One of the possible methods would be the media 
discourse analysis that Lee and Chan (2011) conducted on the 1 July 2003 
Demonstration in Hong Kong.  The authors claimed this method to be more valid, 
as they “contain richer and more detailed contents than television and radio 
newscasts, which are much shorter in duration and thus provide less material for 
analysis” (Lee and Chan 2011, 67).  In their study, Lee and Chan selected four local 
newspapers (i.e. Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, Wenweipo and Ming Pao) according to 
the categories they belonged to, as well as their political preferences as discussed.  
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The first step of the analysis was a search of relevant newspaper articles through the 
electronic news archive available from universities or public libraries.  By setting a 
specific time frame, all news reports, editorials and commentaries bearing the 
“keywords” were chosen for the analysis.  The different newspapers chosen should 
roughly represent the political domain in the society.  
 
A crisis is divided into different time frames for conducting the newspaper discourse 
analysis.  The results generated from different periods of time are compared with 
reference to the three questions mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 4.4.1) to identify 
the relationship between the Strengthening and Weakening Forces and the movement 
between different crisis development levels (i.e., crisis, governance crisis, and 
change), with special attention devoted to the presence (or not) of the catalytic effect.  
Based on the results from newspaper discourse analysis on the case studies as 
presented in the next chapter, the State-society Interactive Framework is applied to 
analyze the two crisis events – the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and the Anti-High 
Speed Railway Incident respectively.  
 
5.2  Research Outline 
As indicated in Table 5.1, the current research is conducted in four stages.  Stage 
One is literature review, which aims to review the most up-to-date research in the 
field of crisis management, examine theoretical discussion by different scholars, and 
identify major analytical approaches for case studies.  Moreover, as the focus of this 
research is on the crisis management of Hong Kong SAR Government, local studies 
on governance and crises are also revisited to illustrate the prospect of conducting 
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crisis studies in Hong Kong. 
 
Two parts of case studies, namely the 1 July 2003 Demonstration and Anti-High 
Speed Railway Incident, are addressed in Stage Two.  With reference to the 
documentary and archival studies and data from interviews, the pattern-matching 
strategy is adopted to identify the research gap and justify for the need for 
introducing a new approach. 
 
Stage Three details the development of the Framework, from identifying the 
limitation of current theories in explaining the Hong Kong cases, to constructing the 
Framework with reference to original data drawn from the interviews. 
 
In the final stage, the case studies are analyzed again using the new State-society 
Interactive Framework, with results from newspaper discourse analyses serving as 
evidence to testify and enhance its validity.  Apart from making theoretical 
innovation, the interview data also provides insights for understanding the crisis 
provoking politics in Hong Kong. 
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Stage 1: 
Literature Review 
Stage 2: 
Case Study 
Aims: 
- Review crisis management literature, 
models, approaches, etc. 
- Identify major analytical approaches 
for conducting case studies 
- Illustrate the prospect of crisis studies 
in Hong Kong 
- Identify room for further theoretical 
development 
Aims: 
- Apply the analytical approaches to 
Hong Kong cases 
- Identify their strengths and weaknesses 
from case studies 
- Pattern-matching 
- Identify the gap and the need for a new 
approach 
Research activities / sources of data: 
- Literature review on crisis 
management  
- Literature review on HK studies 
Research activities / sources of data: 
- Archival studies 
- Newspapers analysis 
- Interviews (supplementary) 
Stage 3: 
Constructing the new approach 
Stage 4: 
Applying the new approach 
Aims: 
- Analyse the research findings 
- Introduce the State-society Interactive 
Framework 
- Comprehend the details of the 
approach 
- Discuss the major theoretical 
contributions to the field 
Aims: 
- Operationalize the State-society 
Interactive Framework 
- Testify the applicability of the 
State-society Interactive Framework on 
case studies 
- Identify limitations and suggest 
avenues for future research 
Research activities / sources of data: 
- Model building 
- Interviews (major) 
Research activities / sources of data: 
- Archival and Documentary studies 
- Newspapers discourse analysis 
Table 5.1 Four stages of this research 
 
5.3  Research Design: Case Study 
Case study is one of the most popular research strategies used in social science 
research.  As stated by Yin (1994, 1), “case studies are the preferred strategy when 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
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over events, and when focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.”  Consider the current study, in which the major research question is: “How 
much can the current crisis management theories, which are developed based on the 
western democratic system, illustrate the crisis politics in Hong Kong, where full 
democracy is absent?  Why can (or can’t) they?”, and the focus of investigation is 
on contemporary crises in the real-life context.  According to Yin (1994), case study 
would be the best choice. 
 
George and Bennett (2005, 19-21) identified four major strengths of using the case 
study method.  First, high levels of conceptual validity can be achieved while 
identifying and measuring the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts.  
Second, this method has great advantages in the “heuristic identification of new 
variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the 
course of field work” (George and Bennett 2005, 20).  Third, the development 
process of causal mechanisms in individual case can be examined comprehensively.  
Fourth, case study is able to model and assess complex causal relations, such as 
complex interactions effects.  This is highly relevant to the State-society Interactive 
Framework, which describes the interactions between different stakeholders during 
crises in Post-1997 Hong Kong.     
 
5.3.1  Case Study and Theory Development 
Theory development is an essential step in designing a case study (Yin 1994, 27), as 
it provides a “sufficient blueprint” (Yin 1994, 28) for study.  Sometimes, theory 
development can be difficult when existing works provide rich theoretical framework.  
However, for some other topics, the existing knowledge base may be insufficient, as 
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the current literature provides no or little conceptual framework (Ibid).  The 
condition for crisis management study in the current research is located in the middle 
of these two extremes, and thus, is rather complicated.  As discussed in the 
literature review, current crisis management theories were developed mainly based 
on the western democratic system.  Therefore, the applicability of these theories to a 
limited democracy, as in the case of Hong Kong, is questionable.  In this situation, 
the case studies adopted in this research can serve as a basis for enriching the theory 
of crisis management through “analytical generalization”, defined by Yin (1994, 31) 
as a method “in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case study”.   
 
Eisenhardt (1989, 548) praised the strengths of theories developed from case study 
research, such as “novelty, testability, and empirical validity, which arise from the 
intimate linkage with empirical evidence”, and mentioned that case selection is an 
extremely important task for a successful and influential case study, as “strong 
studies are those which present interesting or frame-breaking theories which meet the 
tests of good theory or concept development and are grounded in convincing 
evidence” (Eisenhardt 1989, 549). 
 
5.3.2  Pattern-Matching: Developing a New Approach 
The pattern-matching strategy is adopted in this study to develop the State-society 
Interactive Framework.  Pattern-matching is a logic that compares an 
empirically-based pattern with a predicted one (Yin 1994, 106).  Referring to 
Trochim’s (Trochim 1989, 355) basic pattern-matching model in Figure 5.1, 
pattern-matching basically involves the specification of a theoretical pattern, the 
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researching of an observed pattern, and an effort to match these two.  
 
Figure 5.1 The basic pattern-matching model (Trochim 1989, 356) 
 
If the observation realm and the theoretical realm were matched, the validity of the 
study would be enhanced, providing a stronger basis for theoretical influence 
Trochim’s (1989, 355).  In contrast, if the results acquired do not match the 
theoretic patterns, the variable becomes nonequivalent.  This implies that the initial 
theory proposition is to be questioned (Yin 1994, 107).  The current study also 
utilizes pattern-matching process by applying the current crisis management 
approaches (i.e. Leadership and Politicization Approaches) into the case studies, and 
the results are unsatisfactory, as deviation exists between the observed realm and 
theoretical realm (as detailed in Chapter Six).  Therefore, based on the theory 
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development and pattern-matching strategies as discussed, the State-society 
Interactive Framework is developed with the aim to connect the missing links in 
current literature. 
  
5.4  Case Selection 
Four crisis cases leading to two major crisis events - the 1 July 2003 Demonstration 
and the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident in late 2009 - are selected for case study.  
As suggested by scholars and commentators, the 2003 Demonstration is a result of a 
number of government failures and crises that had happened before the rally (J. 
Cheng 2005, A. Cheung 2005a, 2005b, Wong and Wan 2005).  The conventional 
crisis management approaches were mostly event-based, meaning each case study 
focused on one single crisis event.  However, since the State-society Interactive 
Framework emphasizes on the development of crisis provoking politics, a 
comprehensive study on crises with different natures that might have led to a single 
crisis event is conducted in the current study.  Specifically, when studying the 
historic crisis event of the 500,000-people demonstration on 1 July 2003, the 
following incidents could not be ignored: 1) Antony Leung’s car gate scandal; 2) the 
SARS crisis; and, 3) the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law 
regarding the National Security Ordinance.   
 
The 2003 Demonstration and Anti-High Speed Railway Incident are chosen for two 
reasons.  First, these cases are helpful in explaining the proposed “Catalytic Effect 
of Crisis”, as the 2003 Demonstration was stated by many as a result of the many 
different crises that threatened the poor governance of then - CE Tung Chee-hwa’s 
administration, and, while the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident was a single and 
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unique incident with clear goals and objectives, there should be opportunities or 
timing for creating a critical moment for a complex crisis or single crisis.  Second, 
Article 23 of the Basic Law and the construction of the High Speed Railway were 
related to legislation and government policy respectively.  The withdrawal of the 
legislation of Article 23 was undoubtedly the consequence of the half-a-million 
people protest.  However, from a civil society development perspective, the 
Anti-High Speed Railway movement was a successful and well-organized social 
movement, despite the fact that no government concession was observed.  As 
discussed in the literature review, the role of social activists in governance crisis is 
often neglected in conventional crisis management studies. 
 
Case Study Arrangement for 
Leadership and Politicization 
Approach 
Case Study Arrangement for 
State-society Interactive Framework 
1. Antony Leung’s Car Gate Scandal  
 
1. 1 July 2003 Demonstration 
2. SARS Outbreak 
3. Article 23 Controversy: The 
triggering event of the 1 July 
Demonstration 2003 
4. Anti-High Speed Railway Incident 2. Anti-High Speed Railway Incident 
Table 5.2 Case Selection 
 
As outlined in Table 5.2, three incidents were identified as precursors to the 1 July 
2003 Demonstration.  In the following chapters, the Leadership Approach and 
Politicization Approach are first applied to the three incidents, in addition to the 
Anti-High Speed Railway Incident, to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both 
approaches in illustrating the crisis politics in Hong Kong.  The pattern-matching 
strategy is adopted with two main focuses:  First, to determine whether both 
approaches work well in explaining different types of crises, including political 
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scandal, man-facilitated crisis on disease, and policy failure, and second, to 
investigate whether there are cases in which existing theories are violated or are 
inapplicable.  This is followed by an analysis on the four events using the 
State-society Interactive Framework to provide a comprehensive account of the 
social crisis which will be appeared in Chapter Nine. 
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CASE STUDY PART I: 1 JULY 2003 DEMONSTRATION 
 
1 July 2003 was a remarkable day in Hong Kong history.  Half-a-million people 
marched onto the streets, peacefully protesting the poor governance of then-CE Tung 
Chee-hwa’s administration since 1997.  The implication of this rally is far-reaching 
and long-lasting - it was said to be the watershed of Hong Kong civil society 
development (Chan and Chan 2007), since after this demonstration, the entire 
political atmosphere of Hong Kong has changed dramatically, especially for the 
Hong Kong – CPG relationship, as the Hong Kong crisis has become an important 
issue in the eyes of Beijing (J. Cheng 2005). 
 
Underlying cause – Economic Depression since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
The poor economic environment after the handover was an underlying cause of the 
2003 Protest which can be dated back to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  In fact, 
during the first six years of HKSAR, Hong Kong economy had experienced three 
“plightful waves” (Ng and Ip 2005, 381).  The currency attacks in Hong Kong 
during the Asian Financial Crisis were named as the single most important economic 
event in Post-1997 Hong Kong (F. Lui 2002, 243).  At the same time, stock prices 
in Hong Kong Stock Exchange had dropped dramatically for 60% from the peak in 
August 1997 to the bottom twelve months later.  The second wave followed the 
American led global recession in the wake of the collapse of the “new economy” 
bubble and the 9/11 episode in 2001 and the third wave was brought by SARS in 
2003.   
 
Under these circumstances, the economy of Hong Kong was in great depression.  It 
could be reflected by the increases in employment rate of Hong Kong.  The 
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unemployment rate was over 6% in 2002 and hit the peak of 8.8% in July 2003.  
“Hong Kong workers became obsessed with employment and job insecurity as the 
number of business closures and failures, downsizing and staff cutbacks multiples” 
(Ng and Ip 2005, 381).  The public dissatisfaction on the poor economy has been 
transformed to political pressure towards the SAR Government.   
 
Except the economic factor, many reasons have been cited to account for the 
outbreak of 2003 rally, including, but not limited, to the poor leadership of Tung in 
his first term of office (1997-2002), (J. Cheng 2005), the dynamic relationship 
between Hong Kong and Beijing (A. Cheung 2005a), the poor crisis management 
skills of the government in dealing with various crises since late 2002 (A. Cheung 
2005a), and the institutional failure of the newly-implemented Principal Official 
Accountability System (POAS) (A. Cheung 2005b, Wong and Wan 2005).  In 
addition to discovering the reasons, it is of interest to adopt different crisis 
management approaches, as discussed in previous chapters, to analyze this historic 
event.  As mentioned previously, the aim of the crisis management models is not to 
judge whether the government is performing efficiently or not, but to investigate the 
action and reaction of different non-state actors, especially on how their 
performances affect the outcomes. 
 
In this Case Study Part I, the three events identified as the major reasons leading to 
the 1 July 2003 Demonstration – the ultimate governance crisis – are discussed.  
First, the Car-Gate Scandal of Antony Leung, then-Financial Secretary, was an 
incident that hurt the confidence of the people in the then-newly-introduced POAS 
(A. Cheung 2005b), and his resignation was regarded as a direct result of the huge 
demonstration.  The controversy related to the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic 
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Law regarding national security was another important element leading to the rally, 
and was eventually deemed a policy failure as the bill was withdrawn by Tung a 
week after the demonstration.  In addition to these two man-made crises, the 
outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in early 2003 was a 
grave public health incident that took the lives of about 300 Hong Kong people and 
caused billions of dollars in economic losses as a result of the travel warning issued 
by the World Health Organization. 
 
The next four chapters (Chapters Six to Nine) cover Case Study Part I, with Chapters 
Six to Eight being the case study of the three crisis events mentioned.  In each 
chapter, news reports of the events are first presented in order to demonstrate the 
development of the events.  Next, by applying the Leadership Approach and 
Politicization Approach, the comprehensiveness and applicability of these two 
western crisis management approaches in Hong Kong context is analyzed, along with 
a brief summary concluding the major observations.  After the individual case 
studies, a comprehensive analysis of the 2003 Demonstration is given in Chapter 
Nine by applying the State-society Interactive Framework. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ANTONY LEUNG’S CAR-GATE SCANDAL 
 
6.1  Background 
The scandal was first exposed by Apple Daily on 9 March 2003, a few days after the 
annual budget speech on 5 March, in which an increase in vehicle first registration 
tax was announced.  On the headline, Apple Daily disclosed that then-Financial 
Secretary Antony Leung had acquired a new Lexus in January 2003, when he was 
preparing the budget speech.  Days before the exposure, Apple Daily reporters had 
asked the news secretary of the Financial Secretary regarding the car purchase, and 
received the following feedback: 1) The Financial Secretary confirmed that he had 
bought a Lexus in January; 2) the new car was purchased in expectation of his 
new-born baby; and, 3) the tax difference before and after the tax increment was 
around $50,000 (Apple Daily, 9 March 2003).  On the same day, Leung made a 
short announcement in front of the media, and agreed to donate $100,000, which he 
believed was twice the amount of the tax difference, to charity. 
 
“In hindsight, I should have avoided suspicion on conflict of interest, and 
should not buy a new car before the potential tax adjustment.  However, 
I really needed a car and had not meant for tax avoidance.” (Financial 
Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March 2003) 
 
Leung’s short explanation and his donation proved unsuccessful in curbing the 
spread of the scandal, and the public was waiting for then-CE Tung Chee-hwa’s 
response.  A day later, on 10 March, Tung made a short statement stating that he 
believed that Leung did not have any intention to make personal gain, although the 
issue appeared to be a conflict of interest.  
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“I believe that he did not do it for personal gain, it is not deliberately 
done for gains. I have asked again and again all my colleagues in the 
Government when it comes to issues of conflict of interest, we need to be 
whiter than white, apply the highest standard of oneself.” (CE’s 
Transcript, Government Press Release, 10 March 2003) 
 
On the same day, a car dealer claimed that the real tax difference should be $190,000 
instead of the $50,000 claimed by Leung, and Leung increased his charity donation 
to $380,000 (double the amount of the new tax difference) accordingly.  
 
After a few days’ investigation, the Chief Executive sent a public letter to Leung 
regarding his scandal.  In the letter, Tung admitted that Leung’s car purchase before 
the tax increase “would inevitably arouse public suspicion of conflict of interest” 
(The Office of the CE, 15 March 2003), and Leung’s action had breached Sections 
5.1 and 5.4
43
 of the Code for Principal Officials under the Accountability System.  
However, Tung accepted Leung’s explanation that the incident was just an oversight, 
and that he had no intention to evade the tax liability.  Furthermore, Tung also 
disclosed that Leung had made a resignation on 10 March 2003, which Tung did not 
accept, but instead reprimanded him with a formal criticism (Perceived Conflict of 
Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003).  
 
According to some local newspapers (Apple Daily, Ming Pao, 16 March 2003), in the 
Executive Council (ExCo) meeting on 5 March 2003, Yeoh Eng-kiong, 
then-Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food, made a declaration that he had ordered 
a car in January, which was confirmed by the government on 18 March 2003.  This 
                                                 
43
 Section 5.1 of the Code for Principal Official stated that “Politically appointed officials shall avoid 
putting themselves in a position where they might arouse any suspicion of dishonesty, unfairness or 
conflict of interest”, while Section 5.4 stated that “Politically appointed officials shall report to the 
Chief Executive any private interests that might influence, or appear to influence, their judgment in 
the performance of their duties” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau, 2002). 
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brought further criticism on Leung, as it implied that his “oversight” was no longer 
convincing.  As a result, some Pan-democrat lawmakers asked for Leung’s 
resignation. 
 
However, efforts to push Leung out of office were not fruitful.  In the Legislative 
Council, there was a move to press the Chief Executive for an independent inquiry in 
March, a move to authorize the use of Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) 
Ordinance to investigate Leung’s case in April, and a motion of no confidence on 
Leung in May, all of which were defeated by the majority (Please refer to Table 6.1 
for the timeline of the scandal).  As time elapsed, the scandal was no longer a 
headliner, and the pressure on Leung to step-down was apparently relaxed until the 1 
July 2003 Demonstration.  Soon after the rally, in mid-July, Leung resigned.  
 
Table 6.1 Chronology of Antony Leung’s Car-Gate Scandal 
Date Events 
9 March 2003 Apple Daily exposed the scandal. 
Antony Leung spoke to the media and offered to donate $100,000, 
which he believed was twice the amount of the tax difference, to 
charity 
10 March 2003 CE Tung Chee-hwa admonished Leung publicly through mass media.   
Car dealer made a call to a radio phone-in program to report that Leung 
had actually saved $190,000 on tax.  Afterward, Leung raised his 
donation to 380,000 to charity.  
15 March 2003 Leung received a letter from Tung saying that the mistake warranted a 
formal criticism but not a resignation.  Leung admitted that he had 
offered to resign if necessary on 10 March 2003, but he withdrew his 
offer and made a public apology. 
16 March 2003 Newspaper reported that Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for Health, 
Welfare and Food, had declared that he had ordered a car in January in 
the ExCo meeting on 5 March 2003 (Budget Day). 
17 March 2003 LegCo discussed the issue.  Leung was invited to testify.   
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18 March 2003 The government confirmed that Yeoh had made a declaration during the 
5 March 2003 ExCo meeting. 
21 March 2003 A move to press Chief Executive for an independent inquiry into the 
controversy was blocked. 
9 April 2003 A move to authorize the use of Legislative Council (Powers and 
Privileges) Ordinance to investigate Leung’s case was defeated. 
7 May 2003 A no-confidence motion on Leung was defeated by the LegCo.  
16 July 2003 Leung resigned. 
Sources: Data from local newspapers, HKSAR Government Press Releases, LegCo minutes 
and reports 
 
6.2  Leadership Approach Analysis 
Sense-Making 
Sense-making is to grasp crisis as it unfolds (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005).  In 
the Car-Gate scandal, there were two chances for the early recognition of crisis.  
First, Leung should bear the sole responsibility of being aware of a potential conflict 
of interest.  However, he failed to reveal any information about his car purchase 
until the incident was exposed as a scandal by a newspaper.  Second, Apple Daily 
reporters had enquired Leung’s news secretary, Raymond Tam Chi-yuen, about 
Leung’s new car purchase a few days before the scandal made the headline.  
Therefore, it is important to understand whether Tam and Leung understood the 
seriousness and the political sensitivity of the issue.  
 
According to various sources of data, including the explanation made by Leung 
himself in the LegCo meeting, Leung did not recognize the possibility of conflict of 
interest between his car purchase and the first registration tax increase he proposed in 
the budget.  He even claimed that his intention was to absolutely separate his 
private life and his public duty (LC Paper No. CB(2)1819/02-03).  On the other 
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hand, when Tam reported to Leung about the enquires from mass media, Leung 
asked Tam to reply to them as follows: 1) He did buy a new Lexus in January; 2) he 
bought the car for his new-born baby; and, 3) there was a $50,000 tax difference 
(Apple Daily, 9 March 2003).  On 9 March 2003, Apple Daily made the scandal a 
headliner, and the Car-Gate scandal officially became a crisis and “made a sense”. 
 
Decision-Making 
The decision-making body of this scandal was precise and clear: Leung, Tung, and 
Tung’s cabinet.  The decision-making process was relative simple for a political 
scandal, with two main concerns as follows: First, the relationship between Leung’s 
car purchase and his decision to increase the vehicle first registration tax.  As a 
senior financial official, Leung was responsible for the fiscal policy of Hong Kong, 
and should foresee the financial policies of the city.  Apart from the potential 
conflict of interest, the extent to which he had violated the Code for Principal 
Official under the Accountability System was also questioned by the public.  
Besides, the level of “punishment” imposed by Tung was a concern.  According to 
the POAS, political appointees are directly accountable to the Chief Executive, and 
the supervisor-subordinate relationship was clear and well-perceived by the general 
public.  Therefore, any decision made by Tung regarding Leung could be regarded 
as an important crisis management decision, as Leung had already admitted that his 
actions were inappropriate in this case. 
 
Meaning-Making 
Political communication was crucial to the management of this crisis.  Nevertheless, 
under the Leadership Approach, the decision on what information was to be released 
to the media was mainly a top-down process.  In this case, creditability was 
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important (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005), as this is the core value for senior 
government officials who are politically appointed.  On studying the responses from 
Leung and Tung, some important “meaning” can be discovered.  First, Leung 
claimed that his aim was not to evade tax.  This response can be deliberated as 
follows: 1) He was willing to “compensate” for the tax difference (by making a 
donation of $100,000, and later $380,000, to charity).  He made the decision 
instantly, and he asked his news secretary, Raymond Tam, to emphasize the increase 
in the amount of money he was willing to donate, and to remind the mass media to 
take note of this (LC Paper No. CB(2)1819/02-03).  2) He bought the new car for 
his family.  He further emphasized that it was strictly bought for his new-born baby, 
and with no intention of profit-making or tax evasion.  This statement was the major 
focus of Leung’s explanation, and was brought up in almost every occasion until 
Leung resigned, either by Leung himself (Apple Daily 9 March 2003; Financial 
Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March 2003; LC Paper 
No. CB(2)1819/02-03), or by Tung (CE’s Transcript, Government Press Release, 10 
March 2003; Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief 
Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003). 
 
The responses by Leung and Tung can be seen as an attempt to “frame” the scandal, 
one of the three meaning-making strategies proposed by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al.’s 
(2005).  In this case, Leung tried his best to frame his wrongdoings as an “oversight” 
(Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s 
Office, 15 March 2003), stating reasons such as carelessness, political insensitivity, 
and no intention to evade tax. 
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Terminating 
Regarding the termination of a political scandal, political closure, despite the 
uncertainty in its effect, usually draws the most attention.  In this case, there were 
two major junctures that could be identified as (intended) political closure.  The 
“formal criticism” (Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The 
Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March 2003) made by Tung on Leung after the 
investigation, and Leung’s public apology (The Financial Secretary’s Statement on 
the Purchase of a New Car, 15 March 2003) could be the first intended political 
closure aimed at resolving the crisis.  However, the criticism was not well-received 
by the public, especially after Yeoh Eng-kiong declaration was exposed one day later 
(i.e. 16 March).  The second political closure could be after the defeat in LegCo of 
the three moves related to this scandal, namely, the move to press Chief Executive 
for an independent inquiry into the controversy (on 21 March), the move to authorize 
the use of Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance to investigate the 
case (on 9 April), and a motion of no-confidence on Leung (on 7 May).  The defeat 
of these three moves could also be regarded as an operational closure, as there was 
no way to blame Leung within the political arena.  In fact, the ICAC was carrying 
out an investigation of the case at that time, but the Judiciary decided not to press 
charges on Leung.  The final closure of the crisis came as Leung eventually had 
resigned in July.  
 
Learning 
According to convention wisdom, people should learn a lesson from previous 
mistake.  However, the learning process of leaders could be internal and might not 
be observable.  Since Leung explained his wrongdoings as an “oversight”, the 
principal government officials should have learnt to be more careful and be more 
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politically sensitive.   
However, although the “Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the 
Accountability System for Principal Officials” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003), 
did mention “The Car Purchase Incident” and make a point on the issue of conflict of 
interest, it seemed to be defending, rather than discovering problems related to, the 
POAS.  As stated in the Report, the Principal Official (i.e., Leung) was “prepared to 
bear the political responsibility and apologized to the public” (Constitutional Affairs 
Bureau 2003).  He had “acted in a manner which is consistent with their role as 
politically-appointed officials” (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003).  Also, “the 
Code for Principal Officials under the Accountability System has been accepted by 
the public as the basis for measuring the behavior and conduct of Principal Officials 
against public expectations.  The Code serves as a useful yardstick for all concerned” 
(Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003).  Considering this, from an institutional 
perspective, the government seemed to have learnt nothing from this crisis. 
 
However, from the public perspective, the Leung’s case has “sensitized the public to 
conflict of interest issues and to unethical practices beyond traditional concerns with 
bribery and embezzlement and the abuse of public office” (Scott and Leung 2012, 43) 
in which to some extent has drawn the public attention onto the integrity issue of 
public officials.  In fact, a number of former and current government officials has 
been involved into different scandal that related to conflict of interest such as Leung 
Chin-man, a former Director of Housing, accepted a post-public appointment to a 
development company with which he had been accused as receiving potential 
“delayed benefit” in 2008.  The increase of public awareness on integrity issue can 
be regarded as another form of post-crisis learning process. 
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6.3  Politicization Approach Analysis 
Constructing Severity 
In constructing severity, the major concern is whether the core values of the public 
had been violated (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003).  In the Car-Gate scandal, Leung, 
as a senior government official and a political appointee under the POAS, was faced 
with two serious allegations related to core public values: Conflict of interest and the 
integrity of a principal official.  This could explain why the case soon became the 
hottest topic in town through reports by mass media and inquiries from lawmakers. 
 
Constructing Agency 
Recall that a crisis can be framed either a stand-alone, ad hoc disturbance in a system, 
or a symptom of a much larger systematic failure (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003). 
How the crisis is framed would affect the direction of movement onto the next 
dimension (i.e., responsibility dimension).  Although it is difficult to make a 
judgment, Leung’s case was apparently an ad hoc incident, especially since no 
similar incidents were seen afterwards.  However, “going back to the history” 
(Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003) showed that the case was more likely to be a 
“symptom”, as LegCo reports on the scandal showed that the discussion on 
reviewing the vehicle first registration tax was already in progress since July 2001, 
long before Leung became the FS (IN16/02-03, LegCo Secretariat 2003). 
 
Constructing Responsibility 
In this dimension, a crisis can be framed as either an actor failure or a network failure.  
At first sight, the Car-Gate scandal seemed to be the failure of an individual 
policy-maker – Leung himself.  However, as C.-y.Cheung (2005) argued, Leung 
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and Tung seemed to interpret the Code
44
 differently in the very beginning.  
Specifically, Leung’s immediate resignation indicated that he believed his failure was 
serious enough to warrant the consideration of ministerial dismissal.  However, 
Tung’s public letter45 indicated that he thought a formal criticism was enough, and 
expected only a public apology, rather than resignation, from Leung.  It was not 
until after the 2003 Demonstration that Tung changed his mind and accepted Leung’s 
resignation on 16 July 2003.  As a result of this, A. Cheung (2005a) argued that the 
POAS fell short of the requirements to take accountability seriously, and there was a 
grey area between actor failure and network failure, as they were not mutually 
exclusive.  
 
6.4  Summary 
There were both strengths and weaknesses in applying the Leadership Approach and 
Politicization Approach on the Car-Gate Scandal.  Using the Leadership Approach, 
due to the nature of Car-Gate as a political scandal, sense-making and 
decision-making were clear and could be easily identified.  The headline of the 9 
March 2003 edition of Apple Daily was the prelude of Leung’s scandal, and the 
decision-making body was rather small and concentrated, probably consisting of 
Leung, Tung, a few members in Tung’s cabinet, and their subordinates in a 
supporting role.  The meaning-making and terminating processes, in contrast, were 
relatively diverted.  Leung’s explanation of an “oversight” was not readily accepted 
by the public in the meaning-making stage, and his survival in the motion of 
no-confidence could not even be guaranteed if there were universal suffrage in the 
                                                 
44
 Code for Principal Official under the Accountability System (Constitutional Affairs Bureau, 2002) 
45
 “Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car” (The Chief Executive’s Office, 15 March 
2003) 
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LegCo, as the public tended not to accept his explanation and apology (C.-y. Cheung 
2005).  Moreover, the terminating process, either operational or political, should be 
questioned, as the resignation of Leung (16 July 2003) came far later than the time 
his scandal was being made a sense.  Instead, his resignation was generally 
perceived as a direct result of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.  Finally, in the 
learning process, from the institutional perspective, the HKSAR Government seemed 
to refuse to admit that Leung’s case was a failure of POAS.  Instead, the 
Twelve-month Report of POAS
46
 claimed that Leung was upholding political 
responsibility under the POAS by resigning.  Although it may be regarded political 
“spin doctoring”, no significant reform was being made after the scandal. 
 
Under the Politicization Approach, constructing severity was easily done.  The case 
had been recognized as an issue of conflict of interest, and was related to the 
integrity of a government official from the beginning.  However, there were great 
difficulties when constructing agency and responsibility, as it was hard to distinguish 
whether the case was an incident or a symptom, an actor failure or a network failure.  
As mentioned, when applied to real case examples, those dimensions of 
Politicization Approach were not as straight forward as the two sides of a coin.  It 
deserves further discussion in the research findings and discussion chapter. 
 
In the next chapter, another important event that almost happened in the same time 
with the Car-gate Scandal – the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) will be discussed.  It was said to be one of the critical health crises 
happened after the establishment of Hong Kong SAR. 
                                                 
46
 “Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the Accountability System for Principal Officials” 
(Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY 
SYNDROME (SARS) EPIDEMIC 
 
7.1  Background 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was a centennial disease that 
threatened the world.  According to the World Health Organization (WHO), SARS 
killed 774 people around the world, with 299, or nearly 40%, of them Hong Kong 
citizens.  
 
Table 7.1 Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness  
(1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003) 
Areas No. of 
cases 
No. of 
deaths 
Onset date (First 
probable case) 
Onset date (Last 
probable case) 
Mainland China 5327 349 16 Nov 2002 3 Jun 2003 
Hong Kong SAR 1755 299 15 Feb 2003 31 May 2003 
World total 8096 774   
Source: World Health Organization (Updated 21 April 2004)  
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html 
 
The SARS outbreak was a serious public health threat to Hong Kong, as the disease 
was entirely new to the medical arena, even without a formal name (simply called 
Atypical Pneumonia from late 2002 to early 2003) at the very beginning, was 
fast-spreading, and had a high fatality ratio
47
.  The SARS epidemic originated in the 
Guangdong Province, and caught the attention of the mass media in Hong Kong in 
February 2003.  The outbreak reached Hong Kong in late February 2003, and 
continued until mid-June, when World Health Organization declared Hong Kong as 
                                                 
47
 According to the WHO (2004), the fatality ratio of SARS in HKSAR was 17%, even higher than 
that in Mainland China (7%).  Also, Hong Kong’s ratio was the highest in the world (along with 
Canada), except for those areas with a small number of cases (<10).  
160 
 
SARS-free.  Table 6.2 shows a brief chronology of the SARS Epidemic in Hong 
Kong for easy reference. 
 
After the SARS outbreak, three major investigation reports were conducted by the 
SARS Expert Committee appointed by the government (the “Expert Report”), the 
Legislative Council (the “LegCo Report”), and the Hospital Authority (the “HA 
Report”) respectively 48 .  The reports provided a detailed and comprehensive 
account and analysis on each response taken by the government, especially the 
different medical decisions made by the Hospital Authority. 
 
It is not the aim of the current research to provide an alternate report on the SARS 
outbreak, nor to provide a professional account from a medical perspective.  Instead, 
it is to test the applicability of the two crisis management approaches in explaining 
such a large-scale social crisis.  Since the following analyses are based on crisis 
management theories, a sub-field under political science, details related to 
professional judgments and medical decision made may not be included.  The 
medical aspect of SARS could be found in the investigation report published by the 
Hospital Authority.   
 
Table 7.2 Chronology of the SARS Epidemic in Hong Kong 
Date Events 
23 January 2003 Health authority in Guangdong Province of Mainland China 
provided an expert investigation report on cases of atypical 
pneumonia in the Province. 
                                                 
48
 “SARS in Hong Kong : from Experience to Action” by SARS Expert Committee, HKSAR 
Government (October, 2003), “Report of the Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the 
handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the Government and the Hospital 
Authority” (July, 2004), and the “Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS 
Outbreak” by the Hospital Authority (September, 2003) 
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10 February 2003 Local media began to report the atypical pneumonia outbreak in 
Guangdong Province. 
11 February 2003 Stand-up media briefed by Director of Health (DH), who also 
issued press release on the Guangdong Province outbreak and 
health advice, and made a copy to the Mainland health officials. 
17 February 2003 A lady was admitted to the private Union Hospital after 
returning to Hong Kong from a trip to Guangzhou.  She was 
later confirmed to be a SARS case in April. 
21 February 2003 A professor from Guangzhou and his wife checked into Room 
911 of Hotel M in Hong Kong and stayed for one night.  He 
was later found to be the source of SARS outbreak in Hotel M 
and beyond. 
22 February 2003 The professor from Guangzhou, who was suspected of severe 
Community Atypical Pneumonia infection, was admitted to 
Kwong Wah Hospital (KWH). 
28 February 2003 A brother-in-law (a Hong Kong resident) of the professor was 
admitted to KWH.  He was later confirmed to be a SARS case. 
4 March 2003 The Guangzhou professor died in KWH.  His brother-in-law in 
the same hospital was intubated and transferred to intensive care 
unit. 
12 March 2003 WHO issued global alert on cases of acute respiratory syndrome 
in Vietnam, Hong Kong and Guangdong Province in China with 
unknown aetiology that appeared to place health workers at 
high risk. 
15 March 2003 WHO named the illness Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), and listed its main symptoms and signs.  WHO also 
issued emergency travel advisory, but made no recommendation 
to restrict travel to any destination. 
25 March 2003 A high-level SARS Steering Committee, chaired by Chief 
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and 
included the relevant Principal Officials, was established to 
steer Government response to the SARS epidemic. 
29 March 2003 Classes were suspended in schools and childcare centers. 
31 March 2003 213 residents of Amoy Gardens, 107 of whom living in Block 
E, were admitted with suspected infection.  DH ordered an 
isolation of the whole of Block E for 10 days.  DH also 
appealed to residents who had moved out prior to the isolation 
order to report to the Department. 
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2 April 2003 WHO revised its advice to international travelers, and 
recommended postponing all but essential travel to Hong Kong 
and Guangdong Province. 
19 April 2003 Government implemented a territory-wide cleansing day. 
22 April 2003 Classes were resumed for secondary schools students in Form 3 
or above. 
23 May 2003 WHO lifted the travel advisory on Hong Kong. 
28 May 2003 The Government announced the membership of the SARS 
Expert Committee, with the task to review the management and 
control of SARS outbreak in Hong Kong. 
30 May 2003 HA announced membership of its Review Panel. 
23 June 2003 WHO removed Hong Kong from the list of areas with local 
transmission of SARS, and declared Hong Kong as SARS-free. 
September 2003 The Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the 
SARS Outbreak was released 
2 October 2003 The SARS Expert Report was released 
October 2003 LegCo “Select Committee to inquire into the handling of the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the 
Government and the Hospital Authority” was established under 
the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance. 
July 2004 The Report of the Select Committee to inquire into the handling 
of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the 
Government and the Hospital Authority was released. 
8 July 2004 Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food, 
resigned on 8 July 2004 to take political responsibility over the 
SARS outbreak. 
Source: “SARS in Hong Kong: from Experience to Action” by SARS Expert Committee, 
HKSAR Government (October 2003), “Report of the Legislative Council Select 
Committee to inquire into the handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
outbreak by the Government and the Hospital Authority” (July 2004), and the “Report of 
the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS Outbreak” by the Hospital Authority 
(September 2003) and local newspapers. 
 
7.2  Leadership Approach Analysis 
Sense-Making 
The sense-making process in SARS outbreak was blurred.  In late 2002, there were 
163 
 
rumors about an unknown deadly disease spreading in Guangdong Province, and a 
few newspapers reported the panic-buying of certain kinds of medicine or Chinese 
herbs in order to prevent the disease, including “Rumors on virus spread Heyuan 
people rushes to buy drugs” (Oriental Daily, 4 January 2003), and “Mysterious 
pneumonia spreads in Zhongshan, strong infectious pneumonia without cure” (Ming 
Pao Daily, 18 January 2003).  According to the Expert Report and local newspaper 
reports, reports of an “unusual epidemic of fatal pneumonia-like illness in the 
Province” received a wide range of headline coverage on 10 February 2003 (Expert 
Committee, 2003).  Eventually, the crisis made a sense to the government on 10 
February 2003:   
 
“Acting on the media reports, the DH (Department of Health) in Hong 
Kong telephoned on 10.2.03 health officials in the Municipal Health and 
Antiepidemic Station of Guangzhou and the Director General of 
Department of Health, Guangdong, but was unable to establish contact. A 
letter enquiring about the reported outbreak was subsequently faxed to 
both offices. This and follow-up phone calls went unanswered. The 
Director of Health eventually approached the Ministry of Health in 
Beijing for assistance…In Hong Kong, two key events happened on 
11.2.03. First, in the late afternoon, the Director of Health, with the 
information from Guangzhou and enquiry results in Hong Kong, 
conducted a media briefing. She reassured the community that Hong 
Kong had not identified any unusual pattern of influenza-like illness and 
respiratory tract infection, including pneumonia, but that DH would be 
monitoring the situation closely because of the pneumonia cases in 
Guangdong Province. She also reminded the public to take steps to 
prevent influenza during its peak season between January and March. 
Second, HA head office established a working group to step up 
surveillance of cases of pneumonia in public hospitals.” (Expert Report 
Sections 3.2, 3.5-3.6, SARS Expert Committee, 2003)  
 
At this stage, DH merely acknowledged that there was an unusual pattern of 
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pneumonia infection in Guangzhou, meaning that the government had yet to 
recognize the new disease as a (potential) public health crisis affecting Hong Kong.   
The Expert Report reported a debate on whether there was a “community outbreak” in 
mid-March 2003, since, as of 14 March 2003, Yeoh Eng-kiong, then-Secretary for 
Health, Welfare and Food, still refused to admit that there was a community outbreak 
of SARS outside of hospitals.  The Expert Committee accepted that Yeoh’s discourse 
was made due to “an outbreak of a new and unknown disease… The really difficult 
challenge in such situations is how to convey messages in a way that is open, honest, 
clear and sympathetic, and at the same time not likely to be proved wrong” (Expert 
Report Section 4.23, SARS Expert Committee, 2003).  Without commenting on the 
accuracy of this statement, it was relevant to the frontline staff dilemma on crisis 
recognition proposed by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005), as organizations are created 
for routine but not crisis.  Finally, a high-level SARS Steering Committee involving 
the relevant Principal Officials and chaired by Chief Executive was established on 25 
March 2003 to steer Government response to the SARS epidemic (Expert Committee, 
2003).  SARS had eventually become a public health crisis that was to be handled by 
the top leader of Hong Kong – the Chief Executive.    
 
The sense-making process of SARS epidemic could also be reflected in the alerts and 
warnings issued by the WHO.  According to the Expert Report, on 12 March 2003, 
WHO issued global alert concerning cases of acute respiratory syndrome in Vietnam, 
Hong Kong, and Guangdong Province in China.  The unknown aetiology appeared 
to put health workers at high risk.  On 15 March 2003, WHO named the disease 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and listed its main symptoms and signs.  
On the same day, WHO also issued an emergency travel advisory, but made no 
recommendation to restrict travel to any specific locality.  Finally, on 2 April 2003, 
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WHO revised its advice to international travelers and recommended postponing all 
but essential travel to Hong Kong and Guangdong Province (SARS Expert 
Committee, 2003).  The official announcements made by WHO were able to reflect 
the level of seriousness of the epidemic, and at the same time indicated the outbreak 
of the public health crisis of SARS from the local and global perspectives.  
 
Decision-Making 
As mentioned in the sense-making process, it was not until 25 March 2003, in the 
middle stage of the SARS crisis, that the Chief Executive was formally involved in 
the decision-making process.  In contrast, the LegCo Report and Expert Report 
directed most doubts towards Yeoh, a political appointee under POAS, and Margret 
Chan, then-Director of Health and a civil servant.  As stated in the Expert Report 
(2003), the three main components in the public health infrastructure of Hong Kong 
are the Health, Welfare and Food Bureau (HWFB), Department of Health, and 
Hospital Authority (Figure 7.1).   
 
As one of the departments under HWFB, the Department of Health (DH) is the health 
adviser to the government and health advocate of the community, and DH is 
responsible for executing health legislation and policy.  The role of DH “is to 
safeguard the health of the community through promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative services.” (Expert Report Section 2.18, SARS Expert Committee, 2003).  
On the other hand, the Hospital Authority (HA), which reports directly to the 
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food (SHWF), is an independent statutory body 
responsible for the provision of all public hospital services in Hong Kong. 
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Figure 7.1 Organization Structure of the Health Care Delivery System in the 
Public Sector in Hong Kong 
(Source: SARS Expert Report, p. 9, SARS Expert Committee, 2003) 
 
Theoretically, the changes in the commanding structure in the handling SARS 
outbreak had, to some extent, posed new thoughts and challenges to the Leadership 
Approach.  First of all, it should be acknowledged that the Expert Committee’s 
concern on “who is leading”49 was absolutely important in the decision-making 
process.  As Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) mentioned, the top leaders form small 
decision groups to gather information and start coordinating the crisis response efforts.  
During the SARS outbreak, certain “small groups” were formed for coordination.  
As reported by the LegCo Report, “The HWFB Task Force chaired by DR YEOH was 
established on 14 March 2003 to oversee the outbreak control measures taken by DH 
and HA and to collate expert advice to facilitate the work of DH and HA” (LegCo 
Report Section 14.7, LegCo, 2004).  Under the Task Force, the Inter-departmental 
Action Coordination Committee (IACC) chaired by the Permanent Secretary for 
Health, Welfare and Food, Carrie Yau-Tsang was set up on 24 March 2003 to 
                                                 
49
 As the Expert Report stated, “[i]t was not clear who was in overall charge of the outbreak… Within 
the Hong Kong system, it is not clear who performs the function of “surgeon general” or “chief 
medical officer”. In other words, who is the person responsible for giving professional advice to 
SHWF and Government, and providing professional leadership, on public health and healthcare policy 
matters?” (Expert Report Section 6 and 6.3, SARS Expert Committee, 2003). 
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coordinate efforts and resources from twenty five governmental departments and 
bureaus and to implement SARS-related policy decisions and initiatives at the 
operation level (LegCo, 2004).  To a certain extent, the formation of the IACC 
satisfied the argument of Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) on crisis management 
network that a crisis could not be managed in a linear system from a single crisis 
center.  In this case, the HWFB could be regarded as the center, while the IACC 
formed a crisis management network to coordinate the different departments 
concerned.    
 
However, the delegation and decentralization processes during a crisis as suggested 
by the Leadership Approach were not completely applicable in this case.  At the very 
beginning, there was a clear division of labor between the HWFB and DH.  However, 
as Yeoh told the LegCo Select Committee, “HWFB began to take on a more 
participatory and direct role in assessing and managing the outbreak when the 
number of persons infected continued to increase” (LegCo Report Section 14.8, 
LegCo, 2004).  As the disease continued to spread rapidly, both centralization and 
decentralization processes could be seen.  The centralization process continued until 
the top leader of Hong Kong – the Chief Executive - formally took a leading role in 
coordination:  
 
“[A]s the magnitude of the SARS outbreak escalated and the social and 
economic impact of the outbreak became more severe, issues which arose 
in the decision-making processes required input from public officials 
responsible for various policy areas.  It was therefore necessary for a 
forum of a level higher than that of the HWFB Task Force to be set up to 
coordinate the Government’s overall response more effectively.  On 25 
March 2003, the Chief Executive set up and convened the first meeting 
of the Chief Executive’s Steering Committee (CESC) for that purpose.  
168 
 
The membership of CESC included the relevant Principal Officials” 
(LegCo Report Section 14.7, LegCo, 2004).  
 
As LegCo Report added, the “CESC took over the HWFB Task Force’s role as the 
overall commanding body in steering the Government’s response to the SARS 
epidemic” (LegCo Report Section 14.15, LegCo, 2004).  To conclude, delegation 
and decentralization could be found in the commanding structure of the SARS 
epidemic.  In real situations, top leaders may not always get involved at the very 
beginning, and not until the crisis is severe enough.  In this case, the 
decision-making process, to some extent, had interacted with the sense-making 
process: The top leader did not handle the case from the first day.  But when the 
crisis was being recognized as serious, the top leader would take charge.  
 
Meaning-Making 
The government’s intention to reduce public uncertainty caused by SARS was 
obvious.  The argument related to the definition of “community outbreak” was one 
of the key issues being investigated in the Expert Report, as the situation turned very 
bad two weeks
50
 after Yeoh claimed that “there is no pneumonia outbreak in Hong 
Kong” (Transcript of Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food, 14 March 2003).  The 
Expert Committee accepted that the government “was genuinely intended to allay 
public panic, but with hindsight, a more prudent phrase could have been used. There 
is no evidence to suggest that this debate in any way lowered public alertness to the 
public health threat of SARS” (Expert Report Section 4.25, SARS Expert Committee, 
2003).  As Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005) suggested, meaning-making in crisis 
management is about political communication, and crisis communication is a battle of 
                                                 
50
 All schools in Hong Kong were suspended on 29 March 2003, and the 10-day isolation of Amoy 
Gardens Block E was put into effect on 31 March 2003, as the SARS epidemic became more serious. 
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credibility.  Obviously, reports in the mass media about Yeoh’s speech on 14 March 
2003 “had given the impression that he was trying to downplay the seriousness of the 
outbreak and that he had been too reassuring” (Expert Report Section 4.24, SARS 
Expert Committee, 2003).  Although Yeoh’s public relations skill was not the target 
of this comment, his quote was definitely a failure on crisis communication. 
 
Associated with the media’s fault-finding characteristics as stated in Boin, 't Hart, 
Stern, et al. (2005), Betty Tung (Tung Chee Hwa’s wife), who was the president of 
Hong Kong Red Cross at that time, visited Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate during the 
SARS outbreak to demonstrate her support to the community.  However, her visit 
had eventually led to public criticism due to her improper “appearance”, as she was 
“heavily armed” by wearing a full set of protective clothes with mask and goggles.  
Through different channels of media, some health workers complained that they were 
not that “fully equipped” even when working in isolation wards (Apple Daily, 14 
April 2003).  Although Mrs. Tung’s incident, apparently a public relations disaster, 
was not discussed in any of the three investigation reports, it created a negative 
“persuasive story line” (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 69) that Hong Kong was 
an infected area.  From the crisis communication perspective, Mrs. Tung’s action 
affected the public’s confidence on the government.  
 
Terminating 
The crisis termination process of SARS was quite dramatic.  After reaching its peak 
in early April, the SARS crisis started to step into its aftermath in May.  The 
operational termination of SARS outbreak was clear and easily identified.  It started 
with the end of the 10-day isolation period of Amoy Gardens Block E on 9 April, 
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followed by the reopening of schools starting 22 April
51
, after a one-month 
suspension.  More importantly, WHO lifted the travel advisory on Hong Kong on 23 
May, and later removed Hong Kong from the list of areas with local transmission of 
SARS. Eventually, WHO declared Hong Kong as SARS-free on 23 June 2003 (Expert 
Committee, 2003). 
 
However, political termination did not come with the operational termination, as the 
political process of assigning responsibility and accountability began near the end of 
operational termination.  On 28 May 2003, the government announced the 
membership of the SARS Expert Committee responsible for reviewing the 
management and control of SARS outbreak in Hong Kong.  Two days later, the 
Hospital Authority announced the membership of its Review Panel, and in October 
2003, the LegCo Select Committee inquiring the handling of the SARS outbreak by 
the Government was established under the Legislative Council (Powers and 
Privileges) Ordinance, with its report being released in July 2004.  According to the 
report, Yeoh, as a political appointee, was being criticized on the four counts below.  
 
1) Did not show sufficient alertness to the atypical pneumonia (AP) 
outbreak in Guangdong in January and early February 2003 (Section 
15.8). 
2) Regarding to Yeoh’s statement on “no community outbreak” on 14 
March 2003, he did not show that he had the communication skills of 
a policy secretary as expected by the public. (Section 15.10) 
3) Held responsible for failing his monitoring role on Hospital Authority, 
as HA did not have a territory-wide contingency plan for public 
hospitals to deal with large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases 
(Section 15.12). 
4) The Select Committee found Yeoh’s performance not satisfactory in 
                                                 
51
 Starting 22 April 2003, classes began to resume in secondary schools for students in Form 3 or 
above.  By 19 May 2003, classes for all schools resumed (Expert Committee, 2003). 
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the handling of the SARS outbreak in the above aspects. (Section 
15.13) 
 
Eventually, under such serious critiques and political pressure, Yeoh was forced to 
resign on 8 July 2004 to take political responsibility over the SARS outbreak.  This 
marked the complete termination of the SARS crisis. 
 
Learning 
In fact, the learning outcomes of SARS were fruitful, as the three investigation reports 
provided recommendations to different actors and departments (especially to Hospital 
Authority) on disease prevention and control.  However, the Expert Report paid the 
most attention to the learning process, as can be seen from its title: “SARS in Hong 
Kong: from Experience to Action”.  The Expert Report consisted of eighteen 
chapters in total, with twelve of those categorized as “Lessons and Themes”, and two 
of them on “Conclusions and Recommendations”.  In general, the Expert Report 
provided advice to the government on: 1) Organization of health and healthcare 
system for the control of an outbreak of communicable disease; 2) health protection 
functions; 3) coordination within Hong Kong; 4) collaboration within Pearl River 
Delta Region and with international community; 5) surveillance; 6) information and 
data management; 7) surge capacity; 8) clinical management; 9) hospital infection 
control and occupational health; 10) research and training; 11) communications; 12) 
engaging the Community; and, 13) the impact and after-effects of SARS on the 
community. (SARS Expert Report, SARS Expert Committee, 2003) 
 
One of the significant institutional changes in the Hong Kong health care system after 
SARS outbreak was the establishment of the Centre of Health Protection (CHP) in 
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June 2004.  The CHP “is a professional arm of the Department of Health for disease 
prevention and control” (Centre of Health Protection, 2004) through “establishing a 
disease surveillance system, strengthening infection control, enhancing laboratory 
diagnostic capacity, conducting risk communication and health promotion, developing 
applied research and training programs, and preparing emergency response plans” 
(Centre of Health Protection, 2004).  The learning effort by the government in the 
SARS outbreak was reflected in the crisis management of Swire Flu pandemic in 
2009, in which the government received positive comments for its fast responsive 
actions, an experience gained from the handling of the SARS outbreak.  
 
7.3  Politicization Approach Analysis 
Constructing Severity 
The SARS epidemic was definitely a severe public health crisis.  However, its effect 
on “core public value” (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003) was ambiguous.  It is clear 
that the SARS epidemic fulfilled the requirements of “hot topic”, that is, as the event 
got more serious, more people would be affected and more actors (i.e., senior level 
government officials) were likely to get involved in the crisis management process.  
Regardless, SARS was an epidemic that killed 299 people in Hong Kong within a few 
months.  It was not a crisis that started with core public value violation, but it did 
affect people’s lives and the fundamental safety needs of human being (Please refer to 
Maslow’s Needs Theory).  If the massive loss of lives due to an epidemic were 
considered as a violation of crucial values, the severity dimension of Politicization 
Approach would still be substantiated.   
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Constructing Agency 
The agency dimension of SARS epidemic was complicated.  Obviously, the 
handling process of SARS outbreak contained elements of both “incident” and 
“symptom”, as the epidemic itself was an incident, while its negative socio-economic 
impact was a symptom which led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.  The 
construction of agency could be multidimensional in this case, as the HA Report 
discussed the operational and technical aspects, and the LegCo and Expert Reports 
focused on the political, higher-level actors, such as Yeoh, the SHWF, and Tung, the 
CE.  In addition, blames could be allocated according to the status of the personnel 
involved, as could be observed from the LegCo Report.  Yeoh, as a political 
appointee, was asked to bear a different level of responsibility from DH Margret Chan, 
a civil servant.  Thus, in real situations, the distinction between incident and 
symptom is not necessarily clear-cut.  Although the dichotomy method is not always 
applicable in real case examples, it provided insights on how blames are being 
allocated, especially for actors holding different positions during a crisis. 
 
Constructing Responsibility 
The construction of agency directly affects the consideration in responsibility 
dimension.  As mentioned, the SARS epidemic contained components of both 
incident and symptom, which could provide different outcomes in constructing 
responsibility.  However, a review of the blame allocation process showed that the 
stepping-down of Yeoh was obviously a result of the failure of a policy-maker as 
defined by Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003).  However, the LegCo Report also 
mentioned that working relationship among relevant parties, including the 
government, HA, and other organization concerned should be clearly set out (Section 
15.46), which, to some extent, supported the case the epidemic was also a network 
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failure.  Considering the large number of recommendations and suggestions for 
improvement from the three reports, it was obvious that there were limitations in the 
health care system of Hong Kong, which were clearly revealed in the SARS outbreak. 
These fruitful recommendations also served as a proof that SARS could be a network 
failure.  
 
7.4  Summary 
The Leadership Approach was satisfactory in analyzing the SARS epidemic, with all 
its five components clearly answered by the three investigation reports.  However, 
there are two points that warrants further discussion.  First, as mentioned in the 
sense-making analysis, the decentralization and delegation processes were, to some 
extent, contradicting the “going up” process as argued in the Politicization Approach.  
In reality, the top leader would not be there to wait for a crisis, but instead, only step 
in when the crisis is serious enough.  Second, in the crisis terminating process, it was 
observed that political termination happened a long time after the operational 
termination.  Apparently, for a natural disaster, there would not be a full-fledged 
investigation until after the operational termination.  The responsibility-assigning 
and blame process could take time, which is the reason for the delay of political 
termination.  In the case of SARS outbreak, the political termination (Yeoh’s 
resignation) was observed almost a year after the operational termination of SARS. 
 
On the other hand, the outcome of applying the Politicization Approach on the SARS 
case is not satisfactory, with the “either/or” phenomenon being the major problem.  
In a large-scale crisis, it was nearly impossible to dichotomize the dimensions of 
incident versus symptom, and actor versus network failure, due to the complexity and 
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involvement of many actors, ranging from senior government officials to front line 
health workers.  Thus, constructing blame and framing in a natural disaster is an 
uneasy task.  Obviously, the Politicization Approach works better in political crises 
involving fewer people.  
 
The coming Chapter Eight will illustrate another triggering issue of the 2003 Protest – 
the controversy on National Security Ordinance (Basic Law Artic 23) legislation.  
Afterward, the State-society Interactive Framework analysis will be presented in 
Chapter Nine.   
  
176 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: NATIONAL SECURITY BILL 
CONTROVERSY 
 
8.1  Background 
According to Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, it is the constitutional 
responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government to “enact laws on its own to 
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central 
People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political 
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to 
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with 
foreign political organizations or bodies” (Basic Law of HKSAR, Article 23).  The 
controversies began when then-Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa started to spearhead 
the legislation process in his second term of office in 2002.  The consultation paper 
on proposals to implement Article 23 was released on 24 September 2002.  The 
proposed legislation prohibited activities including treason, secession and subversion, 
sedition, theft of state secrets, and foreign political organizations conducting political 
activities in the HKSAR.   
 
According to A. Cheung (2005b, 37), the HKSAR government was 
“heavy-handedness in Article 23 legislation and the backlash”, and had 
underestimated the opposition from the general public while overestimating the 
support from pro-Beijing parties in passing the bill.  He further suggested that the 
proposed bill had startled the pan-democrats as well as the general public, as they 
have been openly asking for the termination of the one-party rule of the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP), especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident
52
.  
 
Then-Secretary of Security, Regina Ip, was responsible for moving the bill.  
Debates between supporters (including government officials) and the opposition 
were long-lasting and harsh, especially between September 2002 and July 2003, and 
public forums, newspaper columns, radio phone-in programs, LegCo meetings, and 
government press conferences became battlefields for both camps.  The 
dissatisfaction of people towards Article 23 was first shown in the 60,000 people 
demonstration
53
 on 15 December 2002.  To fight back, the pro-government camp 
organized an assembly with about 40,000 participants to support the legislation on 22 
December 2002.  However, there was doubt that some of the participants were there 
because of the free transportation by shuttle bus and the free lunch (Apple Daily, 23 
December 2002).  According to the opinion poll conducted by the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong in December 2002, 68.6% of respondents opposed to the 
legislation, in contrast with the 19% supporting it (Apple Daily, 24 December 2002).  
The consultation period for the legislation ended on 24 December 2002. 
 
In January 2003, the government announced some clarifications and amendments to 
the legislative proposals regarding the implementation of Article 23, which included 
the abolition of the offence of misprision of treason and abolition of the offence of 
possession of seditious publications. (Government further clarifies legislative 
proposals to implement BL 23, Government Press Release, 28 January 2003) 
 
                                                 
52
 This kind of request may be identified as a kind of subversion against the Central People's 
Government, and would be prohibited and even sanctioned after the legislation of Article 23. 
53
 60,000 was the number provided by the organizer. The number was about 12,000, according to 
Hong Kong Police. 
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These further clarifications were believed to be concessions by the government in 
response to the strong opposition towards the original proposal (Apple Daily, 29 
January 2003), but the government refused to admit this.  Soon afterwards, without 
further in-depth consultation, the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill was 
published in the Hong Kong Gazette on 14 February 2003, and introduced to the 
Legislative Council on 26 February 2003.  However, the draft bill suffered severe 
critique on those sections related to secret hearing
54
.  The bill was scheduled to be 
passed in July 2003, resulting in those opposition parties and groups calling for a 
protest on 1 July 2003, the HKSAR Establishment Day. 
 
The 1 July protest rally in 2003 was certainly a historic event in Hong Kong (J. 
Cheng 2005, Chan and Chan 2007), with half-a-million people marched towards the 
government offices in Central in a peaceful manner, in protest of the poor 
governance of Tung, especially during the outbreak of SARS.  However, it was 
clear that the main reason was the people’s antagonism towards Article 23.  Despite 
of the rally, Tung’s government still insisted on moving the third reading of the bill 
on 9 July 2003, after making further amendments
55
 on some controversial sections.  
However, the passage of the bill was found to be impossible on 6 July, when 
Executive Council
56
 member James Tien, Chairperson of Liberal Party (LP) from 
                                                 
54
 “If in the course of any proceedings before the Court of First Instance the Court is satisfied, upon 
application by the Secretary for Justice, that the publication of any evidence to be given or any 
statement to be made in the course of the proceedings might prejudice national security, the Court may 
order that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing so as to 
avoid such publication” (Section 8D (5), Part 4: Amendments to the Societies Ordinance, National 
Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill). 
55
 “1) Delete the provision regarding a local organization subordinate to a mainland organization 
which has been proscribed by the Central Authorities. 2) Introduce "public interest" as a defense for 
unlawful disclosure of certain official information, in order to protect and alleviate the concerns of the 
public, particularly those of the media. 3) Delete the provision which confers on the police a power to 
search without court warrant in the exercise of their emergency investigation powers” (Chief 
Executive's transcript on Basic Law Article 23, Press Release, 5 July 2003). 
56
 Executive Council (ExCo) is the highest decision-making body in HKSAR government chaired by 
the Chief Executive. 
179 
 
the pro-Beijing camp, tendered his resignation to the ExCo and declared that all LP 
lawmakers would not support the bill in LegCo.  The government postponed the 
legislation the next day as there were insufficient votes to support the bill in the 
LegCo after the U-turn of Liberal Party.  The National Security (Legislative 
Provisions) Bill was eventually withdrawn from the legislative program by the CE on 
5 September 2003.   
 
8.2  Leadership Approach Analysis 
Sense-Making 
The further clarifications
57
 released in January 2003 on the original proposal could be 
perceived as the government’s response to the worries and dissatisfaction of the 
public towards the legislation.  It could be seen as the government’s recognition of 
the opposition towards the law, but was far from the sense-making of a crisis.  
However, the government did not foresee the failure of proceeding with the third 
reading on time (i.e., 9 July 2003) until the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.  More 
accurately, from a policymaking perspective, the policy did not fail until James Tien 
resigned from the ExCo and directed his party to oppose to the legislation, which 
made the passage of the bill in LegCo impossible.  If this were the case, the real 
crisis duration from the government perspective would be short (from 1 July protest 
until the resignation of both Regina Ip and Antony Leung on 16 July 2003).  As 
commented by many scholars, the half-a-million people protest rally was a result of 
the many issues that gathered severe public dissatisfaction.  Thus, the sense-making 
for the Article 23 case, as a triggering reason for the rally, was difficult to analyze 
independently, without considering the whole picture with all other crisis events. 
                                                 
57
 See Government further clarifies legislative proposals to implement BL 23, Government Press 
Release, 28 January 2003 
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Decision-Making 
In this case, Tung was solely accountable for the decision-making process, although 
Regina Ip was the principal official responsible for promoting the legislation of 
Article 23.  It was because the decision-making power of postponement and 
withdrawal of the bill were in the hands of the Chief Executive-in-Council.  Tung’s 
leading role in this crisis as the top leader of HKSAR Government was as appropriate 
as suggested in the Leadership Approach.  Under the executive-driven (Li 2007, 32) 
tradition, the Chief Executive’s prominent role in policymaking is unquestionable.  
Moreover, apparently there was a miscalculation in the level of opposition and 
dissatisfaction among the general public in Hong Kong, given that Hong Kong had 
just emerged from the SARS outbreak and was in a great economic depression.  The 
uncertainty and inaccuracy in catching “national mood” (Kingdon 1995) in 
policymaking and decision-making might, to some extent, be related to the 
non-democratic system in Hong Kong, and could serve as evidence that the 
Leadership Approach, as a western-based crisis management theory, might not be 
fully applicable to non-democratic systems, such as Hong Kong. 
 
Meaning-Making 
Although Regina Ip’s tough image, strong words, and weird examples58 given during 
the consultation process received wide criticism, there was no direct relationship 
between the policy failure and her political communication skills, as it was obvious 
that the nature of this critical and highly controversial law has angered the people, and 
they were opposed to those terms and sections inside the bill that would harm their 
freedom.  Ip’s public relations skill was just a part of the issue, but certainly not a 
                                                 
58
 One of the famous quotes from Regina Ip was a democracy, such as Germany before World War II, 
could still elect a devil like Hitler.  Ip later apologized for her statement, and promised not to use 
Hitler as example (Apple Daily, 31 January 2003).    
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sufficient factor that led to such a huge opposition.  This is an example of a case that 
even spin doctoring could not help, as it is neither helpful in passing a “disgusting” 
policy, nor useful in safeguarding a critical governance crisis.  To some extent, spin 
doctoring is not really responding to nor tackling the core issue.  In the Hong Kong 
context, it has become a tactic for the government to “wait until” the LegCo pass the 
controversial policy, as technically the pro-establishment camp is always controlling 
the majority in the legislature.  
 
Terminating 
It was easy to identify the operational termination of a policy failure, in this case, the 
postponement and withdrawal of the legislation.  However, the political termination 
process was unclear and could be long lasting.  Of course, the resignation of Ip could 
be one of the possible terminating points, as she was the political-appointed principal 
official responsible for the whole legislation process.  However, the aftermath 
impact of such a “collapse” of the cabinet (i.e., the resignation of Leung, later, Yeoh, 
and finally, Tung) would have really harmed governance prestige and public 
confidence, and was not covered in this approach.  Furthermore, the issue of Article 
23 still exists, as it is the constitutional obligation for HKSAR government to legislate 
the Article as stated in the Basic Law.  The nature of a policy failure is, to certain 
extent, different from a scandal or a disease, as a policy process would never end, 
since the government can restart anytime it wants to.  The relationship between 
crisis nature and crisis management is an important issue to be discussed in latter 
chapters. 
 
Learning 
Rather than learning, the aftermath of this policy failure could better be described as 
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changing of political environment and social atmosphere, which are more significant 
than those experiences learnt by the government in this failure.  As Chan and Chan 
(2007) argued, the 2003 incident was a watershed of Hong Kong civil society 
development.  Not only did the government learn a lesson, but the whole society 
also learnt a lesson, especially on how to bargain with the government by mobilizing 
the masses.  Obviously, the top-down perspective of Leadership Approach failed to 
address this issue.  If the political environment changes dramatically after a crisis, 
the learning efforts of the government would become minimal, given that there would 
be new challenges next time.    
 
8.3  Politicization Approach Analysis 
Constructing Severity 
The severity of this crisis was not simply because the violation of core public values 
(i.e., freedom) stemming from Article 23 itself, but also the shock and political 
pressure brought by the half-a-million people protest.  The shockwave of the protest 
even counter-affected the framing role of mass media (Lee and Chan 2009), as 
newspapers in Hong Kong were found to be politically indifferent for a period of time 
just after the rally, when all of them, even the Pro-Beijing ones, were criticizing the 
poor performance of Hong Kong SAR Government and Tung.  In general, the crisis 
status was gained not by the nature of the event (Article 23 legislation), but by the 
scale of the protest.     
 
Constructing Agency 
The agency dimension in this case was quite simple and direct, as it was clearly not a 
technical incident involving lower-level actors.  As mentioned, the Article 23 
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incident was a highly politicized policy failure directly caused by the top leaders of 
the HKSAR Government - the Chief Executive and his cabinet.  Also, it should be 
related to the overall governing ability of Tung’s administration.  In the 
policymaking cycle, the agenda setting process is in the hands of the policy 
entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), and thus, it is not surprising that all focuses were on 
the major policy actors, in this case, Tung and Ip.  
 
Constructing Responsibility 
There were both actor failure and network (policy) failure in the Article 23 
controversy, as observed from Ip’s resignation and the withdrawal of the bill.  
However, there was a saying that Leung and Ip resigned in order to save Tung from 
the political pressure of stepping-down, which would have made this a case of 
“scapegoating”.  Once again, the politicization was challenged for its “either/or” 
phenomenon, as it is difficult to make an absolute judgment on the category in each 
dimension.         
  
8.4  Summary 
A policy failure is entirely different from other types of crisis in view of its man-made 
nature.  Although the legislation of Article 23 was the direct reason leading the 1 
July 2003 Demonstration, the Leadership Approach has underestimated the 
complexity of this governance crisis, which included, but was not limited to, the two 
crisis events discussed before.  This crisis is a proof that the Leadership Approach 
was not designed for analyzing crises with multiple reasons and backgrounds.  In 
general, it is difficult to sense a crisis stemming from a policy failure in advance in 
the Hong Kong context, as technically, policies proposed by the government would 
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not fail in the LegCo, given that the pro-establishment camp is always in control.  
Also, the process of meaning-making is not as useful as the theory suggested, as it is 
doubtful whether such a controversial bill could be framed to “look normal” from a 
political communication perspective.  One of the possible reasons could be that there 
could not be such a controversial policy in western democracies.  The idea of 
constitutional obligation is strange in policy formulation, and is, to some extent, 
related to the non-democratic system in Hong Kong.  National mood is not one of 
the major concerns, but the leader perspective is.  The deadlock between the state 
and the society has created new challenges in studying policy failure as a governance 
crisis, as would be further discussed in the coming chapters. 
 
After the discussion on the three cases, the historical event of 1 July 2003 Protest will 
be introduced by adopting the State-society Interactive Framework in the coming 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER NINE: THE 1 JULY 2003 DEMONSTRATION - 
STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIVE FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS  
 
As discussed in Chapters Six to Chapter Eight, three major events are considered to 
have led to the 1 July 2003 Demonstration: The Car-Gate scandal, the outbreak of 
SARS, and the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.  In 
current literature, crises are mostly regarded as an individual event, although scholars 
might agree that there are many reasons behind.  In fact, the half-a-million people 
protest in July of 2003 was a catalyzer that linked the three events, even though the 
events were almost unrelated with one another.  The Car-Gate scandal was 
obviously a political scandal related to the misconduct of a high ranking official – 
Antony Leung, then-Financial Secretary.  The outbreak of SARS was a natural 
disaster-turned man-made crisis due the ineffective crisis management of HKSAR 
government.  Finally, the controversy on the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic 
Law, believed to be the direct reason for the protest, was definitely a policy failure.  
 
The above mentioned three crisis events were in the same line with C-y. Cheung’s 
(2005) illustrations which appeared in the book titled “The July 1 Protest Rally” 
edited by J. Cheung (2005).  It can be sure that C.-y. Cheung was not the only 
scholar or commentator who had associated those three crisis events with the 
demonstration.  In fact, numerous newspaper articles had reported the anonymous 
participants’ point of view towards the demonstration.  
 
“In fact, after 1989, I have never tried to take to the streets as I think the 
government will turn good.  However, the recent Antony’s car scandal, 
SARS incident and Mrs. Regina Ip’s remarks [on Article 23] has shown 
that governance problem would only be intensified.  My hopes have 
been dashed.” (HK Economic Times, 2 July 2003) 
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The 1 July Demonstration also shocked the Pro-establishment camp.  Oriental 
Daily, a Pro-Beijing newspaper, in its editorial on 4 July 2003, blamed the 
government badly on their poor crisis management in the above mentioned three 
crisis events which directly led to the rally of half-a-million people on the street.  
The editorial emphasized that the demonstration happened not only because of the 
Article 23 controversy, but it could also be the result of a chain of crises and 
wrongdoings which was observed after Tung launched the POAS in 2002.  A few 
days later, the Oriental Daily (9 July 2003) interviewed some LegCo members, and 
among them some Pan-democrats suggested that Leung and Ip should be “fired” 
after the demonstration.  Almost at the same time, Chan Yuen-han, a 
Pro-establishment lawmaker, argued that the Article 23 controversy was the catalytic 
event of the demonstration.  However, the Leung’s scandal and poor crisis 
management of Yeoh’s had also triggered public dissatisfaction towards Tung’s 
administration (Apple Daily, 7 July 2003).   
 
Obviously, after the demonstration, major public opinion has pointed their fingers 
towards Tung.  As such, the Pro-establishment camps began to blame Tung’s 
government intensively.  From the perspective of State-society Interactive 
Framework, the “u-turn” of the Pro-establishment camp marked a significant 
decrease in Crisis Weakening Forces.  Indeed the demonstration as a catalytic event 
escalated the situation into the governance crisis level that the governmental change 
would be a reasonable expectation of the general public in order to solve the crisis.  
 
In the next section, the data collected by Lee and Chan (2011) can be a strong 
evident to show how Crisis Weakening Forces (i.e. the supporters of the government) 
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diminished significantly after the demonstration.  The data had provided invaluable 
insights for understanding the operations of Crisis Strengthening and Weakening 
Forces and the Catalytic Effect of Crisis which were the key components of this 
State-society Interactive Framework.   
 
9.1  Results from Newspaper Discourse Analysis 
After analyzing the three events with the Leadership Approach and the Politicization 
Approach respectively in the above three chapters, newspaper discourse analysis is 
now adopted to attempt to capture the Strengthening Forces and the catalytic effect 
of the 1 July 2003 Demonstration in a more objective way.  With reference to Lee 
and Chan’s (2011, 68) study, the time range of the crisis is divided into three periods 
as follows: 
 
1) The pre-protest period: 1 April to 30 June 
2) The event period: 1 July to 9 July 
3) The post-protest period: 10 July to 22 November  
 
Lee and Chan (2011) first used the Chinese keyword “July 1 protest” to sort out 
related articles, which were coded using the coding scheme from their readings of the 
materials, focusing only on those articles with very specific “answer” to the 
questions they had set.  For example, “who was the culprit of the protest?”  
Articles that simply presented different points of view without a clear stand point 
were not included. 
 
The search for culprits could be regarded as an assessment of the Strengthening 
Forces.  As Lee and Chan (2011) argued, the choice of “culprits” is, to some extent, 
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a reflection of the wants of the people.  For example, an attack on the political 
system may move democratization forward by a step, and laying the blame on the 
leader may create sufficient political pressure to press for changes in the government 
(e.g., stepping-down of the official).  Thus, the strength and concentration of the 
Strengthening Forces are important factors in determining the level of a crisis (i.e., 
crisis, governance crisis, or change) in the development process. 
 
Table 9.1 Identification of the culprits – 1 July 2003 Demonstration (percent) 
WENWEIPO ORIENTAL DAILY 
Culprits/Period Pre 7/1 Post Culprits/Period Pre 7/1 Post 
Hong Kong SARG 9 25 57.1 Hong Kong SARG 42.1 89.4 66.3 
CE Tung Chee-hwa 0 4.2 7.1 CE Tung Chee-hwa 10.5 23.4 28.6 
Pro-establishments 0 0 0 Pro-establishments 0 0 7.8 
Foreign Forces 82 66.7 32.1 Foreign Forces 52.6 0 14.3 
The Media 9 20.8 10.7 The Media 0 0 7.8 
Central Government 0 0 0 Central Government 0 4.3 7.8 
Pan-democrats 0 0 0 Pan-democrats 0 0 0 
Articles (N) (11) (24) (28) Articles (N) (19) (47) (77) 
MING PAO APPLE DAILY 
Culprits/Period Pre 7/1 Post Culprits/Period Pre 7/1 Post 
Hong Kong SARG 87.5 100 88.2 Hong Kong SARG 85.7 87 79.6 
CE Tung Chee-hwa 11.9 2.7 20.9 CE Tung Chee-hwa 28.6 52.2 26.9 
Pro-establishments 9.5 0 0 Pro-establishments 15.9 13 7.5 
Foreign Forces 4.8 0 1.8 Foreign Forces 0 0 1.1 
The Media 2.4 1.4 2.7 The Media 0 0 0 
Central Government 0 1.4 3.6 Central Government 4.8 13 5.4 
Pan-democrats 0 0 0 Pan-democrats 1.6 0 0 
Articles (N) (42) (73) (110) Articles (N) (63) (23) (93) 
Note: Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.  Sum of 
percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories. 
Source: (Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong 2011, 71) 
 
Table 9.1 is a summary of the discourse analysis by Lee and Chan (2011) on the 
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major culprit in the 1 July 2003 Demonstration.  It can be seen that the discourses of 
Apple Daily and Ming Pao were quite similar, as both identified the “Hong Kong 
government” as the major culprit in all three periods, followed by “Chief Executive 
Tung Chee-hwa”.  It should be pointed out that, in all three periods, more than 80 
percent of their discourses pointed out that the “Hong Kong government” should 
bear responsibility for the social crisis.   
 
As for Oriental Daily and Wenweipo, there was a significant increase in the 
percentage of discourses identifying “Hong Kong government” and “Tung” as the 
top two culprits from the pre-protest period to the event and post-protest periods.  
One important point to note is that, before the protest, a majority of their discourses 
was putting the blame on “politicians destroying Hong Kong/ foreign forces”, an 
option that saw a sharp decrease in the post-protest period to a percentage much 
smaller than the “Hong Kong government”.  
 
9.2  Methods to Resolve the Crisis 
The solution for resolving a crisis could be closely related to the possibility of a 
change in the government, which could be a major policy change, institutional 
change, personnel change in high-ranking officials, or even a regime change.  Thus, 
a strong catalyzer for a crisis would be the lack of positive response of the 
government regarding the clear and strong expectation for change by the public.  
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Table 9.2 Methods to resolve the social crisis of 1 July 2003 (percent) 
WENWEIPO ORIENTAL DAILY 
Methods/Period Pre 7/1 Post Methods/Period Pre 7/1 Post 
Postpone Article 23 0 0 0 Postpone Article 23 0 39.3 0 
Complete Article 23 22.2 24 0 Complete Article 23 11.1 0 0 
Revising Article 23 0 12 0 Revising Article 23 22.2 0 0 
Gov Respond to Public 0 36 35.5 Gov Respond to Public 66.7 25 42.3 
Rebuild Gov Authority 0 0 12.9 Rebuild Gov Authority 0 0 0 
Democratic Reform 0 0 19.4 Democratic Reform 0 7.1 9.6 
Admin. Reform 0 4 0 Admin. Reform 0 39.3 42.3 
Solidarity of HK Ppl.  55.6 24 22.6 Solidarity of HK Ppl.  0 0 7.7 
Developing Econ. 44.4 24 22.6 Developing Econ. 0 10.7 0 
Tung Stepping Down 0 4 0 Tung Stepping Down 0 25 5.8 
Est. Gov Mouthpiece 0 0 12.9 Est. Gov Mouthpiece 0 0 0 
Citizens’ Participation 0 0 0 Citizens’ Participation 0 0 1.9 
Clear Position of PD 0 0 0 Clear Position of PD 0 0 0 
China Intervention 0 4 0 China Intervention 22.2 0 11.5 
China Refrains 0 0 0 China Refrains 0 0 3.8 
Articles (N) (9) (25) (31) Articles (N) (9) (28) (52) 
MING PAO APPLE DAILY 
Postpone Article 23 20 57.1 10.3 Postpone Article 23 45.5 50 0 
Complete Article 23 10 0 0 Complete Article 23 0 0 0 
Revising Article 23 10 0 0 Revising Article 23 0 0 0 
Gov Respond to Public 40 17.1 15.7 Gov Respond to Public 9.1 8.3 0 
Rebuild Gov Authority 20 0 0 Rebuild Gov Authority 0 0 0 
Democratic Reform 0 14.3 21.8 Democratic Reform 27.3 33.3 0 
Admin. Reform 0 11.4 12.8 Admin. Reform 18.2 16.7 0 
Solidarity of HK Ppl.  0 0 2.6 Solidarity of HK Ppl.  0 0 0 
Developing Econ. 0 14.3 9 Developing Econ. 0 0 0 
Tung Stepping Down 0 8.6 7.7 Tung Stepping Down 0 0 0 
Est. Gov Mouthpiece 0 0 0 Est. Gov Mouthpiece 0 0 0 
Citizens’ Participation 0 0 1.3 Citizens’ Participation 0 0 68.8 
Clear Position of PD 0 0 1.3 Clear Position of PD 0 0 31.3 
China Intervention 0 0 11.5 China Intervention 0 0 0 
China Refrains 0 0 6.4 China Refrains 0 0 0 
Articles (N) (10) (35) (78) Articles (N) (11) (12) (16) 
Key: Solidarity of Hong Kong People (Solidarity of HK Ppl.), Establishing Mouthpiece for Government 
(Est. Gov Mouthpiece), China refrains from Intervention (China Refrains), Clear Positioning of 
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Pan-democrats (Clear Position of PD) 
Note: Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.  Sum of 
percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories. 
Source: (Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-Colonial Hong Kong 2011, 77) 
 
Table 9.2 shows a summary of the discourse analysis by Lee and Chan (2011) on the 
possible methods to resolve the social crisis of 1 July 2003.  The discourses of 
Apple Daily, Ming Pao, and Oriental Daily quite constantly mentioned “Postponing 
Article 23 legislation” as a method, especially during the protest period, while some 
mentions of “revising the proposed law” appeared in Wenweipo.  Regarding to the 
notion of change, a high percentage of discourses in Oriental Daily and Wenweipo 
mentioned the need for “Government to respond to the public”, especially after the 
protest.  In the long run, most newspapers asked for “democratic 
reform/development” or an “administrative reform”, with the percentages of these 
two categories increasing noticeably during and after the protest.  Also, it is worth 
noting that Wenweipo, as a CCP party newspaper, expressed its views on “democratic 
development” and the need to “rebuild government authority” after the protest. 
 
9.3  State-society Interactive Framework Analysis 
The analysis of newspaper discourse in the previous section indicated that there were 
changes in the strengthening and weakening forces in the case of 1 July 2003 
Demonstration due to the various external and internal factors.  Originally, 
according to Hallin and Macini’s (2004) idea of political parallelism in the media, the 
four local newspapers in Hong Kong selected for the analysis could be roughly 
divided into those supporting the pan-democrats (i.e., Apple Daily and Ming Pao) 
and those that are pro-Beijing (i.e., Oriental Daily and Wenweipo).  They represent 
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the Strengthening Force and Weakening Force in the State-society Interactive 
Framework.  Specifically, pro-government newspapers always side with, and hold a 
positive view of, the government, with discourses asking for the “solidarity of Hong 
Kong people” and focus on “developing economy”, and a description of the culprits 
as “Politicians destroying Hong Kong / foreign forces”.  However, newspapers 
supporting the pan-democrats would point their fingers at the “Hong Kong 
government” as a whole, or specifically at “Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa”, and 
their strong sense in postponing the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was 
definitely a major source of Crisis Strengthening Force.   
 
In the State-society Interactive Framework, the power of the two forces would 
change according to different external and internal factors.  The crisis management 
efforts made by the government in the three events leading to the 1 July protest (i.e. 
the Car Gate scandal, the outbreak of SARS and the controversy of the Security 
Ordinance) was presented in the previous chapters.  Hence, they will be repeated in 
details here.  By adopting the State-society Interactive Framework, major 
observations are summarized in Figure 9.1 below to explain the huge influence of the 
protest to the whole crisis development process in the crisis management perspective. 
 
9.3.1  The Change of Force: U-turn of the Pro-Business Party 
One of the critical political impacts brought by the 1
st
 July Protest was the U-turn of 
Pro-Business lawmakers.  As discussed in Chapter One, the pro-business bloc, since 
the colonial era, has been a political conservative that supports the government.  
Their support has continued after the handover under the united front strategies 
adopted by Beijing (Loh 2010).  However, as Ma (2012) argued, the political 
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support from the pro-business bloc is sometimes fragmented as the party politics in 
Hong Kong is immature and the pro-business block unable to form a stable and 
trustworthy “political alliance” with the government.  Thus, the U-turn of 
pro-business bloc in critical issues such as Article 23 became possible under their ad 
hoc relations.  
 
Soon after the Protest, a number of pro-business lawmakers suggested to suspend or 
to further amend the National Security Ordinance Bill.  For example, David LI, a 
lawmaker who is also a banker claimed that Regina Ip’s performance was 
unsatisfactory and the government should evaluate the process (Apple Daily, 3 July 
2003).  On the other hand, James Tien, chairman of Liberal Party, a pro-business 
party, suggested that the government should postpone the legislation to next 
legislative year.  He further claimed that he had discussed the issue with some 
Beijing officials and his idea was acknowledged by them (Wenweipo, 5 July 2003).   
 
Finally, an urgent ExCo meeting was called in 6 July night.  At the same time, the 
Liberal Party announced that they supported the deferral of the legislation.  After 
four hours of ExCo meeting, the government announced that the legislation will be 
suspended and James Tien had been resigned from his ExCo membership.  In reality, 
without the support of Liberal Party (with 8 votes in the LegCo), passing the bill had 
become impossible.  In this case, the pro-business bloc represented by Liberal Party 
had performed as a critical minority that alters the government final decision.  The 
retreat of Liberal Party has changed the Crisis Weakening Force into Crisis 
Strengthening Force as they “chose to stand by the people” (Lee Cheuk-yan, 7 July 
2003, Apple Daily).  
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Figure 9.1 State-society Interactive Framework analysis of 1 July protest 
 
Figure 9.1 summarizes observations from the three events leading to the 2003 
Demonstration, and serves to explain the huge influence of the protest to the whole 
crisis development process from the crisis management perspective.  Before the 
protest, public dissatisfaction was already at a high level due to various reasons, such 
as distrust in the Tung administration stemming from the Car-Gate scandal, the 
extremely poor economic and social condition brought by SARS, and the threat on 
human rights and freedom in connection with the possible legislation of Article 23.   
These are all regarded as Strengthening Forces of the crisis.  However, the 
relationship between those crises was unclear until the appearance of the catalyzer – 
1 July protest.  Thus, the 1 July protest had finally become a social crisis as 
 
Crisis Weakening Force: 
● Pro-government parties support in the LegCo  
● Positive discourses from the Pro-Beijing newspapers  
● The above forces deteriorated shapely during the protest 
period (i.e. Liberal Party’s U-turn and the energized 
public opinion effect)  
Crisis Strengthening Force: 
● Legitimacy crisis of the government  (i.e. Car Gate) 
● Public dissatisfaction towards the ineffective crisis 
management of SARS and the poor economy 
● Opposition parties and organizations called for 
demonstration on 1 July to express people’s anger 
● Negative mass media coverage (with clearer and stronger 
views asking for government change - on postponing the 
Security Ordinance legislation and on Tung’s 
administration) 
● The half-a-million demonstration protest on 1 July 
(Catalytic effect existed) 
 
Government 
Change 
Governance 
Crisis  
Crisis  
The Catalyzer  
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described by Lee and Chan (2011), or a governance crisis under the Crisis 
Development Ladders. 
 
Based on the results of newspaper discourses analysis, Chan and Lee (2006, Lee and 
Chan 2011) argued that there was an energized public opinion during the protest, and 
observed a diminished political parallelism in the media, which, they explained, was 
a reflection of public opinion influencing the mass media in the short run, leading to 
an amendment in the media’s political orientation.  From the perspective of the 
State-society Interactive Framework, public opinion was strong enough to cause a 
decrease in the weakening force (i.e., coverage by the pro-government newspapers) 
for a short time, as some actors chose to take side with the view of the majority of the 
people in the final stage.  In this regard, the Crisis Strengthening Forces were united 
to exert sufficient pressure on the government.  
 
It is difficult to make a conclusion on whether the Strengthening Forces have led to 
the catalytic effect or vice versa, though it seems a stronger Strengthening Force may 
lead to the catalytic effect.  Also, the presence of the catalytic effect would enable 
the Strengthening Forces to operate in full capacity to possibly force changes in the 
government.  Thus, the end of the 2003 Demonstration crisis saw the postponement 
of the Article 23 legislation process and the stepping-down of Antony Leung and 
Regina Ip.  
 
In the coming chapter, the case study part II – the Anti-High Speed Railway Incident 
will be discussed.  Compared with the 2003 Protest, the Anti-High Speed Railway 
Incident was said to be a latent crisis.  In fact, there were intensive state-society 
interactions.  However, it failed to reach to the level of governance crisis.  Thus, it 
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would be an useful case to investigate how do different crisis management 
approaches are going to illustrate the latent crises which were seldom appeared in 
current literatures.  
  
197 
 
CASE STUDY PART II 
CHAPTER TEN: ANTI-HIGH SPEED RAILWAY INCIDENT 
10.1  Background 
In 2009, the Hong Kong government proposed the construction of a high speed 
railway, the 26-km Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Express Rail Link (commonly known as High Speed Railway or XRL) running from 
West Kowloon in Hong Kong to the boundary of Hong Kong and Shenzhen, from 
where it will connect to the 16,000-km National High-speed Railway Network (MTR 
Corporation, 2010).  The construction of the High Speed Railway began in January 
2010, and is targeted for completion in 2015.  The total cost of the project was 
estimated to be 66.9 billion, and the funding was appropriated by the Legislative 
Council on 16 January 2010.   
 
The huge construction cost was one of the major concerns for those who were 
against the High Speed Railway.  The Anti-High Speed Railway movement was an 
opposition against one of the most controversial urban policies – the XRL, which had 
created great dispute before and after its appropriation by the Legislative Council in 
2009.  The movement was viewed as another watershed of social movement in 
Hong Kong after the 1 July 2003 Demonstration, as, for the first time, a group of 
young people, commonly referred to as the “Post-80s” (meaning they were born after 
1980), were considered the initiator of a new mode of social movement, which 
involved spreading information through the internet and actually taking part in 
demonstrations at different localities.  However, the definition of “Post-80s” was 
unclear, and the mass media and general public had never paid special attention on 
this group of youngsters.  
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Phase 1: Anti-Express Railway Appropriation 
After the announcement of the government’s request for appropriation of the railway 
project, a Facebook group named “Against 66.9 billion Express Railway, calling for 
demonstration outside the LegCo on 15/1/2010” was set up, attracting more than 
50,000 members.  A pressure group known as the League of Anti-Express Rail Link 
was responsible for most of the Facebook groups’ actions.  It was a very different 
kind of set up from the traditional social movement, as a “virtual” group was taking 
the lead in the very beginning, instead of a political party
59
.  The League was 
“virtual” in that only a spokesperson, instead of any executive, was speaking on its 
behalf to the mass media.  It had no formal membership, organization chart, or code 
of formation, not even an office mailing address.  Almost all of its announcements 
were distributed through Facebook and other web pages, such as “Hong Kong 
Discussion Forum” and “Golden Forum” (The Encyclopaedia of Virtual 
Communities in Hong Kong, 2010).  
 
The League of Anti-Express Rail Link organized a series of activities through the 
internet, among them a demonstration outside the LegCo Building with 1,700 
participants.  Later, the League organized the “Five Districts Tapas” to explain their 
standpoints to the general public.  The “Five Districts” refers to the five 
geographical constituencies of LegCo, as the majority of the LegCo members who 
support the bill were from the functional constituencies.  The activists also called 
for universal suffrage with the Tapas.  The first tapa was held on 16 December 2009, 
and the second was held on 5-8 January 2010, in which the participants knelt each 
time after walking slowly for 26 steps (a reference to the 26km Express Rail Link).  
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 Based on information collected during an interview with Respondent C, a Pan-democrat party 
leader 
199 
 
At the same time, university students also organized the “University Student Tapas” 
on the campus of six public universities in Hong Kong.  Besides the tapas, activists 
also called for a hunger strike from 12-17 January 2010 outside the LegCo Building.  
The hunger strike was organized by the “ Post-80s Anti-Express Railway 
Youngsters”, who also pled for support through the internet.  Despite these actions, 
the bill was eventually passed by the LegCo without any amendment on 16 January 
2010 by simple majority.  
 
Phase 2: Against the Removal of Choi Yuen Village 
After the appropriation of funding from the LegCo, the focus of the Anti-High Speed 
Railway movement turned to protecting Choi Yuen Village, a village that would be 
demolished for the construction of the stabling siding for the railway.  There were 
two main arguments against the demolishment of Choi Yuen Village.  First, most of 
the villagers were seniors who either did not want to move or were incapable of 
doing so.  Second, the villagers were opposed to the compensation package, as they 
found the amount insufficient for them rebuilding a farm of the same size on a new 
site. 
 
An online interest group called the Choi Yuen Village Concern Group was set up on 
Facebook, gathering around 3,000 members.  As the villagers were mainly old 
people, most of the protests were organized by the “Post-80s” through the internet.  
Respondent I, a leader of student movement at that time, admitted that although some 
of the protesters knew each other personally, they could not confirm whether 
everyone who signed up would appear until they actually arrived at the venue, 
because all protesters got the protest information online.  According to So (2008, 
242), the post-modern mode of social movement had assorted some spontaneous and 
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creative elements which “turned the protest into a seemingly joyful and even festive 
event”.  In the movement to defend Choi Yuen Village, protesters became creative 
in their methods of expressing their ideas.  For instance, a community market was 
set up to sell featured items such as “Express Rail Link boiled eggs” (the Cantonese 
for “boiled eggs” is the same as that for “scram” or “leave”) and a rice cake that 
mocked the “functional constituency as good-for-nothing”.  The main strategy of 
the protesters was to gain publicity in order to draw the attention of the society to the 
group of under-privileged villagers whose rights were neglected.  With the passage 
of the appropriation bill in the LegCo, the construction of the High Speed Railway 
was impossible to stop, and the demolition of Choi Yuen Village could not be 
prevented.  Thus, the activists turned to preserving the culture of Choi Yuen Village 
by cooperating with the villagers to set up a mini museum nearby with photos and 
exhibits related to the rural life, in hope of letting the public know more about Choi 
Yuen Village, and helping the villagers fight for more compensation from the 
government through protests and various collective actions. 
 
In conclusion, it was surprising that such a large-scale social movement could not 
influence the decision of the government, as the appropriation bill was passed by the 
LegCo without any amendment and delay, except for the postponement due to the 
filibuster tactic adopted by the Pan-democrats in the debating process. 
 
10.2  Leadership Approach Analysis 
Sense-Making 
It is difficult to determine whether the incident could be defined a crisis from the 
government’s perspective.  Unlike the legislation of Article 23, which was definitely 
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a policy failure, the LegCo appropriated the funding for the High Speed Railway 
without any amendment or significant delay on 16 January 2010.  Although it was 
hard for the government to deny that they had paid attention and responded to the 
Anti-High Speed Railway movement, it was also difficult to measure what the 
government had done from a crisis management perspective, except for the 
reiteration of their standpoint in order to satisfy the general public in different 
occasions
60
.  The objective of the government had been simple and clear – to have 
the appropriation bill passed in the LegCo on time, so as to prevent the activists from 
ultimately escalating the issue into a (potential) policy failure.  Theoretically, 
potential threat would easily be ignored at this stage, since the top leader of the 
government would not be involved unless the issue was “big enough”.  The 
government announced its intention to construct the High-Speed Railway
61
 and 
requested for appropriation from the LegCo Financial Committee on 20 October 
2009.  However, before late November 2009, anti-High Speed Railway activities 
were mostly quiet and small-scale, with the joint declaration made by 69 scholars 
from Hong Kong universities on 4 November 2009 and the two small-scale 
demonstrations (less than 100 participants) outside the Government House on 16 
November 2009 and LegCo on 22 November 2009 being more noticeable ones. 
 
Crisis status was entitled by the people (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005).  The 
3,000-people “Anti-High Speed Railway, Stop appropriation” demonstration on 29 
November 2009 was the first large-scale social movement related to the issue.  
However, the response of the government afterwards did not “make a sense” for 
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 Please refer to the Secretary of Transport and Housing (STH) transcript on Hong Kong Express 
Rail Link Forum (30 October 2010), Speech by STH on “Express Rail Link: The Fast Track to Future 
Economic Growth” at the luncheon meeting of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors (14 December 
2010), and numerous LegCo Q&A sections. 
61
 See “ExCo approves implementation of high-speed rail link” (Transport and Housing Bureau, 20 
October 2010) 
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entitling the movement to the crisis status.  The spokesperson for the Transport and 
Housing Bureau argued that the project was supported by the general public since it 
would bring enormous social and economic, so the government had submitted the 
proposal to the LegCo as scheduled (Apple Daily, 30 November 2009).  It appeared 
that the continuous protests and demonstrations against the building of the railway 
had not “threatened” the government.  Although the filibustering of Pan-democrat 
lawmakers had delayed the appropriation process twice (18 December 2009 and 8 
January 2009), the government was confident from very beginning that there would 
be enough votes to pass the appropriation in the LegCo with firm support from 
mainly Pro-establishment lawmakers.  Therefore, the movement could only be 
defined as a potential crisis, as the government in fact did not admit that it was a 
governance crisis. 
 
However, from a societal perspective, the movement had made a sense for a crisis.  
There were continuous demonstrations and protests outside the LegCo building and 
the Government House, with protesters using different means of demonstration, such 
as the ascetic practice by university students and the booths selling goods and food 
outside the LegCo and at Choi Yuen Village, which were widely reported by the mass 
media.   The 2003 Demonstration was a single event that terminated the Article 23 
legislation, while the Anti-High Speed Railway movement was a process in which 
the activists tried to force the government into conformity in a way similar to the 
2003 incident, that is, by using the so-called “people power”.  The slow-burning 
nature of the Anti-High Speed Railway movement made it difficult to determine 
whether it should be classified as a crisis in the sense-making process. 
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Decision-Making 
The Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link 
was one of the largest infrastructure projects in Hong Kong after 1997.  As an urban 
policy, the High Speed Railway went through the policymaking process, in which the 
policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995) was Eva Cheng, who was completely 
responsible for this project as the Secretary for Transport and Housing.  In this 
regard, the crisis management term in this incident was small.  Although there was 
no prior signal that the request for appropriation from the LegCo would fail, Cheng 
never wasted any opportunity in lobbying different social groups to support the 
project, including the speeches she delivered at Hong Kong Express Rail Link Forum 
(30 October 2009), the luncheon meeting of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors (14 
December 2010), and the numerous LegCo Q&A sections.  In this case, the major 
“battlefield” was the LegCo, and the government’s effort in pushing the bill forward 
and its awareness in the need to lobby for support from LegCo members could be 
reflected in the large number of administrative papers submitted by the 
Subcommittees on Matters Relating to Railways to the LegCo, as listed in Table 
10.1.   
   
Table 10.1 Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways (Papers) - 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) 
LegCo Reference Title Date 
CB(1)356/09-10(01) Administration's paper attaching a draft Public 
Works Subcommittee (PWSC) paper on special 
ex-gratia payments 
13 November 2009 
16 November 2009 
17 November 2009 
CB(1)361/09-10(01) Administration's paper attaching two draft 
PWSC papers on the construction of the 
railway works and non-railway works 
respectively 
13 November 2009 
16 November 2009 
17 November 2009 
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CB(1)400/09-10(02) Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section 
of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express 
Rail Link (Chinese version only) 
13 November 2009 
CB(1)400/09-10(03) Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section 
of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express 
Rail Link (Chinese version only) 
13 November 2009 
CB(1)356/09-10(02) Administration's paper on the Hong Kong 
Section of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Express Rail Link (supplementary information 
paper) 
13 November 2009 
16 November 2009 
17 November 2009 
CB(1)503/09-10(01) Administration's paper on funding arrangement 
of the Hong Kong Section of the 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express 
Rail Link: Supplementary information on the 
increase in costs of the railway and 
non-railway works (Follow-up paper) 
16 November 2009 
CB(1)398/09-10(01) Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section 
of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express 
Rail Link (powerpoint presentation materials) 
(Chinese version only) 
16 November 2009 
CB(1)503/09-10(03) Administration's paper on the Hong Kong 
Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong 
Kong Express Rail Link: associated traffic 
facilities for the West Kowloon Terminus 
(Follow-up paper) 
16 November 2009 
CB(1)503/09-10(02) Administration's paper on the Hong Kong 
Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong 
Kong Express Rail Link: patronage forecast, 
economic benefit and operational viability 
(Follow-up paper) 
16 November 2009 
CB(1)423/09-10(01) Administration's paper on briefing on the 
planning of the West Kowloon Terminus 
(powerpoint presentation materials) 
17 November 2009 
CB(1)423/09-10(03) Administration's paper on cross-boundary 17 November 2009 
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passenger traffic forecast (powerpoint 
presentation materials) (Chinese version only) 
CB(1)399/09-10(01) Administration's paper on Hong Kong Section 
of XRL - operational viability 
17 November 2009 
CB(1)423/09-10(02) Administration's paper on pedestrian linkages 
and road schemes adjacent to West Kowloon 
Cultural District (powerpoint presentation 
materials) 
17 November 2009 
Source: Legislative Council, 2012 
 
Compared to another important infrastructure – the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao 
Bridge, in which the government submitted only six administration papers to the 
LegCo within the entire 2008-2009 legislative year before its funding was 
appropriated in May 2009, the large number of papers related to the High Speed 
Railway, as listed in Table 10.1, was an indication that the government attempted to 
defend the project by providing details on items such as “Supplementary information 
on the increase in costs of the railway and non-railway works” (CB(1)503/09-10(01)), 
“associated traffic facilities for the West Kowloon Terminus” (CB(1)503/09-10(03)), 
“patronage forecast, economic benefit and operational viability” 
(CB(1)503/09-10(02)), and “cross-boundary passenger traffic forecast” 
(CB(1)423/09-10(03)).  It was obvious that the government was trying hard to 
explain and answer all enquiries in order to ensure a smooth appropriation request.  
To conclude, the decision-making of the government in this incident was to monitor 
the issue, so as to make sure that the bill could pass successfully in the LegCo, and at 
the same time, prevent any policy failure.  However, the government had 
demonstrated its concern on public opinion, which will be detailed in the following 
part. 
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Meaning-Making 
Theoretically, the main function of crisis communication is to reduce public and 
political uncertainty (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005).  However, in this incident, 
the major concern of the government was to make sure that LegCo would pass the 
bill smoothly in order to prevent policy failure.  Therefore, the strategy of the 
government was to persuade the lawmakers so as to influence the general public to 
support the High Speed Railway project. 
 
As suggested by Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et al. (2005), the three factors important to 
government crisis communication are the degree of preparedness, the degree of 
coordination of outgoing information, and the degree of professionalization.  The 
Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, published by the Highways Department, was an 
example of the communication effort made by the government in this case.  From 
June 2009 to November 2010, fifteen issues of newsletter were published
62
, with the 
aim of providing relevant information to the villagers of Choi Yuen Village, and 
informing them of the arrangements made by the government for the affected bodies 
(Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 1, 24 June 2009,).  Despite the claim that 
the newsletter was an informative publication, the persuasion effort made by the 
government in the newsletters was obvious, as could be seen from the headline of 
Issue No. 1, which suggested that the Choi Yuen Village locality was the best choice 
for building the High Speed Railway depot among the other possibilities (Choi Yuen 
Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 1, 24 June 2009).  In addition, although the publisher 
of the newsletters was a civil services department (Highways Department), the 
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 Please go to http://www.expressraillink.hk/en/multimedia-gallery/publications-and-publicity.html 
for accessing the Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters (Chinese version only) 
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political orientation was apparent.  Issue No. 2 of the newsletter included a “sharing” 
by a District Councillor on how he had helped a villager to communicate with the 
government through peaceful means in order to achieve some requests of the 
villagers (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 2, 6 July 2009).  The discourses 
of “communication achieving win-win situation” could be found in Issues No. 2 to 6 
in January 2010, when the LegCo approved the appropriation.  
 
The earlier newsletters could be regarded as a sort of propaganda, especially when 
compared to those published after the funding approval (Issues No. 7 to 15).  
Starting from Issue No. 7, which was published a few days after the appropriation, no 
more interviews, sharing, or persuasive articles (for supporting the project) was 
found.  The newsletter had simply become a medium for the government to make 
announcements, such as asking the villagers to register for the resettlement scheme 
as soon as possible (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 7, 20 January 2010).  
The content of the newsletters had also become straightforward, such as: The option 
of “village relocation” would not be considered (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue 
No. 8, 30 January 2010); there was no room for further negotiation with the 
government (regarding compensation) (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 9, 12 
February 2010), and no more delay would be allowed for the villages to move out 
(Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletters, Issue No. 13, 17 June 2010). 
 
It can be concluded that the political communication effort made by the government 
was aimed at preventing a policy failure as a result of the inappropriate handling of 
the incident.  By using different means, such as the lobbying done by Eva Cheng 
and corresponding government officials (as mentioned in the sense-making part), and 
the newsletter publication, which were unusual for other government projects, the 
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government’s meaning-making attempt on smoothing the policymaking (cum 
appropriation request) process was noticeable.  Although these preventive 
communication strategies could not be directly regarded as real crisis communication, 
they should be considered as essential parts of the meaning-making process, which 
was closely related to the sense-making process. 
 
Terminating 
The termination of a crisis meant the start of the assignment of accountability.  
Technically, Eva Cheng, as a political appointee under the Principal Official 
Accountability System (POAS), was undoubtedly accountable for political 
consequences of the High Speed Railway project.  However, the policy process was 
a success, as the bill was passed by the LegCo with no amendment or significant 
delay.  Thus, there could not be a blame assignment. 
 
The operational closure and political closure assessment were complicated.  The 
date on which the LegCo appropriated the funding, 16 January 2010, could be 
regarded as an operational closure.  However, the conflicts related to the removal of 
Choi Yuen Village lasted for almost 10 more months.  The first phase of the 
removal was carried out on 4 November 2010, while the second phase was on 19 
November 2010 (Choi Yuen Tsuen Newsletter, Issue No. 15, 12 November 2010).  
Both phases saw strong resistance from the villagers and social activists, and the land 
reclaiming process had not been successful (Oriental Daily, 20 November 2010). 
 
The political closure could not be assessed without mentioning the rise of the new 
group of social activists known as the “Post-80s”, who have become the new pillars 
for social movements.  Their organizations and networks in the protests related to 
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the 2012 National Education controversy were viewed as the legacy of the Anti-High 
Speed Railway movement (Respondent C).  Thus, even though the railway issue 
was over, the “Post-80s” organizations are still in place and are ready for future 
incidents.  As such, political closure could not be measured clearly. 
 
To conclude, crisis termination in the Leadership Approach mainly focuses on the 
settlement of a crisis.  Identifying a closure would be difficult if the crisis were not 
severe enough.  Moreover, a clear distinction between operational closure and 
political closure is not always achievable, and the end of the blaming process does 
not automatically mean a complete political closure, as the dissatisfaction of the 
public or activists could extend into future actions.  Once the blame shifts to the 
system (i.e., political institution), the incident itself would no longer be the major 
focus, as what the public is actually eager for are reforms and real changes behind 
the scene. 
 
Learning 
The learning process in this incident was not obvious due to the reality of policy 
success - passing of the bill by the LegCo.  The old way of doing things, that is, 
garnering the support of pro-establishment camp, was proven to be effective.  As 
such, there was not a strong incentive for the government to make a genuine change, 
except as a public relations tactic.  Characteristics of cyberactivists, defined by 
McCaughey and Ayers (2003) as internet users who actively participated in the 
online social movement and transformed the virtual movement to a real social 
movement by using internet as a channel for organizing, were observed in the 
Anti-High Speed Railway movement, and thus, there was a voice asking the 
government to respond to this new trend.  As a result, the government launched a 
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Facebook page called “Upper Albert Road” (later retitled as “Office of the Chief 
Executive”63), though its effectiveness in gathering opinions from social activists of 
the new generation (i.e. cyberactivists or the Post-80s) was doubtful.  From a 
decision-making perspective, there was no real change in the government 
policymaking process, but a rather interactive framework could be seen.  The 
learning process, which was not obvious, could be considered a result of the positive 
policy outcomes of the High Speed Railway project, as it had proven that the old way 
of policymaking was still useful.  
 
10.3  Politicization Approach Analysis 
Constructing Severity 
The process of framing in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident was diverged.  In 
the severity dimension, it was crucial to define whether the incident had violated the 
core values of the public.  From the perspective of the social activists and 
pan-democrats, the High Speed Railway incident was framed as a malfunction of the 
LegCo, with the passage of the appropriation guaranteed due to support from the 
Functional Constituency, which was described as a rubber stamp, or a “voting 
machine” (Apple Daily, 23 January 2010).  Moreover, the FC was also blamed for 
being a kind of “business-government collusion”, as most of its members are from 
various business sectors (Ming Pao, 20 January 2010).  On the other hand, some 
newspapers described the activists as merely anti-government, and that in fact, the 
majority of the people were supporting the project (Oriental Daily, 23 January 2012). 
 
In reality, the incident could not be classified as a policy failure due to the passage of 
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the funding request.  At the same time, framing the High Speed Railway project as a 
violation or threat to core public values was inappropriate, especially when compared 
to the Car-Gate scandal, in which a conflict of interest was observed.  In the whole 
policymaking process, the absence of public participation (Ming Pao, 20 January 
2010) and overemphasis on the importance of “development” (Ming Pao, 26 January 
2010) might be the only reasonable critiques on the government, and was clearly not 
strong enough for the incident to be framed as a violation of core public values.  
According to the blame constructing model (Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003), the 
incident could not proceed to the agency dimension and responsibility dimension 
when severity could not be constructed. 
 
10.4  Summary on Leadership and Politicization Approaches Analyses 
There were difficulties in applying the Leadership and Politicization Approaches to 
analyze the Anti-High Speed Railway movement, as both models emphasize on the 
severity of the crisis.  Since the Leadership Approach focuses on what should be 
done by the government, and the Politicization Approach focuses on who should be 
blamed, the more severe a severe crisis is, the better it would fit into the models.  
However, as discussed previously, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident was not 
severe enough to attain the status of a crisis, making the results of applying the 
models insignificant.  Specifically, the Leadership Approach is government-oriented, 
focusing mainly on the leaders in crisis management.  However, the government is 
only one side of the story.  As can be seen in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, 
state-society interactions are crucial to the development of a crisis.  On the other 
hand, the Politicization Approach is a blame-allocating model aimed at studying the 
politicization of crisis aftermath, but not the crisis itself.  Thus, it is not useful in 
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discussing how a not-so-serious incident would advance to a crisis.  In summary, 
when applied to the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, both models performed 
unsatisfactorily and their explanatory power is weak.  
 
10.5  State-society Interactive Framework Analysis 
Many of the respondents had participated in the Anti-high speed railway movement 
with different levels of involvement.   Respondent G, as one of the coordinators 
from a Pan-democrat party, was greatly involved since the very beginning.  
Respondent G said that the movement could be dated back to late 2008 when the 
Choi Yuen Villagers learnt from the government about the high speed railway project.  
They were asked to move out within two years.  Respondent G stated that the issue 
was neglected until late 2009 since no one knew what high speed railway and Choi 
Yuen Village were.  Thus, the major role for them was to make the issue public.  
They tried to collect signatures through a “street station” (a booth with banners and 
leaflets).  However, the outcome was insignificant until some of the Post’s 80 began 
to expose the issue on the internet.  
 
In contrast, one of the Pan-democrat party leaders (Respondent C) admitted that the 
role of the party as a whole was rather supportive throughout the movement as the 
party had participated in actions such as mobilization, coordination and liaison 
especially at the beginning.   Respondent C observed that the Choi Yuen Villagers 
and those young activists who highly concerned about conservation issues were the 
initiators of the movement.  In fact it all started with those victims, (i.e. Choi Yuen 
Villages) and later on spread over to other stakeholders (i.e. conservation activist) 
and finally the so called “Post 80’s” young activist joined. 
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From the observations of the respondents, the development of Anti-high speed 
railway incident was a slow-burning crisis as it did not catch much public attention 
until much effort was made to escalate the issue into the public agenda.   Different 
actors and activists were trying to develop sufficient Crisis Strengthening Forces in 
order to push forward their wants and demands.    
 
Compare with the 2003 Demonstration, the Anti-high speed railway incident 
happened carried a special feature.  The rapid and intensive use of internet as a 
means of communication among different non-state actors especially by the Post 80s’ 
was surprising.  Almost all respondents who participated in the movement gave 
credits to the mobilization power through internet.  On the other hand, during this 
incident, the government had first attempted to make use of the internet in response 
to the public demands.  At the beginning of the outbreak of the incident, the 
government started to realize the importance of the internet on policy development 
and governance.  Instead of merely using internet as a tool for distributing 
information through government official website and taking in public opinion and 
enquiry though e-mail, the Hong Kong government began to use the internet in a 
more creative and “interactive” manner.   
 
For instance, the Transport and Housing Bureau had set up an “online forum” 
through Facebook for three hours on 6
 
February 2010 to collect comments on 
different policy issues especially on building the Express Rail Link.  This was a 
typical one-way “e-participation” as no “response” could be made on others’ posts, 
(i.e. can be done by internet settings), and it was aimed at providing a platform for 
the public to express their opinions (Apple Daily, 16 February 2010).  It was taken 
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as public relation tactics instead of sincerely listening and consulting the public in an 
interactive way as the page was created after the funding bill has been submitted to 
the LegCo waiting for appropriation.  Obviously, it was part of the lobbying instead 
of a true heart consultation.  At the same time, the government did not respond after 
getting comments from its Facebook.  In this regard, on the other way round, it 
showed that the government has acknowledged internet as a new media which has 
becoming a new battlefield between both parties on different political and social 
issues.  It creates the elementary stage for generating the Crisis Strengthening and 
Weakening Forces as discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
The Movement: Success or Failure? 
Respondent G suggested that the movement was a “fifty percent success” - to some 
extent, the emerging of Post 80’s activists, the claiming of more compensation and 
the relocating of Choi Yuen Village were regarded as partial success.  However, the 
appropriation of the funding in LegCo with no delay has made the movement “fifty 
percent failure”.  In general, according to Respondent G, it was the result of 
collective effort made by institutional channel (political party inside the LegCo), civil 
society mobilization and the drive of villagers. 
 
Both Respondent G and J (J is a social activist on railway affairs) suggested that the 
fail to stop the high speed railway project was mainly because of the time limitation.  
The government officially announced the funding bill for building the high speed 
railway in October 2009 while the funding was approved by the LegCo in January 
2010.  As mentioned, this incident was a slow-burning crisis in which the short time 
frame eliminated the further development of crisis politics and manipulation.  The 
approval of funding by the LegCo was a significant Crisis Weakening Force as it was 
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nearly impossible to “undo” it under current institutional setting. 
 
Respondent J also mentioned that the focus of the event was not that touching upon 
the core values of the general public.  In fact, the protests and collective actions 
took place during the movement has attracted the public attentions as discussed in the 
earlier section.  Recapping some of those, the “Five Districts Tapas”, hunger strike 
and the surrounding of LegCo building by the activists were all Crisis Strengthening 
Forces which successfully drew the public attention onto the incident.  Apparently, 
Crisis Strengthening Forces of this issue were multi-dimensional and they could be 
reflected by the increasing newspaper coverage as listed in Table 10.3.  However, if 
went back to the core issue, the bill was approved with no delay.    That was why 
some respondents admitted it was a partial failure.  Except the reason of time 
limitation which was counterfactual, the newspaper discourse analysis conducted 
below would provide a better understanding on the operation of Crisis Strengthening 
(and Weakening) Forces.  The Anti-High Speed Railway Incident can be seen as a 
latent crisis for the State-society Interactive Framework – a crisis failed to reach the 
level of government change.  
 
10.5.1  Results from Newspaper Discourse Analysis 
Using a method similar to that of Lee and Chan (2011), “anti-high speed railway” 
was chosen as a keyword for searching related articles on Wise News.  It should be 
noted that, as mentioned in Lee and Chan (2011), even though this process may not 
be able to gather all articles related to Anti-High Speed Railway movement, it is 
useful for obtaining a comprehensive set of data without any systematic research bias.  
All news reports, editorials, and commentary columns were selected, and the time 
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range for the current search was chosen to cover the period of the whole movement, 
that is, from the initiation of the project on 20 October 2009 to the passage of the 
appropriation bill in LegCo on 27 January 2010.  This period was further divided 
into four sub-periods according to the five major events during the movement listed 
below: 
 
1. 20 Oct 2009 - the HKSARG announced the funding arrangement of the Express 
Rail link 
2. 18 Dec 2009 - funding application was debated in the Finance Committee of the 
Legislative Council for the first time 
3. 8 Jan 2010 - funding application was debated in the Finance Committee of the 
Legislative Council for the second time 
4. 16 Jan 2010 - the LegCo appropriated the funding application 
5. 27 Jan 2010 - the construction work started 
 
Period 1 covered the time between events 1 and 2, and Period 2 covered the time 
between events 2 and 3, and so on.  The analysis was conducted in an inductive 
manner, with an aim of determining which groups of people were referred to in 
reports of Anti-High Speed Railway incidents on newspapers, regardless of them 
being mentioned in a formal news report, or just in editorials, Op-Eds, or 
commentaries.  In total, seven categories of activists were recognized:  
 
1) Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR) - As the railway will pass under Tai 
Kok Tsui, those residents might be potential victims of possible structural 
damages to their homes.  
 
2) Internet Activists (IA) - The cyberactivists who were opposed to the 
project and participated actively online and/or offline.  
 
3) Choi Yuen Villagers (CYV) - Choi Yuen Village had to be demolished 
and its residents relocated, as its site would become the stabling siding 
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for the express railway. This group was the direct victim in this project.  
 
4) Professionals (PFs) – Experts from different sectors, including engineers, 
scholars, and architects, who sometimes expressed their opinions 
individually or as representatives of their respective professional 
associations.  
 
5) Post-80s youngsters (P80) – Young activists who were sometimes 
referred to as (post-secondary) students, youngsters, or teenagers.  
 
6) Pan-democrats (PD) - Lawmakers coming from, and members of, 
Pan-democratic parties, also called “opposition parties” by 
Pro-establishment media.  
 
7) People who were called anti-express railway groups or organization, but 
without sufficient information to be identified, would be coded under 
Union and others (U&O). 
 
How activists are identified can directly influence the opinion of the public towards 
the movement.  According to two opinion polls conducted by the University of 
Hong Kong Public Opinion Poll (HKU POP) at the end of 2009 to early 2010, 
around 47% of the respondents supported the project during the first poll, increasing 
to 50% after one week (Table 10.2).  It was surprising that as the Anti-High Speed 
Railway movement gained higher media exposure and the protests outside the LegCo 
stepped up in severity and variety, more people began to support the project. 
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Table 10.2 HKU Public Opinion Poll on High-Speed Railway appropriation 
Question:  The government is seeking for LegCo funding of HK$ 66.9 billion, which is 
equivalent to HK$10,000 per HK citizen, for the Express Rail Link construction project.  
Do you incline to support or oppose the funding, or prefer to suspend it? 
Answer/Date of survey 1
st
 Survey: 29/12/09-5/1/10 2
nd
 Survey: 11-13/1/2010 
Support 47%  50% 
Oppose 23%  20%  
Suspend 22%  24%  
Don't know/ Hard to say 9%  6% 
Total (N) 100% (1,018) 100% (1,008) 
Source: HKU POP SITE releases survey on Express Rail Link in cooperation with Justice & Peace 
Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese - Press Release on January 7, 2010, available at: 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release726.html 
HKU POP SITE releases second survey on Express Rail Link in cooperation with Justice & Peace 
Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese - Press Release on January 14, 2010, available at: 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release729.html 
 
Table 9.3 shows the results of the newspaper discourse analysis, and attention should 
be devoted to three of the groups:  Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR) and Choi Yuen 
Villagers (CYV), who were supposed to be the victims of this project, and the 
Post-80s young activists (P80), who were very active in different aspects, including 
online and offline participation.  A comparison of data for Periods 1 and 2 with 
Periods 3 and 4 shows that in the earlier periods, more newspapers tended to identify 
Choi Yuen Villagers or Tai Kok Tsui Residents as the activists, while in the latter 
periods, after the public began to pay attention to the movement when the LegCo was 
debating the proposal followed by approving the appropriation, less focus was given 
to those victims.  Instead, the Post-80s were regarded as the movement activists.  
Specifically, the change in Wenweipo was the most significant, as its identification of 
Post-80s as activists increased from 0% in Period 1 to more than 90% in Period 3.  
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Table 10.3 Identification of the movement activists (percent) 
WENWEIPO ORIENTAL DAILY 
Group/Period P1 P2 P3 P4 Group/Period P1 P2 P3 P4 
TKTR 0 0 0 0 TKTR 38.4 11.1 25 0 
IA 0 0 0 0 IA 23 5.5 12.5 3.7 
U&O 100 12.5 0 42.8 U&O 15.3 22.2 10 30.1 
CYV 50 25 0 5.7 CYV 53.8 11.1 5 3.7 
PFs 0 12.5 0 0 PFs 15.3 0 0 0 
P80 0 62.5 92.3 42.8 P80 53.8 61.1 75 67.9 
PD 0 62.5 30.7 14.2 PD 0 38.8 22.5 5.6 
Articles (N) (2) (8) (13) (35) Articles (N) (13) (18) (40) (53) 
MING PAO  APPLE DAILY 
Group/Period P1 P2 P3 P4 Group/Period P1 P2 P3 P4 
TKTR 26.6 0 0 0.9 TKTR 31.8 10.5 1.5 0 
IA 13.3 6.6 4.7 8.8 IA 4.5 18.4 9.2 4.4 
U&O 40 23.3 20.6 15.6 U&O 9 13.1 20 32.8 
CYV 20 13.3 0 3.9 CYV 45.4 18.4 10.7 2.9 
PFs 20 3.3 3.1 1.9 PFs 9 10.5 3 0 
P80 33.3 66.6 73 57.8 P80 50 63.1 61.5 53.7 
PD 0 13.3 9.5 19.6 PD 9 15.7 20 8.9 
Articles (N) (15) (30) (63) (102) Articles (N) (22) (38) (65) (67) 
Key:  Tai Kok Tsui Residents (TKTR), Internet Activists (IA), Choi Yuen Villagers (CYV),  
Professionals (PFs), Post’s 80 Activists (P80), Pan-democrats (PD) 
Note: Number of articles does not include those without relevant information to the question.  Sum of 
percentage can be larger than 100% since one article can be coded under multiple categories. 
Source: Self-collected data from the four local newspapers in Hong Kong through WiseNews   
 
10.5.2  Discussions 
From the State-society Interactive Framework analysis (Figure 10.1), the media 
exposure failed to form sufficient political pressure towards the government as it 
missed the focus.  The Choi Yuen Villagers and Tai Kok Tsui Residents should be 
the victims, and thus, their fight for their own interest through different kinds of 
Anti-High Speed Railway movement was completely legitimate.  The results from 
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Period 1 show that most newspaper articles identified these two groups as the 
activists at the very beginning of the movement.  However, in the latter periods, 
Post-80s activists were labeled as the new blood of social movement, and hence had 
dominated the news reports, as newspapers shifted from reporting the opposition of 
victims to reporting the new generation of social movement, with special focus on 
the different social movement activities.  Some articles in Wenweipo even argued 
that the Post-80s activists were manipulated by opposition parties (Pan-democrats).  
The legitimacy of the whole movement had been reduced, as newspapers focused on 
reporting their tactics as a new format of social movement, or labeling them as 
radical or being manipulated, all of which had no relationship with the controversy 
itself.  The final outcome was that support for the railway project had increased 
during the movement, and the crisis was significantly weakened.   
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Figure 10.1 State-society Interactive Framework analysis on Anti-High Speed 
Railway incident 
 
Based on the analyses with both the Leadership and Politicization Approaches and 
the newspapers discourse analysis in the previous section, it can be concluded that 
the Strengthening Forces in this incident was not strong enough to escalate it to a 
governance crisis.  Although the Anti-High Speed Railway movement gained plenty 
of media exposures, the media discourse had missed the focus of the incident, and 
thus, the Strengthening Force was significantly reduced.  At the same time, the 
government had maintained a sufficient level of Crisis Weakening Forces through 
various means.  First, the government had guaranteed enough votes in the LegCo to 
pass the appropriation of funding for the project.  Second, there was an increase in 
the rate of support for the project as newspapers shifted from reporting on the project 
 
Crisis Weakening Force: 
● Majority of the LegCo member (Pro-government) 
supported the project firmly 
● Media agenda shifted from the negative side of the 
project to the rising of young activist (post 80’s) 
● The public supporting rate on the project was 
increasing according to HKU surveys 
● The government officials had made their effort on 
persuading different actors by emphasizing the 
important of development  
● The issue did not converted into a governance 
crisis 
Crisis Strengthening Force: 
● Numerous collective actions organized by activists  
● The focus of the mass media was turned from 
reporting the victims to the post 80’s  
● Focus shifted - from livelihood to political conflicts 
● No catalytic effect existed  
Government 
Change 
Governance 
Crisis  
Crisis  
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itself to focusing on the movement, which, along with the rise of the Post-80s that 
had drawn the attention of the public, had diminished the Crisis Strengthening Forces.    
Although there were some eye-catching protests outside the LegCo Building and the 
Government House, the catalytic effect did not exist.  After the funding had been 
approved, the Anti-High Speed Railway issue gradually dropped out from the scenes, 
even though some of the activists had changed their battlefield to the conservation of 
Choi Yuen Village. 
 
The above four chapters has demonstrated the two parts of case study.  In the next 
chapter, discussion and analysis on findings and observations will be presented.  It 
is important to under what has yielded by this research in order to contribute to the 
theory discussion in crisis management.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
11.1  Overview 
In the previous chapters, the two conventional crisis management approaches, 
namely, the Leadership Approach and the Politicization Approach, were applied to 
the analysis of different crises.  In general, the two approaches were applicable to 
some, but not all, types of crises.  The Leadership Approach was strong in 
analyzing large-scale crises involving a large number of people and a distinctive 
crisis management core group, such as natural disasters or diseases (e.g., SARS), 
whereas the Politicization Approach was designed to assign blames to specific 
government official, such as Antony Leung in the Car-Gate Scandal.  
 
While their contributions should be acknowledged, weaknesses were also observed 
in both approaches, as both of them were not explanatory in nature, and failed to 
properly address questions such as “why was there a crisis?”  The Leadership 
Approach, for example, was an aftermath review of crisis, and while the 
Politicization Approach could explain how blames were being assigned after a crisis, 
it still failed to explain why a crisis had become so serious that the officials should be 
blamed, and further discussion using the Politicization Approach would be unfruitful 
if the incident was not serious enough.   
 
It is these limitations that led to the formation of the State-society Interactive 
Framework to illustrate the development of a crisis.  As mentioned previously, it is 
reasonable to expect that governance crises in Hong Kong, a limited democracy, are 
completely different from those under the full democratic context, which western 
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scholars have always taken for granted.  The current research has also interviewed 
17 respondents to obtain enough data to form a solid empirical basis for constructing 
a new crisis management framework. 
 
11.2  The Leadership Approach 
11.2.1  Crisis Management as Procedures 
The Leadership Approach consists of five elements, namely sense-making, 
decision-making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, 
et al. 2005), which could be understood as the essential procedures of crisis 
management, and are commonly described as steps or patterns in current literature ('t 
Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, Boin 2004, Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 1997).  From a managerial perspective, these steps 
and patterns form a crisis management cycle, and are guidelines developed by 
scholars for crisis managers, who are most likely government officials.  Discovering 
a crisis (as sense-making) is always the most important issue, as crisis management 
should start with crisis recognition.   Learning, as an aftermath of crisis, is 
necessary for preventing similar crises from happening in the future.  However, the 
significance of these five elements may vary between crises.  For example, 
sense-making can either be minor or unobservable if the crisis happened too fast or 
too strong.  Further, hindsight is always perfect, as in the case of the 911 terrorist 
attacks.  No one could have predicted such a tragedy beforehand.  However, 
tracing the clues in the aftermath is always easy, as argued in Boin, 't Hart, Stern, et 
al. (2005, 23), in the United States, if the information collected by Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) were pieced together with that from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the authorities could have been alerted before the attack. 
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Even though the Leadership Approach is a comprehensive set of procedures covering 
most aspects of managing a crisis, its weakness is that it is not explanatory in nature.  
Rather than explaining “what would happen if something was done”, it is more 
similar to a handbook or guideline on “what should be done”.  In Boin, 't Hart, 
Stern, et al.’s (2005) words, the main theme of this approach is to advise those 
leaders to avert threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis, and to explain 
what went wrong so as to convince the public that it would not happen again.  It 
should be noted that the five stages in the Leadership Approach is comparable to the 
stages model (Jones 1984) in public policymaking.  However, a more interesting 
topic to political scientists would be the interaction between different actors during a 
crisis, as in Kingdon’s (1995) Multi-Stream Model describing agenda setting and its 
relations with policy change.    
 
11.2.2  Top-down: Government or Leader-oriented 
As an approach and a checklist of “must do” in crisis management designed for the 
leaders, the main focus or target audience of the Leadership Approach is the 
government officials, and thus, this method could be described as a top-down 
approach, which assumes that the government (the leader) is the major actor in crisis 
management and should take a prominent role.  The problem is that the responses of 
other actors are not taken into account.  Although meaning-making (i.e., crisis 
communication) focus on how the public perceive the government’s responses, there 
is no interaction between the two, meaning that it should be regarded as a one-way 
top-down communication.  
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Crisis communication is a big issue in crisis management, and is a highly sensitive 
topic in real politics.  As discussed in the literature review, messages that have gone 
through mediation and mediatization (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) may be perceived 
very differently from the original meaning that the government has intended to 
deliver.  This is evidence of the active role of mass media in the transmission of 
information in a crisis.  Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) further argued that the mass 
media is more eager to frame (or manipulate) the news story, a view supported by 
many of the interview respondents in the current study who are reporters 
(Respondents K, N, and O).  Respondent D even used the word “dramatization” to 
describe the story-making strategy by the mass media to attract audience, and 
accounted for it by the need for the mass media to make profit as privately-owned 
organizations.  Thus, it is impossible to ignore the effect of the mass media’s 
proactive role, which is one of the weaknesses of the Leadership Approach, as it 
could only represent the government leaders’ perspective of crisis management.  
 
11.2.3  The Issue on Severity 
The level of seriousness of a crisis plays a significant role in assessing the efficacy of 
Leadership Approach.  In general, the more severe the case is, the more powerful 
the model becomes, as in the incidents of the Car-Gate Scandal and the SARS 
outbreak.  The Car-Gate Scandal had been a serious case since its first day of 
exposure, as it was a violation of public value – conflict of interest by a senior 
government official.  Om the other hand, the SARS outbreak, though not as serious 
as the Car-Gate Scandal at first, became much more critical in mid-March 2003 
along with the global alert issued by the WHO. 
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The comprehensiveness of the Leadership Approach analysis is dependent on the 
severity of the crisis, as when the crisis is “serious enough”, more resources would 
be involved and more attention would be drawn.  However, apart from the severe 
crises, scholars are also interested in topics in grey areas (e.g., potential crises or 
social issues) that finally dropped out from the scene.  In this regard, the Anti-High 
Speed Railway incident could serve as an example, as an analysis on it suggested that 
the incident was not serious enough, and as such, failed to fit into the Leadership 
Approach.  This example shows that the level of severity would be the major 
limitation for this approach, as it had decided what should be “managed” as a crisis 
theoretically.  Through efforts of prevention – those “minor” steps taken beforehand 
to avoid the intensification of an issue into a crisis, topics in grey areas could be 
screened out due to its lack of severity, which also answers an important question in 
crisis management – why only some issues could become crisis.  
 
11.2.4  Dependence on a Clear Start and a Clear End 
Severity, to some extent, is linked to the emphasis of a clear start and cut off of a 
crisis.  Sense-making is related to how a crisis started – either by being recognized 
or gained a crisis status, whereas both operational and political termination concern 
with how a crisis ended.  It is much easier to identify the beginning and the end of a 
serious crisis, which usually creates an abnormal condition by distracting the daily 
operation of the government and leading to chaos.  Similarly, the end of a crisis can 
be determined by whether conditions have “returned to normal”.  Both the Car-Gate 
Scandal and SARS outbreak should fall into this category, as their start and end 
could be recognized without much difficulty.  However, the starting points of the 
Article 23 legislation controversy and the Anti-High Speed Railway movement were 
more ambiguous.  Specifically, the Anti-High Speed Railway movement could not 
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be considered as a significant governance crisis but a latent crisis, and the assessment 
of learning process in the Leadership Approach became meaningless, as the 
government believed that its “vote counting” tactics in policymaking was proven to 
be functioning properly.  In general, analyses based on sense-making and 
terminating are effective for serious crises with clear starts and ends.  In contrast, 
starts and ends could not be easily recognized in cases that are potential or 
“unsuccessful” governance crises. 
  
11.2.5  The Leadership Approach: Summary 
As Boin, 't Hart, Stern et al. (2005, 9) mentioned, the Leadership Approach aims to 
“find out what crises ‘do’ to establish political and organizational orders”.  
Although the authors criticized the overtly instrumental orientation of those self-help 
and how-to books that call for a crisis free environment, the Leadership Approach 
still could not escape from the issue of “what should be done”.  The five elements 
the authors suggested are still instrument-oriented, and could not solve the question 
of “why crisis had happened or was created”.  In summary, the Leadership 
Approach is useful for analyzing large-scale crisis with high severity, such as 
political scandals and natural disasters.  The clear start and clear end brought by the 
severity also fit into the comprehensiveness of the Leadership Approach.  However, 
as its name suggests, the Approach is mainly government- or leader-oriented, and 
therefore, actions and reactions of other actors are either briefly acknowledged or 
completely neglected.  This is the limitation of the Leadership Approach.  
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11.3  The Politicization Approach 
11.3.1  Path Dependence 
The Politicization Approach is based on a blame constructing chart derived by 
Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003), which contains three levels, namely, severity 
dimension, agency dimension and responsibility dimension (Figure 3.1).  Every 
dimension represents a yes or no question, and the answer to the previous question 
would directly affect the next dimension (i.e., path dependence).  The tree starts 
with “the problem occurs,” and the first level (i.e., severity dimension) is to decide 
whether crucial public values are violated or threatened.  If no violation or threats 
were found, the crucial values would not be at stake, and the blaming process would 
be stopped.  However, the definition of crucial value is confusing.  As stated in 
Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003), when a situation is viewed as non-political with no 
threats to core values, the events would be eliminated from the blame game.   
Based on this mechanism, there exists a threshold to initiate the blaming mechanism 
– harm to public values.  Thus, the Car-Gate Scandal was turned into a huge crisis, 
as it involved a conflict of interest by a senior government official.  On the other 
hand, core public values are not clearly defined in the Anti-High Speed Railway 
incident, and therefore, the Politicization Approach could not be applied.    
 
Apart from the severity dimension in the beginning, it is also difficult to make a 
strong judgment in the agency dimension and responsibility dimension.  
Brandstrom and Kuipers (2003) divided the agency dimension into an incident or a 
symptom.  In the incident dimension, the case is framed as an operational and a 
technical issue focusing on lower-level actors, whereas the symptom dimension 
interprets the issue as a strategic and political issue focusing on higher-level actors.   
Sometimes a case could be consisted of both components, leaving a grey area 
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in-between the incident and symptom dimensions.  For example, in the SARS 
outbreak, there were operational issues as stated in the Hospital Authority Report.  
At the same time, the SARS outbreak was a political symptom of Tung’s poor 
administration.  The non-exclusive nature of the dimensions would significantly 
weaken the explanatory power of Politicization Approach.  
 
11.3.2  Core Public Value: a Hard and Fast Rule 
The vital component in deciding whether a crisis deserves the blame is a violation or 
threat to core public values, though it is doubtful that every crisis starts with a 
violation of public values.  Generally, it could be expected in all political scandals, 
but not in policy failures and natural disasters.  Although the SARS case is widely 
accepted as a crisis due to its severity, it did not violate public values.  On the other 
hand, the legislation of Article 23 and High Speed Railway incident were truly 
political, and the Article 23 incident was a very exceptional case in which a bill was 
blamed for its attempt to restrict human rights and freedom.  Alternatively, policy 
failure could be a mistake in grasping the national mood
64
 as Kingdon’s (1995) 
stream model suggested.  The definition of severity should be multidimensional, as 
death on a large-scale or huge loss of public money are all reasonable possibilities to 
start the blame constructing process.   
 
11.3.3  The Aftermath Blame Game 
The major contribution of the Politicization Approach is showing how blames are 
assigned.  The blame constructing chart mentioned five possible outcomes, namely, 
                                                 
64
 As stated in Kingdon (1995, 146), national mood was defined as “the notion that a rather large 
number of people out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood 
changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have 
important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes”. 
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crucial values at stake (no blame was being constructed), scapegoat, organizational 
mishap, failing policy-maker, and policy/system failure.  In general, this approach 
focuses on the post-crisis arrangement (blaming), with little attention paid on the 
crisis management efforts being made during the crisis.  In real politics, assigning 
accountability to officials after every serious incident is an unavoidable task.  In 
fact, the blaming game (Hood 2002) is just part of the crisis management process.  
More importantly, blaming always happens in the aftermath.  For example, the 
post-SARS outbreak investigations lasted for a year after the disease was under 
control, and it was also a year after the end of the crisis that Yeoh Eng-kiong, the 
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food resigned.    
 
The five possible outcomes mentioned in the previous paragraph could be 
categorized into three sub-sets – no blame assigned, actor failure (either top-level or 
front-line staff), and network failure (either implementation failure or policy/system 
failure).  In this regard, two important questions are neglected – how was the blame 
constructed?  What would happen after blames had been constructed?  Similar to 
the Leadership Approach, the Politicization Approach is also limited in that its 
results are always non-self-explanatory.  A not-so-serious crisis would not bring 
about any blame.  If someone stepped-down due to accountability, it should be 
regarded as a failure of the actor.  In general, the approach is useful in justifying the 
outcomes instead of explaining them.    
 
11.3.4  The Politicization Approach: Summary 
The Politicization Approach is innovative in the field of crisis management in that it 
provides a political account to the construction of post-crisis blame that is distinctive 
from the instrumental-oriented theories (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005) that has 
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been dominating the field.  The step-by-step model is supposed to be clear and easy 
to apprehend, but the non-exclusive feature of three dimensions has weakened the 
explanatory power of this approach.  Also, a thing that could be concluded from the 
analyses of case studies is that it is difficult to determine whether an incident is an 
actor failure or network failure, as most crises are caused by multiple reasons.  In 
fact, of the four incidents discussed in the previous chapters, none had a definite 
conclusion.   
 
Owing to its step-by-step feature, if an incident failed to pass the severity dimension, 
it would not be able to reach the other dimensions, and no blame would be assigned.  
In other words, an assumption of this approach, which has also confined its 
applicability, is that there has been a serious mistake leading to a severe crisis.  
Therefore, this approach was unable to explain the Anti-High Speed Railway 
incident, which was only a potential crisis with no violation of or threats to core 
public values.  Moreover, even if a crisis is severe, it would still be excluded if it 
did not go against public values.  Thus, it is clear that a violation of core public 
value is definitely important in distinguishing the severity of a crisis.  However, 
most violations of core public values are found in political crises related to the 
misconduct of government officials, such as sex scandal and corruption, whereas 
crises brought by natural disasters might not be suitable.  
 
From a macro perspective, the Politicization Approach principally focuses on one 
particular step – construction of blame in the whole crisis management process, 
which is also the most politicized part.  However, it is impossible to see the full 
picture without studying and analyzing the managerial aspect.  Thus, the 
Politicization Approach, though essential, has to be supplemented by other models or 
233 
 
theories, such as, the Leadership Approach, so that a comprehensive account could 
be given.  
 
11.4  Core Strengths of the State-society Interactive Framework 
One of the reasons for the existence of a theoretical gap in the current theories is the 
emergence of pro-active non-state actors due to the rapid development in information 
technology and communications. The State-society Interactive Framework is 
developed with filling this theoretical gap in mind, and has the following three 
features:   
 
11.4.1  Amalgamation of Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches 
Complimentary contribution does not simply mean combining the top-down 
(leadership) and bottom-up (politicization) approaches.  Instead, some components 
of both approaches have been integrated into the Crisis Strengthening Forces and 
Weakening Forces.  In general, the leadership and crisis management efforts made 
by the government, including those observable actions as decisions on policy, rescue 
efforts in disaster, allocation of resources, communication during crisis, and the 
supportive actions performed by pro-government parties and organizations (i.e., 
positive media exposures), are regarded as Crisis Weakening Forces that attempt to 
bring the crisis back to normal situation.  
 
On the contrary, blaming and accountability issues are categorized as Crisis 
Strengthening Forces.  Crisis is always a political sensitive issue. When the 
government is criticized for not doing a good job in crisis management, public 
dissatisfaction and hardship in the aftermath (e.g., the extremely poor economy after 
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SARS in Hong Kong) would emerge as political pressure, with manipulation of 
opposition parties and organizations possibly further worsening the situation.  The 
public would call for actions, such as independent investigation, assignment of 
responsibilities to different officials involved, press for the resignation of particular 
key actor(s), or even try to achieve policy change or institutional change from the 
government.  In cases of diseases or natural disasters, even the natural environment 
could act as a Strengthening Force.  If the crisis worsens to a level that is 
uncontrollable, the anger of the people would be further intensified. 
 
The State-society Interactive Framework could be regarded as a comprehensive crisis 
management analytical approach.  Although crisis management is conventionally 
seen as the responsibility of government, the analytic power of the Leadership 
Approach is questionable, as it is similar to a handbook instructing the government 
on what should be done when there is a crisis.  On the other hand, with its focus on 
the blame and accountability assignment process, the Politicization Approach is more 
analytical, though it could not truly reflect the efforts made by the government in 
managing the crisis.  To cover for these limitations, the Framework integrates 
elements of both approaches, and is able to provide a foundation for full assessment 
on crisis politics. 
 
11.4.2  Crisis Politics as Battles: Multi-crisis Effect 
The textbook description of crisis as a cycle or in bell-shape is actually a 
simplification of a crisis into the beginning, peak, and termination.  There is no 
doubt that all crises consist of the three mentioned components, but in the real world, 
crisis management is neither a cycle nor a bell-shaped distribution.  The 
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development process of a crisis is in fact dramatic and sometimes unforeseeable, and 
it is possible to have different “waves” of threats in one crisis, especially in the 
unpredictable natural disasters. 
 
The Interactive Framework includes a key element called the Crisis Development 
Ladder.  The ladder consists of three steps, namely, crisis, governance crisis, and 
government change.  Depending on the power of the Strengthening and Weakening 
Forces, an issue would move along the three steps of the ladder, until there is 
government change or termination of the crisis.  One of the strengths of the Crisis 
Development Ladder is its ability in explaining crisis with multiple reasons, which is 
important as a certain low-profile event in one crisis might be a symptom of future 
crisis development.  For example, the Car-Gate scandal had nearly died down and 
was replaced by other hot issues (the SARS outbreak) before it was brought up again 
during the 1 July protest.  However, no one knows at the moment that these two 
events would jointly become the symptoms of 2003 demonstration.  The 
multi-crisis analysis suggested by the State-society Interactive Framework is also the 
first in kind among the crisis management theories.  
 
Moreover, when a suitable situation arrives, such as the existence of catalytic effect 
(in this case, the 1 July protest), an event that seems to have disappeared could 
instantly be revived and move the whole crisis to the higher step.  Compared to the 
five elements in the Leadership Approach and the blame constructing chart of the 
Politicization Approach, the Crisis Development Ladder of the Interactive 
Framework can better reflect the real world situation.  
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11.4.3  Catalytic Effect of Crisis: A Window for Government Change 
The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is the most distinguishable feature of the Interactive 
Framework.  It could be defined as a sudden huge event or issue that creates and 
gathers sufficient Strengthening Forces from different arenas to push the crisis to the 
final stage of government change.  The catalytic effect is unique in its ability to 
answer the major research question in this thesis, that is, why could some crises lead 
to change, but others could not. 
 
In the Politicization Approach, the blame constructing chart is an attempt to allocate 
blames in the crisis aftermath by asking three yes-no questions directing the issue to 
different outcomes, instead of explaining the reasons behind such consequences.  
The major difference between the Politicization Approach and the Interactive 
Framework is that the latter is able to provide a multi-dimensional analysis on a 
crisis, which is helpful in the more complicated political and social environment of 
Hong Kong, and also in the real world with rapid globalization due to innovations in 
information technology and communication.  In addition, as people become more 
educated and better informed, they will no longer completely follow the 
arrangements of the government without raising questions when there is a crisis.  
Thus, the Interactive Framework is able to respond to the new political and social 
environment, in which the civil society is stronger and more influential than before. 
 
11.5  Limitations 
Conducting research in crisis management in Hong Kong is a challenging task, given 
that there are only a few academic studies focusing on the topic.  As the field of 
crisis management is multi-disciplinary in nature, the current study mainly focuses 
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on the political and leadership perspectives in crisis management.  Although it is 
not the aim of this research to study the performance of the government during the 
crises, a lack of professional knowledge in fields such as public health (the SARS 
case) or urban planning (the High Speed Railway case) may, to some extent, affect 
the depth of the study.  However, the valuable opinions and information from 
informants and various sources, including the internet, library and archives, have 
been extremely helpful as building blocks for the development of the Interactive 
Framework. 
 
The common pitfall for field researches in political science is the lack of 
interviewees, especially government officials who are directly in-charge or involved 
in the political process.  Thanks to interviews with LegCo members and political 
news reporters, who interact closely with the government, and the availability of 
government reports, committees’ minutes, and even written version of speeches, 
information in the current study could be deemed reliable.  Moreover, key 
informants have also provided details and perspectives not covered in documents, but 
it is unavoidable that some interviewees had failed to recall their memories on events 
that happened almost 10 years ago.  To increase reliability, all information collected 
from the interviews is cross-checked with news reports and other sources of 
information to ensure exactitude.   
 
As shown in previous chapters, current approaches are met with limitations in their 
explanatory capacity on crises in non-democratic regimes, such as those in Hong 
Kong.  Comparatively speaking, the limitation of the Interactive Framework, which 
is developed to reflect the political context in non-democratic regimes, such as Hong 
Kong and Mainland China, may be its applicability and validity in explaining the 
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situation in an absolute authoritarian state, though it is doubtful that a state without 
any state-society interaction exists.  Therefore, although the level of democracy and 
freedom may vary in different societies, the State-society Interactive Framework 
should, to great extent, be useful in explaining crisis management in different types 
of regimes.  
 
11.6  Observations on the Crisis Politics in Hong Kong 
11.6.1  Politicization Process with Anonymous Party Identity 
The observations of non-state actors also provided an answer to one of research 
questions: Why are there so many crises happening after the handover?  As 
mentioned in the Introduction, Hong Kong is currently a limited democracy with a 
comparatively high level of liberty.  That is to say, Hong Kong people enjoy a 
relatively high level of freedom and autonomy in different aspects, such as freedom 
of speech, publication, and assembly, under a political system that is neither 
authoritarian nor democratic.  Fifty percent of the seats in the Legislative Council 
are elected through direct election, while the rest is elected through small-circle 
elections with strong Beijing influence.  Moreover, the Chief Executive is elected 
by an Election Committee commonly regarded as a rubber stamp of Beijing, and 
Hong Kong people could not directly elect the Chief Executive until at least 2017. 
 
Therefore, the political context in Hong Kong is complicated, as the people could 
enjoy limited democracy through the existence of opposition parties in the LegCo, 
but have no access to the executive power, as the Chief Executive is not directly 
elected, and can govern without effective check-and-balance from the LegCo, which 
is always controlled by his alliances (i.e. the pro-government camp).  Thus, to force 
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a government change, the only thing the people can do is to construct crisis 
provoking politics, that is, the use of different kinds of crisis events to create a 
window of opportunity for government change, through politicization. 
 
By observation, the crisis politics in Hong Kong is under the politicization process 
with anonymous party identity.  This observation was firstly inspired from a 
conversation with Respondent G, a Pan-democrat District Councilor who is also 
actively involved in social movements: 
 
“If I were to participate in the social movement, I need to be 
“de-politicized”… [As the public may think that] you have a party 
agenda behind … [The initiative] made by a “pure” non-party social 
activist could be eye-catching for the public, but they still need the 
support of a political party.  However, if you carry the party flag from 
the very beginning, you may lose public attention in just thirty seconds… 
If you want to succeed, you need to be “de-partized”, and have to use 
some “soft tactics” to catch public attention and support… [It is] a 
politicization process without evident party identity.” (Respondent G) 
 
What Respondent G mentioned is a dynamic situation.  As discussed previously, 
most respondents agreed that making an issue loud and “big” (i.e., politicization) is a 
common tactic for different non-state actors to push forward their agenda through 
social movements.  However, political party members, regardless of their political 
orientation, suggested that their attachment with the political party is, to some extent, 
embarrassing during the politicization process.  Using Respondent C’s words, Hong 
Kong people are in general separating “politics” and “livelihood” (policy) issues, and 
they have a relatively negative feeling towards political parties.  Similar 
interpretation was also made by Respondent F, a committee member of a 
Pro-establishment party.  “Not bearing the name of the party is to prevent from 
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being blamed for milking the stories” (Respondent F).  On the other hand, 
Respondent M tried to explain this observation by arguing that political parties are 
mostly election-oriented and lack clear political ideologies, making people think that 
they are milking the stories merely for votes. 
 
Therefore, the current conservation is in contrast with party politicization, which 
means having a very clear political party identity when pushing political agenda 
towards social issues or problems.  Political parties promoting themselves by 
delivering their policy platform clearly with distinctive political ideological 
background (e.g., the conservatives and the social democrats) is commonly observed 
in democratic countries.  Their message is simple – “vote for us if you support our 
stand”.   However, under current political context in Hong Kong, policy change 
cannot be achieved through regular elections, leading to the need for crisis provoking 
politics.  As some respondents mentioned, party politics in Hong Kong is immature 
due to the lack of trust from the general public - a view shared by some scholars, 
such as Choy (1999, 121), who argued that political parties in Hong Kong are mostly 
election-oriented, and has never been too ideological-oriented or politicized.  Mass 
political mobilization by parties is rarely seen.  Rather, social pressure groups and 
individuals have picked up this role, as in the case of the 1 July 2003 protest.  In 
general, political parties in Hong Kong are still suffering from low legitimacy after 
1997 (Ma 2007, 135).   
 
The soft process in politicization observed in Hong Kong can be accounted for by the 
following three unique conditions: 
    
1) A limited democratic system with political parties that are isolated from the 
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executive power; 
2) An immature party politics due to most people not having trust in political parties, 
or thinking that parties are not that influential (Respondents C and M); 
3) A crisis provoking politics, making projection of social problems into crises 
much feasible in influencing government decision than through formal institution 
(e.g., elections and petitions) (Respondent G) 
 
The major goal of the activists is to fight for government change.   In the short term, 
it aims to achieve policy breakthrough in some “deep-level social conflicts”, 
especially when groups with vested interest are concerned, while in the long term, it 
tries to break the deadlock in Hong Kong political reform.  The democratization 
process in Hong Kong has been a tough and slow process.  Due to the absence of 
universal suffrage, activists, especially the Pan-democrats, have been trying their best 
to criticize the low legitimacy of the current Hong Kong SAR Government.  The 
legitimacy crisis of the government is nearly always bundled with social crises, 
especially when the government is found to be ineffective and inefficient in crisis 
management.  The poor capability of the government can be the result of both 
incompetence of its top leaders and its bias towards certain influential groups (i.e., 
the Pro-Beijing camp and the business sector).  Thus, activists have been working 
hard to impel political crises, so as to force possible government change.  In fact, a 
majority of the interviewees admitted that their reason for opposing to government 
decisions or policies is the nondemocratic political system in Hong Kong.  They are 
waiting for a catalyzer (i.e., the Catalytic Effect of Crisis) in order to impose 
sufficient political pressure (i.e., the Crisis Strengthening Forces) to accomplish 
government change. 
 
Therefore, in the Hong Kong context, crisis is not only an abnormal and 
unpredictable situation threatening the government, but also a catalyzer for 
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government change.  The nondemocratic executive branch in Hong Kong makes it 
possible for the government to ignore the real needs of the majority of people.  The 
politicization process with anonymous party identity in Hong Kong illustrates how 
the non-state actors, who are not involved in the decision-making process, use crisis 
as an opportunity to impose sufficient political influence on the government to lead 
to a real change for the good of the general public under a system without full 
democracy. 
 
11.6.2  The Crisis Politics of Hong Kong under the State-society Interactive 
Framework 
As a means of politicization, the politicization process with anonymous party identity 
is a Crisis Strengthening Force under the State-society Interactive Framework, and 
thus, a strategy to achieve government change.  To accomplish this, non-state actors 
would try to project the seriousness of a crisis in order to impose sufficient political 
pressure on the government for changes.  Two of the common strategies used are 
continuous mass media coverage and collective actions. 
 
Politicization processes are different among regimes depending on their 
socio-political context.  As mentioned previously, Hong Kong’s politicization is 
rooted in the immature and, to some extent, unpopular political party politics.  As 
such, it is a politicization strategy that tries to downplay party identity during the 
process.  Support from the people, that is, public opinion, is with no doubt the core 
of the Crisis Strengthening Forces, and, as observed by the respondents, 
politicization without party identity is the most effective way to achieve this in the 
Hong Kong context, especially after the 2003 Demonstration.    
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Politicization process without party identity is highly relevant to the State-society 
Interactive Framework, as both of them view crisis as a development process.  More 
importantly, it explains the deliberate effort from non-state actors in framing and 
escalating an issue into a social crisis (i.e., Crisis Strengthening Forces), in order to 
have more chances to influence government decision-making under a closed political 
system without full democracy. 
 
11.7  Comparative Perspective on Crisis Politics: SARS Experiences  
The State-society Interactive Framework has demonstrated its strength in explaining 
crisis politics in non-democratic regimes.  Although the Interactive Framework is 
developed based on the fragmented system in post-1997 Hong Kong - a 
semi-democratic system with high level of freedom and liberty, it is still applicable to 
other non-democratic, semi-democratic, and also some newly developed democratic 
systems.  In this section, the SARS outbreak is selected as an example to illustrate 
the crisis politics in three other Asian states, including Mainland China, Taiwan, and 
Singapore.  The main goal of this section is to identify the possible political forces 
(i.e., Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces) that may affect the crisis politics in 
those nations, which could provide valuable insights and form a solid foundation for 
the further development of the State-society Interactive Approach.     
 
11.7.1  Mainland China 
The People’s Republic of China is generally regarded as an authoritarian state under 
the dominant rule of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and China’s party-state nature 
has been one of the spotlights in studies on crisis management of SARS.  Identified 
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as the origin of the disease, the Chinese province of Guangdong saw a total of 5,328 
SARS cases, with 3,250 deaths as of May 2003
65
 (Cheng and Lye 2005, 208), the 
highest number in the world.   
 
The SARS outbreak in China was a hot topic in crisis management studies, with 
analyses from various angles, including media control (Powers and Xiao 2008), 
public health management (Tang 2003, Wong and Zheng 2004), and SARS elite 
politics (Loh 2004, Loh and Yip 2004, Saich 2006).  From a crisis politics 
perspective, the media control and elite politics in China is highly relevant to the 
State-society Interactive Framework.  Specifically, the tight control on media is an 
effective tool to suppress the Crisis Strengthening Forces, especially when the 
Chinese government started to realize that the SARS outbreak could become a 
political problem, rather than merely a medical problem (Cheng and Lye 2005, 211).  
The observations on media control during SARS outbreak is summarized as follows. 
 
Media Control during SARS 
The issue of freedom of press in China has been widely criticized by the international 
community, and the country was evaluated as “not free” by the Freedom House (He 
2004, 182).  As argued by He (2004), the CCP has developed a systematic media 
control network through different means, such as license granting, censorship system, 
“clean up” and crack down” of illegal publications, management and “rectification” 
of newspapers and periodicals, and cyber censorship.   
 
Indeed, the period between late 2002 and early 2003 was extremely sensitive to the 
CCP leadership, as it was the time when the fourth generation leaders, led by Hu 
                                                 
65
 Data obtained from Ministry of Health, PRC, and cited in Cheng and Lye (2005, 208). 
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Jintao, was taking over the power (Zheng and Lye 2004, 50).  In this regard, it is not 
surprising that some journalists in Guangdong were being criticized for their reports 
of the appearance of an “atypical pneumonia” on local newspapers during the early 
stages of the outbreak.  As Zheng and Lye (2004) added, the Chinese government at 
that time aimed to create a “conducive environment” to ensure a national-wide 
stability that would facilitate the smooth transformation of power to Hu.  After 
suppressing the news for a few months, eventually, on 3 April 2003, almost half a 
year after the first SARS case in Guangdong, the Chinese government held its first 
press conference on SARS, announcing that there was no SARS case in Beijing, and 
that the disease was under control in China (Eckholm 2006, 122).   
 
Besides, the media control of CCP on newspaper could be identified through 
newspaper discourse analyses conducted by some scholars.  For example, Huang 
and Hao (2008) examined how People’s Daily, a CCP propaganda newspaper, and 
Beijing Youth News, a market-oriented newspaper, covered the SARS crisis, and  
found that both newspapers were consistent with the stance of CCP in handling 
SARS, which is a reflection that the “newspaper censorship and publicity of 
information about the epidemic were based on the Party’s strategies rather than their 
own editorial decisions” (Huang and Hao 2008, 93). 
 
From the perspective of the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces, the media 
control tactics had sufficiently dampened the state-society interactions, as not many 
people (except those living in affected areas) realized the seriousness of SARS at the 
very beginning.  The sharp awareness of the potential political threat to the new 
Hu-Wen leadership has forced the CCP to maintain a tight control on the spread of 
information related to SARS.  In this case, media control was an effective and 
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strong Crisis Weakening Force that had prevented the SARS outbreak from 
becoming a huge political crisis that might affect the power transition to the fourth 
generation of leadership.   
 
SARS and the Hu-Wen New Leadership 
The outbreak of SARS had given a great challenge to the new leadership of Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao.  However, in contrast with Tung’s failure in Hong Kong, 
SARS had, to some extent, strengthened the Hu-Wen leadership, as they presented a 
more people-oriented and caring manner during the incident.  As Eckholm (2006) 
observed:  
 
“In many countries, a similar deadly fiasco might overturn the 
government.  In China, government creditability was low to begin with, 
and my impression, based on widespread interviews in May and June of 
2003, is that President Hu and Prime Minster Wen were, on balance, 
personally strengthened by the events, even if broader trust in the system 
sank to a new low.  Their counterattack on SARS, if belated, came 
across as strong and in keeping with the image the new leader had 
cultivated of being more in touch with ‘the people’ than their 
predecessors” (Eckholm 2006, 129). 
 
The Hu-Wen’s public relations tactics were quite effective in upholding the 
dampened creditability of the Chinese government during SARS.  As mentioned in 
the previous section, the political sensitivity at the time of SARS had made the 
incident not merely medical issue, but a potential political crisis.  Thus, neglecting 
the public health perspective, the CCP leadership had tried their best to minimize the 
political influence of SARS on the new leadership.  There could be multiple 
conclusions towards China’s public health system on disease control, however, from 
a crisis politics perspective, the SARS outbreak did not reach the level of 
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Governance Crisis in the State-society Interactive Framework. 
 
In fact, the political impact of SARS on China’s new leadership was relatively minor. 
It was to large extent associated with the long history of keeping public health 
matters as top state secrets by the CCP (McNally 2003, 72).  In this regard, a tight 
media control is an effective tool to maintain this phenomenon.  Media control in 
China has not merely performed the role of “filter”, but is also in line with the old 
Maoist way of propaganda, as McNally (2003, 73) observed:  “The party and media 
mass mobilized society into confronting the SARS crisis… Media outlets also 
portrayed the battle against SARS as a test of whole nation, exhorting people to rally 
around the communist leadership to overcome the country’s hardship.” Thus, in 
general, the crisis management of SARS in China was a battle of information flow 
and propaganda.  Although the health system of China has been widely criticized by 
the outside world, the media control of China and the public relations tactics 
performed by the new leadership had kept the Crisis Strengthening Forces at a low 
level, and thus governance crisis was not observed in China in the SARS incident.  
 
11.7.2  Taiwan 
Taiwan was one of the most severely affected regions of SARS, with Taipei city and 
Taipei county (now New Taipei city) recording the highest number of SARS cases 
(Figure 11.1).  The crisis politics of SARS in Taiwan was completely different from 
its counterparts of Hong Kong and Mainland China across the strait.  Since 1996, 
Taiwan people have experienced full universal suffrage in electing their own 
President.  In fact, all levels of government bodies, from the President to City 
mayors, and from Legislative Yuan members to City Council members, are returned 
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by direct elections.  At the time of SARS outbreak, Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was the President, while the Taipei City was 
headed by Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT, or the Chinese Nationalist Party).  
As some scholars suggested, the battle of SARS crisis was in fact a battle of publicity 
between the DPP’s central government and the KMT’s Taipei city government.  The 
creation of public fears towards SARS by the Taipei city government was a weapon 
to attack the DPP’s central government (Gao 2003, 66). 
 
 
Figure 11.1 Geographical Distribution of SARS Probable Cases in Taiwan 
Source: (Chen, Chien and Yang 2003, 308) 
 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of SARS Politics in Taipei 
Gao (2003) provided detailed analyses of the de-crisis strategies of the Taipei city 
government in dealing with SARS, and argued that the SARS crisis management of 
Ma’s Taipei city government was completely a political operation campaign in order 
to demonstrate their prestige over the DPP’s central government headed by Chen.  
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Under the “Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of SARS Politics in Taipei” 
suggested by Gao, the Taipei city government had constantly adopted and reinforced 
the shock therapies (Kimenyi and Mwabu 2007) to distinguish themselves from the 
“gradual reaction” of Taiwan central government.  
 
The SOP started with the emotional appearance on the mass media, which created a 
sense of public fear.  It was followed by a series of shock therapies
66
 that made the 
Taipei city government “battlefront fighter” of the SARS crisis.  In contrast, 
regardless of whether the central government followed the city government’s shock 
therapies or not, the city government would always win – if the central government 
followed, it means the city government was acting more quickly.  If the central 
government did not follow, the consequences of the disease would be borne by the 
central government, not the city government. 
 
From the angle of State-society Interactive Framework, the Taipei city government 
managed by the KMT, an opposition party, was an extraordinary “non-state actor”, in 
contrast with the DPP’s central government.  Making use of Taipei city as a 
platform, the KMT was trying to project the seriousness of the SARS crisis to attack 
the DPP’s popularity in order to increase their own.  Although the SARS crisis 
eventually did not reach the critical level of Governance Crisis, Ma’s Taipei city 
government successfully transferred part of the political responsibility of the crisis, 
and his performance during SARS as Taipei city mayor did not become a political 
burden for his Presidential campaign in 2008.  
                                                 
66
 For example, without coordinating with the central government, the Taipei city government 
extended the home-isolation period from 10 days to 14 days and reduced the body temperature for 
home-isolation from 38
o
C to 37.5
o
C, both of which were not based on the professional standard of 
WHO, but to differentiate themselves from the central government (Gao, 2003: 78-79).  
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There is no evidence that the KMT tried to make use of the SARS incident to 
overthrow DPP’s regime.  In fact, they did not need to, as Taiwan is under full 
democracy.  Thus, in this case the Crisis Strengthening and Weakening Forces were 
mostly provided by the KMT’s Taipei city government.  On the one hand, they 
projected the seriousness of SARS.  On the other hand, KMT offered shock 
therapies through the Taipei city government.  In democratic regimes, with the 
presence of regular elections, it is not necessary for the oppositions to make use of 
crises to impose government change.  Rather, they would want to gain as much 
publicities as they could during the crises.  This is especially true if the state control 
part of the institution is controlled by two major parties, as in the Taiwan case of 
central government versus the capital city government, or maybe the Executive 
versus the Legislative.  Indeed, KMT had been in control of the Legislative Yuan 
for most of the time during Chen’s presidency (2000-2008).     
 
11.7.3  Singapore 
Singapore was another Asian country that was significantly affected by the SARS 
outbreak, with a total of 238 cases and a fatality rate of 13.9% (33 deaths) (Teo, Yeoh 
and Ong 2008, 88).  Among the four regions discussed in this thesis (i.e., Hong 
Kong, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Singapore), the political impact of SARS on 
Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party 67  (PAP) was minimal, although 
then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong labeled SARS a “national crisis” with 
“catastrophic consequences” in a parliamentary speech in April 2003.  
                                                 
67
 The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been Singapore's ruling party since 1959.  Since the 1963 
general elections, the PAP has dominated Singapore's parliamentary democracy.  Although there is 
universal suffrage, the PAP has been criticized for the passing of laws that suppress free speech and 
other civil liberties. 
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Of course, credit should go to the crisis management efforts made by the 
Singaporean government, as they enforced strict measures to contain the outbreak, 
for which they received praised from the WHO as a “model” of crisis management 
for other nations to emulate (Weber, Law and Tan 2008, 146).  As mentioned in the 
State-society Interactive Framework, government crisis management measures could 
be a strong Crisis Weakening Forces, especially in the case of natural disease.  Once 
the spread of the disease has been controlled, there is no room for further political 
manipulation.  The effective crisis management also made it hard for the 
oppositions to attack the popularity of the ruling party.  On the other hand, media 
control in Singapore is also very tight, and Singaporeans enjoy much less freedom of 
speech and assembly compared to Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
 
“Triumph over Adversity” 
Weber, Tan, and Law’s (2008, 152) study suggested that the success of Singapore in 
the battle of SARS was mainly because of the Singapore government’s ability to gain 
public compliance with directives on public and personal health.  They argued that 
the government had successfully framed communicative responses to the crisis in 
terms of “social responsibility” and “sacrifice”, under girded by “government 
paternalism”.  Through different mass media, Singaporeans were told to be 
community-oriented by truthfully reporting their symptoms and history of contact, 
with no regard to their self-interest (i.e., social responsibility).  Moreover, as 
illnesses such as SARS were usually given the “war” metaphors (Baehr 2006, Sontag 
1999), the notion of “sacrifice” was rooted into the public and to those who worked 
in the medical community.  All medical practitioners, victims of SARS, and 
survivors are described as “war heroes”.  Moreover, the Singaporean leaders had 
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practiced what themselves preached to promote the importance of the directives (i.e., 
government paternalism), such as the self-quarantine of a Parliament member when 
he found that he had treated a SARS-infected patient (Weber, Law and Tan 2008, 
156). 
 
In fact, state-society interactions in Singapore were positive, as most of the people 
supported their government during the SARS incident.  With the cooperation of the 
people, the Crisis Weakening Forces directed by the government was extremely 
effective, and Singapore was safe eventually.  In this case, the Crisis Strengthening 
Forces were weak, and the crisis politics was not obvious, evident from the fact that 
the SARS incident was not linked up with some critical political issues, such as the 
long paternalist rule of PAP.  In contrast, the paternalistic governance was said to be 
quite effective in handling natural disease.  Thus, SARS in Singapore was totally a 
medical issue without any political implication.   
 
11.7.4  Summary 
This section serves as an evaluation on the application of the State-society Interactive 
Framework on various governmental systems (partial democracy with a relative high 
level of liberty in Hong Kong, authoritarian with very limited of freedom especially 
on freedom of speech and political participation in Mainland China, liberal 
democracy in Taiwan, and a relatively democratic parliamentary system in which 
freedom is being restricted by the government under paternalistic rule in Singapore), 
and discusses the potential for further studies.  Due to limitations in the scale of 
research, a comprehensive analysis was not possible on the three regions other than 
Hong Kong (Mainland China, Taiwan, and Singapore).  Instead, the crisis politics of 
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SARS in the four regions, associated political issues, and a brief illustration on Crisis 
Strengthening and Weakening Forces are given in Table 11.1.  The Forces are 
categorized as “Weak”, “Moderate” and “Strong” for easy understanding.   
 
In conclusion, crisis politics happens in all types of regime, especially if the crisis 
were serious enough.  It is the relationship between crisis politics and the Crisis 
Strengthening and Weakening Forces that is of interest.  For example, in Singapore, 
the crisis politics of SARS was not obvious, which might be related to the effective 
crisis management efforts of the government (i.e., very strong Crisis Weakening 
Forces).  If the Singapore government performed poorly in crisis management, the 
outcome could be totally different, and might even become a “political bomb” that 
would affect the People’s Action Party’s paternalistic rule. 
 
The State-society Interactive Framework is a total crisis management framework that 
puts all the political factors (i.e. Forces) that may contribute to a crisis into 
consideration.  As could be seen from the real world examples, crises are not 
individual cases.  In this regard, the Interactive Framework could provide a 
comprehensive analysis on different actors and issues that might contribute to the 
development of crisis politics.  Specifically, poor crisis management by the 
government on any particular social problem could bring unexpected political 
consequences, as can be seen from the Arab Spring.  The multi-crisis effect 
consideration and the “battle” between different Forces are original contributions 
brought by the State-society Interactive Framework to the field of crisis 
management. 
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Table 11.1 Summary Table of the SARS Politics in the Four Regions 
Region Hong Kong Mainland China Taiwan Singapore 
Regime type Partial democracy Authoritarian Democracy Paternalistic democracy 
Crisis Politics: 
Political issues that 
associated with SARS 
- Poor governance under 
Tung 
- Car-Gate scandal 
- Article 23 Legislation 
- Fourth generation of leader 
assuming power (i.e., 
beginning of the Hu-Wen 
era)  
- Party struggle between 
DPP (central gov’t) and 
KMT (Taipei city gov’t)  
N/A 
Crisis Strengthening 
Forces 
Very Strong 
(severe public dissatisfaction) 
Weak to Moderate 
(tight media control, imperfect 
information of the public) 
Moderate 
(struggle between central and 
Taipei gov’t, KMT challenged 
DPP) 
Weak 
(tight media control) 
Crisis Weakening Forces Weak 
(crisis management measures 
were seriously criticized, 
multi-crisis effect that severely 
damaged gov’t legitimacy) 
Moderate  
(ineffective and delayed crisis 
management measures, but 
quite successful public relations 
performance by leaders) 
Moderate 
(crisis management 
effectiveness affected by party 
struggle) 
Very Strong  
(effective crisis management 
measures, paternalistic rule) 
Catalytic Effect Yes 
(1 July 2003 Demonstration) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Political outcomes Stepping-down of principal 
officials and CE, postponement 
of Article 23 Legislation 
Stepping-down of front line 
officials (no great impact to 
ruling party) 
Stepping-down of front line 
officials (no great impact to 
ruling party) 
N/A 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSION 
 
The field of crisis management has been dominated by western scholars, and as such 
a liberal democratic system of government is taken for granted.  However, as a 
Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong would not be able to enjoy a 
full democracy at least until 2017.  Thus, it is doubtful that current crisis 
management models and theories can be applied without modification in the Hong 
Kong context.  In an attempt to develop a framework suitable for use in a limited 
democracy, such as Hong Kong, the current thesis first applied two crisis 
management approaches, that is, the Leadership Approach (top-down) and the 
Politicization Approach (bottom-up) to the Hong Kong context to identify their 
weaknesses and limitations.  With these in mind, the State-society Interactive 
Framework is introduced. 
 
The two crisis incidents selected as case studies in this thesis are the 1 July 2003 
Demonstration and the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, both of which saw active 
civic participation and involved controversies in different political aspects.  In fact, 
the 1 July protest was a direct result of three crisis events, including the Antony 
Leung Car-Gate Scandal, the outbreak of SARS, and the proposed legislation of 
Article 23 of the Basic Law (National Security Ordinance), all of which happened in 
the first half of 2003.  On the other hand, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident that 
extended from late 2009 to early 2010 was related to the controversy on building the 
Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link.  
The crisis in 2003 had led to a major policy change (i.e., the postponement of Article 
23 legislation) and the resignation of government officials, whereas the Anti-High 
Speed Railway movement ended with no change in the government.  Granted, there 
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was a significant difference in the number of participants between these two 
movements.  However, other than simply focusing on the number of people, a more 
valuable study would be to understand to what extent the crisis management theories 
could explain the phenomena. 
 
There are five elements in the Leadership Approach: Sense-making, decision-making, 
meaning-making, terminating, and learning, and three dimensions in the 
Politicization Approach: Constructing severity, agency, and responsibility.  
Analyses of the case studies discovered two major limitations regarding to the 
applicability of both crisis management approaches.  First, both approaches were 
found to be in excellent in understanding conventional crises, such as political 
scandals or natural disasters, but are not applicable to policy failure, since both 
approaches depend significantly on the seriousness of the crises.  If the “culprit” 
could be clearly identified, and the crisis development process simple and direct, 
both approaches would be extremely helpful in understanding the whole crisis 
management process.  If the crisis were more serious, it would be easier to divide it 
into different stages for analysis.  However, there is no clear standard of what 
constitutes a serious crisis.  Some challenges to the government, or so-called “social 
events”, might not necessarily be the crisis scholars had in mind when they 
developed their theories.  For example, the Anti-High Speed Railway incident had 
not been taken to the level of governance crisis.  In fact, it did not even reach the 
threshold for initiating an analysis under the Politicization Approach (i.e., serious 
violation of core public values). 
 
Second, both approaches are useful in the aftermath assessment of the crisis 
development process, but are not explanatory enough to answer the current research 
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question:  Why could some crises lead to change, but others could not.  Although 
the Leadership Approach claimed to be a step forward of other crisis management 
approaches (Boin, 't Hart and Stern, et al. 2005, 9) that are in traditional handbook 
style, it is, to a large extent, still thinking within a set of guidelines.  Specifically, 
the five elements in the Leadership Approach, though demonstrating the major 
components to be concerned by the government during a crisis, have failed to explain 
why different crises would lead to different (political) consequences.  The 
Politicization Approach, while more explanatory in nature, has a threshold 
requirement on severity (i.e., core public values violation), which has limited its 
application to assessing potential crises or other types of crises. 
 
There are two reasons regarding the shortcoming of both approaches in the Hong 
Kong context.  On the one hand, both approaches are unable to reflect the 
complexity of Hong Kong’s political structure, that is, a semi-democratic legislature 
under the administration of an almost authoritative executive branch.  It is obvious 
that, without regular elections of the executive body, the survival of government 
officials has no direct relation with their crisis management performance.  However, 
the political sensitivity of crisis management to elections is a major concern in the 
theories developed by western scholars (McConnell and Stark 2002).  Thus, the 
absence of a well-developed electoral politics has made it hard to associate the 
situation of Hong Kong with the theories.  On the other hand, the crisis 
management approaches are unable to provide a comprehensive assessment on the 
highly-politicized incidents in Hong Kong, as both of them view crisis and crisis 
management from a particular perspective.  The Leadership Approach focuses on 
what should be done by the government during a crisis, whereas the Politicization 
Approach, while famous for its illustration of blame construction, could not 
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completely reflect the politics of crisis management. 
 
The State-society Interactive Framework proposed by the current study is able to 
tackle the limitations of both Leadership and Politicization Approaches.  There are 
four elements in the Interactive Framework.  First, a Crisis Development Ladder 
has been developed to illustrate the relationship between crisis, governance crisis, 
and government change.  Governance crisis is now described as a crisis that 
provides sufficient threats on the legitimacy of the government or the survival of the 
regime, and is differentiated from a simple crisis, which in its broadest sense, is 
defined as an out of normal situation that requires government intervention.  
Government change can be regarded as a kind of termination for the crisis, as it 
involves either a stepping-down of a particular government official, or a change in 
the institution (including policy change) as a whole.  The Crisis Development 
Ladder serves as a path to demonstrate the possible political outcomes of a crisis. 
 
The two other major components of the Interactive Framework are the Crisis 
Strengthening Forces and Crisis Weakening Forces.  These two forces represent the 
interaction between the government and the public in a crisis.  Crisis Strengthening 
Forces are regarded as the efforts made by different actors in the society, including 
opposition parties, mass media, and pressure groups, who want to take the crisis 
further up the Crisis Development Ladder.  Crisis Strengthening Forces include, but 
are not limited to, the political power of actors within the institution, such as 
impeachment initiated by the oppositions in the legislature, the negative reports in 
newspapers, the exposure of scandalous materials, and the collective actions (i.e., 
protest and demonstration) organized by different social groups.  On the other hand, 
the Crisis Weakening Forces mainly come from the government or pro-government 
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parties or groups.  They include supportive votes in the legislature that protect the 
officials involved from the impeachment or motion of no-confidence.  The 
supportive and positive mass media exposures also play an important role in 
convincing the public that everything is under control.  The struggles between the 
two forces would determine whether a crisis would lead to a government change.  
 
The most distinguishable feature of the Interactive Framework is the Catalytic Effect 
of Crisis, which is similar to the policy window of opportunity suggested in 
Kingdon’s (1995) Multi-stream Model.  It is inspired by the word “catalyzer”, as 
suggested by Respondent C.  The Catalytic Effect of Crisis is defined as the 
prominent event that intensifies in a very short period of time and creates an 
opportunity for government change.  In most situations, the catalytic effect is 
associated with the immense growth of Strengthening Forces and the decline of 
Weakening Forces, and is, thus, an alternate way of viewing crisis as a means leading 
to government change, especially in a limited-democracy like Hong Kong.  
 
In order to make the State-society Interactive Framework more scientific and 
objective, the newspapers discourse analysis method similar to that of Lee and Chan 
(2011)was adopted, with an aim of measuring the changes in Strengthening Forces 
and Weakening Forces in the mass media and identifying the existence of Catalytic 
Effect of Crisis.  With reference to the two case studies, the 1 July 2003 protest was 
definitely a catalyzer that led to the postponement of the legislation of Article 23 of 
the Basic Law and the resignation of two officials.  This suggestion is substantiated 
by the results of the newspaper analysis, which indicated a major shift of intensity 
from Weakening Forces to Strengthening Forces during the protest period.  
However, in the Anti-High Speed Railway incident, Strengthening Forces were 
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insufficient, and hence, the incident was unable to move on to the stage of 
governance crisis.  Moreover, there was an absence of catalytic effect, thus no 
change was made by the government eventually. 
 
This thesis has yielded three theoretical contributions to the arena of crisis 
management and one empirical contribution to the study of Hong Kong politics.  
First, the Interactive Framework is theoretically a complimentary contribution of 
both top-down and bottom-up approaches, as it attempts to unite them on the same 
playfield.  The Interactive Framework is an approach of multi-dimensional crisis 
management, which intends to illustrate the relationship between the state and the 
society during a crisis by using the two crisis forces.  Second, compared with the 
current approaches that view crisis management as an assessment in the aftermath, 
the Interactive Framework describes crisis development with respect to the changes 
in Strengthening and Weakening Forces throughout the entire crisis.  It can also 
explain the occurrence of multi-crisis effect.  Third, the Catalytic Effect of Crisis is 
an original finding in crisis management studies that associates crisis with the 
possibility of bringing government change.  Instead of perceiving crisis as an 
abnormal situation, the catalytic effect emphasizes the importance of crisis in 
directing the decision-making of the government.  Turning an issue into a crisis is 
definitely helpful in drawing public and government attention, as it may result in a 
real change in the policy or the institution.  This crisis manipulating process by 
different non-state actors is observed as a politicization process without party identity 
under crisis provoking politics.  It refers to the creation of crisis, or making a crisis 
more serious and notable, in order to serve certain political agenda. 
 
Finally, the introduction of a new perspective on crisis-provoking politics in Hong 
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Kong is the empirical contribution of this thesis.  People are unable to influence 
political affairs effectively through formal means, given that universal suffrage is not 
yet available in Hong Kong.  The observed crisis-provoking politics could due to 
the presence of incapable government officials that are able to survive under the lack 
of an effective check-and-balance mechanism, though this point of view could be 
disputed with reference to the colonial administration operated by the British.  In 
contrast, the politicization process without party identity would possibly be changed 
by the continual enlightenment of the civil society and party politics.   
 
Until this moment, Hong Kong people are still enjoying a relatively free and liberal 
society.  This is the soil for civil society development, and is also an essential 
condition for the crisis provoking politics of Hong Kong.  A limited-democracy 
with liberty allows Hong Kong people to escalate different social problems to the 
level of social crisis, which provides sufficient Strengthening Forces to take the 
agenda further.  If the catalytic effect were activated, as in the case of the 
half-a-million people protest on 1 July 2003, there would be a good opportunity to 
force the government to make major concessions.  In conclusion, with the political 
development of Hong Kong towards democracy at stake, there will definitely be 
increasing number of social and political crises.  The current political scandal 
related to the unauthorized construction in the apartment of the Chief Executive 
Leung Chun-ying is a predictable development under the crisis provoking politics.  
Crisis is powerful, especially when the people realized that they can neither choose 
their leader nor change the government without one. 
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12.1  Avenues for Future Research 
It is impossible to have a perfect model.  However, efforts should be made to the 
continuous improvement of a model.  The State-society Interactive Framework 
would be more impeccable with the incorporation of different mechanisms of force 
assessment, of which newspapers discourse analysis as adopted in this research is 
one, as newspapers coverage represents an important element in the analysis of Crisis 
Strengthening or Weakening Forces.  Nevertheless, there should be other potential 
methods of assessment, qualitative or quantitative, available from different 
disciplines, such as management studies or psychology.
68
  With their help, the 
Interactive Framework would definitely become more scientific and objective.  
Moreover, borrowing ideas from different areas would help make the arena of crisis 
management more multi-disciplinary, and will contribute to the creation of new 
knowledge and new perspectives in this field.  
 
Scholar should associate knowledge with the real world situation.  The soft 
politicization under crisis provoking politics would be helpful for understanding the 
power relationship between the state and society during periods of democratization 
and political reform.  The Interactive Framework could be applied to those 
countries and regimes that are newly democratized or are in the transitional period, 
especially Asian countries, such as Burma.  Besides, countries that are now in the 
elementary stages of democratization or are having an ineffective “democratic” 
system should be also targeted, as in China and Singapore.  However, the value of 
the Interactive Framework in Western societies should not be underestimated.  In 
                                                 
68
 A blame response analysis of the newspapers was conducted after a riot in the Netherlands. The 
two basic questions the authors suggested were in line with the state–society interactive framework: (1) 
What kind of blame can one be facing?; and (2) How is one to respond to blame?’ Please refer to 
Resodihardjo et al. (2012, 231). 
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fact, further studies should be made to investigate the necessary conditions for 
government changes in democratic countries, for example, with limited time before 
the next election, it is interesting to know how the government is going to deteriorate 
the Strengthening Forces in order to minimize the possible damage to the popularity 
during and after the crisis.  The ideas presented in the current study could be put to 
test under different contexts, both theoretically and empirically.  Although the field 
of crisis management is comparatively new at this stage, it is full of potential for 
further development, and it would definitely be beneficial to the academia and also to 
the wellbeing of the people in the world.  
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Government Documents 
(Only list out those without properly cited inside the main text or footnote) 
1. CE’s Transcript, Government Press Release, 10 March 2003 
2. Financial Secretary’s Q&A Transcript, Government Press Release, 9 March 
2003 
3. Government further clarifies legislative proposals to implement BL 23, 
Government Press Release, 28 January 2003 
4. Perceived Conflict of Interest in Your Purchase of a Car, The Chief Executive’s 
Office, 15 March 2003 
5. Report of the Hospital Authority Review Panel on the SARS Outbreak, Hospital 
Authority, September 2003 
6. SARS in Hong Kong : from Experience to Action, SARS Expert Committee, 
HKSAR Government, October 2003 
7. The Basic Law, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
8. The Financial Secretary’s Statement on the Purchase of a New Car, 15 March 
2003) 
9. Twelve-month Report on Implementation of the Accountability System for 
Principal Officials, Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2003 
 
Legislative Council Documents 
1. Report of the Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the handling 
of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak by the Government and the 
Hospital Authority, July 2004 
2. Various Legislative Council Papers (please refer to the in text citation and 
footnote for the reference code) 
 
Web Sites  
(Only list out those without properly cited inside the main text or footnote) 
1. MTR. Express Rail Link. Available at: 
http://www.expressraillink.hk/tc/database/faq.html 
2. The Encyclopaedia of virtual communities in Hong Kong. Express Rail Link. 
Available at: 
http://evchk.wikia.com/wiki/%E5%BB%A3%E6%B7%B1%E6%B8%AF%E9
%AB%98%E9%80%9F%E9%90%B5%E8%B7%AF 
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Newspapers 
1. Apple Daily (2003-2012) 
2. Hong Kong Economic Times (2003-2012) 
3. Ming Pao (2003-2012) 
4. Oriental Daily (2003-2012) 
5. Sing Tao Daily (2003-2012) 
6. South China Morning Post (2003-2012) 
7. Ta Kung Pao (2003-2012) 
8. The Sun, Hong Kong (2003-2012) 
9. The Standard (2003-2012) 
10. Wen Wei Po (2003-2012) 
(please refer to the in text citation and footnote for exact date and/or article)
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APPENDIX II: PROFILES OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondent Interview Details Profile Occupation Political 
Affiliation 
Respondent A 
(Preliminary) 
26 Apr 2011 (11:00) 
Respondent’s Office 
A is a former LegCo member and a senior politician who has 
served the Hong Kong polity since colonial era.  Being a 
former leader of Pro-establishment Party E1, A is currently a 
commentator in the mass media. 
The interview with A was a preliminary one, with an aim to 
identify potential research focuses for the study of crisis 
management in Hong Kong.  A mentioned the significant role 
of mass media during the crises, which ignited the idea of 
conducting the newspaper discourse analyses. 
Commentator / 
Consultant 
Former Leader 
of Party E1 
Respondent B 
(Preliminary) 
19 Sep 2011 (19:45) 
A café in Tsuen Wan 
As a social activist currently working for a human rights 
pressure group, B has been taking part in social movements in 
opposition to major government infrastructure projects. 
The interview with B was the second preliminary interview.  
As a very vigorous social activist, B discussed some tactics for 
pushing forward policy agenda, which served as a guide in the 
study of crisis politics from a policymaking perspective. 
Campaigner of a 
human rights 
NGO 
Member of 
Party D2 
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Respondent C 14 May 2012 (17:30) 
Party D1 
Headquarters 
As the leader of Pan-democrat Party D1, C is an active social 
activist who is continuously taking part in social movements 
regarding civil disobedience. 
C was the first respondent participating in a semi-structured 
interviewed using the set of research questions listed in 
Appendix B.  During the interview, C mentioned the 
importance of “catalyzer’ in crises, which inspired the idea of 
the Catalytic Effect of Crisis as a triggering point for 
government change.  
Social Activist, 
Politician 
Leader of 
Party D1 
Respondent D 24 May 2012 (15:00) 
Party D2 District 
Office 
D is a LegCo member from Pan-democrat Party D2.  Before 
becoming a politician, D worked as a reporter and commentator 
in international news agencies. 
D analyzed the relationship between mass media, social 
activists, and political parties during SARS based on personal 
experiences.  As a media practitioner and politician, 
information provided by D was essential to understand the 
interactions between different stakeholders in the event.   
 
LegCo Member Committee 
member of 
Party D2 
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Respondent E 28 Feb 2013 (16:00) 
Party E2 
Headquarters 
E is a senior officer of Pro-establishment Party E2, as well as a 
researcher.  E also serves as a commentator on newspaper for 
political and social affairs in Hong Kong. 
E was the first respondent from the Pro-establishment camp, 
and illustrated the complexity of “weak alliance” between 
government and Pro-establishment parties.  E’s observations 
provided insights to study crisis development as changing of 
“forces” – party support during a crisis is not a commitment, 
but is highly dependent on the political environment and public 
opinion.   
Senior Officer 
of Party E2 
Senior Officer 
of Party E2 
Respondent F 7 Mar 2013 (16:00) 
Party E3 District  
Office 
As a committee member of Pro-establishment Party E3, F is 
also a freelance column writer who is interested in various 
social issues.  F is a current supervisor of a LegCo member’s 
district office.  
F’s commentaries and interviews appeared on mass media 
recurrently.  As a member of the Pro-establishment, F 
admitted that they need to mind their words when discussing 
controversial issues.  F shared the same conservative mind set 
with E in supporting government during political crises.  
Supervisor of a 
LegCo 
member’s 
district office 
Committee 
member of 
Party E3 
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Respondent G 15 Mar 2013 (14:30) 
Respondent’s 
District Council 
Office 
In addition to being a District Council member from 
Pan-democrat Party D3, G is an active social activist with 
concerns for a variety of social issues.  G has been deeply 
involved in the Choi Yuen Village incident. 
G served as key informant for the Anti-high speed railway 
incident.  Moreover, G addressed the challenges and obstacles 
of politicizing social issues to social crises based on experience 
in different social movements.  As a committee member of a 
major Pro-democrat party, G is in good position to illustrate the 
complicated relationship between social activists and political 
parties, especially regarding controversial issues.   
District Council 
member, Social 
activist 
Committee 
member of 
Party D3 
Respondent H 15 Mar 2013 (21:00) 
A café in Causeway 
Bay 
As a reporter who had worked in a major newspaper in Hong 
Kong, H is now working for a new media online, in addition to 
being a current reporter of social and political issues. 
The new media that H is working for has a strong pro-democrat 
background.  H explained how new media can mobilize 
people in different social issues through internet platform, such 
as Facebook, and could easily gather a critical mass in short 
time.   
Reporter N/A 
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Respondent I 21 Mar 2013 (16:00) 
Lingnan University 
Leading the Pan-democrat Party D4, I is a politician and a 
social activist with great concerns on issues related to the 
minorities and grassroots.  I was active in leading students’ 
movement.  
I illustrated the interrelations between government legitimacy 
deficit and governance crisis, and believed that the lacking of 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong has provided a political 
environment for a crisis provoking politics.   
Social activist, 
Politician 
Leader of 
Party D4 
Respondent J 22 Mar 2013 (15:30) 
A café in Causeway 
Bay 
In addition to playing the role of an internet social activist, J 
actively participates in different online new media.  J is also 
the manager of a website that monitors the service of public 
transport.  
J was a key actor in the latter stage of the Anti-High Speed 
Railway incident, serving as informant and consultant for 
Pan-democrat LegCo members.  J’s major responsibility was 
to provide data and information, and to draft questions 
regarding the potential loopholes of the project for the LegCo 
members during the filibustering of funding appropriation 
stage.  
Social activist N/A 
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Respondent K 25 Mar 2013 (15:30) 
A café in Causeway 
Bay 
K works as a reporter of political news for a major 
pan-democrat news group in Hong Kong.  K has previously 
worked for a major Pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong.   
By comparing the two media companies that K worked for, K 
experienced how the strong political preference of the 
supervisors and editors influenced the news reporting style and 
frames.  
Reporter N/A 
Respondent L 27 Mar 2013 (17:30) 
A café in Central 
Other than being a District Council member from 
Pro-establishment Party E4, L is a committee member who 
often acts as the party’s spokesperson and commentator with 
high media exposure. 
Similar to Respondent F, L is a party spokesperson who always 
expresses opinion in front of the media on behalf of the party.  
L said that party support is, to some extent, helpful to the 
government during political crises or scandals.  However, in 
line with other Pro-establishment respondents, L admitted that 
the actions of the party are heavily influenced by public 
opinion, and they would not support the government if the 
government were being criticized badly.      
District Council 
member 
Committee 
member of 
Party E4 
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Respondent M 28 Mar 2013 (15:30) 
A café in Tai Wai 
As a member of Pan-democrat Party D5, M is a social activist 
and author of books on social movements and political issues, 
on top of being a commentator who appears on internet radio 
programs. 
M has worked among the group of social activists, political 
parties and media, and identified the uncompromising actions 
and directions of these three groups.  The distrust among the 
three groups is deeply-rooted due to the short-term 
ad-hoc-based orientation of different actors and a lack of 
comprehensive political discourse towards the democratic 
development of Hong Kong.  Non-state actors worked 
according to their best benefit, such as for vote or for individual 
popularity. 
Social activist, 
Freelance writer 
Member of 
Party D5 
Respondent N 29 Mar 2013 (19:30) 
A café in Yau Ma Tei 
Besides being a chief reporter of local news of a Pan-democrat 
newspaper in Hong Kong, N is experienced in reporting on a 
wide range of policy issues. 
In this interview, N disclosed internal practices of how 
government promotes its political agenda to the public through 
mass media.     
Reporter N/A 
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Respondent O 29 Mar 2013 (19:30) 
A café in Yau Ma Tei 
Having a strong connection with government officials and 
LegCo council members, O is a senior reporter of political 
news in a Pro-establishment newspaper in Hong Kong. 
In this interview, O disclosed the internal practices of how 
government influences newspaper reports towards different 
crises and controversial issues.  The mass media “frames” has 
become a major force that influences the development of crisis 
politics. 
Reporter N/A 
Respondent P 15 Apr 2013 (18:00) 
Lingnan University 
As an active social activist who engages in a variety of social 
movements regarding to democratization and labor issues, P is 
in the head of a joint university student association. 
Based on experiences gained as a social activist and student 
movement leader, P analyzed the political culture of Hong 
Kong regarding how an issue has to be framed and politicized 
under a “pure” and “politics-free” environment, as the general 
public has strong negative impression towards political parties 
and political controversies.  Only issues that are framed as 
close to people’s livelihood and “apolitical” could reach the 
critical mass attention and support.   
Social activist, 
Student leader 
N/A 
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Respondent Q 19 Apr 2013 (15:00) 
LegCo Complex 
Building 
With expertise on labor issues and poverty policies towards 
grassroots, Q is a senior LegCo Council member, as well as the 
party leader of Pro-establishment Party E5. 
Q commented that governance crisis in Hong Kong is highly 
dependent on the “bottom line” – if the interest of majority 
Hong Kong people were being affected, the issue would 
substantially become huge social and political crises that could 
destroy the legitimacy of government.  
LegCo and 
District Council 
member 
Leader of 
Party E5 
Note:  
 
All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. 
For political parties, “D” stands for Pan-democrats, “E” stands for Pro-establishment. 
For respondents’ party affiliations, “Leader” stands for President or Vice-President of a party, “Committee member” stands for 
Executive/Central Committee Membership of a party. 
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APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. What was your role in the incident/crisis/event? 
2. Do you think that the incident/crisis/event was successful / serious? 
3. To what extent you think the incident altered government decision? 
4. During the incident/crisis/event, could you observe any critical point? 
5. What are the major goals for social movement? How to achieve such goals? Are 
there any helping hands? 
6. How would you comment on the relationship between mass media and social 
movement? How would you comment on the relationship between political 
party and social movement? 
7. How would you comment on the roles of political parties in current Hong Kong 
polity? 
8. How would you comment on the roles of political parties in crises and scandal? 
9. Under the current political context, what would be the most feasible method to 
alter government decision?  
10. In general, are there any governance crises in Hong Kong currently? Why? 
11. Do you think some issues are being politicized? How would comment on this 
phenomena? 
12. Do you think crises would lead to government change?  
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